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NTRAL ASIAN REVIEW

A quarterly review of cultural developments in the six Muslim republics of the Soviet Union.

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CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW aims at presenting a coherent and objective picture of cultural developments in the six Muslim Soviet Socialist Republics of Azerbaydzhan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tadzhikistan, Kirgizia and Kazakhstan. The subjects treated include history, geography, demography, the arts, education, irrigation and communications.

In addition, the *REVIEW* analyses past and current Soviet publications on the countries bordering on or adjacent to these republics, namely, Persia, Afghanistan, the Indian sub-continent, Tibet and Sinkiang.

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CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW

CONTENTS

	Page
Editorial	338
Soviet Central Asia	
The Partition of Central Asia	341
The Annexation of the Akhal Oasis	352
The Turkic Nationality and Speech in the USSR in 1959 : An Analysis of the Census Results	362
Agitprop : Some Details of Agitation and Propaganda Work in the Muslim Republics	376
Three Recent Central Asian Novels	387
News Digest : Administrative and Territorial Changes ; Conferences ; Education ; Irrigation ; Linguistics ; Press	397
Borderlands	
Herat, 1856-7	403
Russian-Indian Trade in the 18th Century	418
The Position of the Indian Working-Class, 1870-1939	435
Sinkiang, 1928-59	441
The Borderlands in the Soviet Press	458

Vol. VIII, No. 4.

1960

Maps

Irtysh-Karaganda Canal	page	400
Tadzhik dialects and their location	facing ,,	401
Sinkiang	,,	448
Soviet Socialist Republics of Central Asia, Kazakhstan and Azerbaydzhan	at end	

Abbreviations

Abbreviations used in the Review when referring to the Soviet Academies of Sciences, and to newspapers and periodicals etc. employed as sources, are as follows :-

AN/SSSR	Akademiya Nauk (Academy of Sciences) of USSR
AN/Az. SSR	,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, Azerbaydzhan SSR
AN/Kaz. SSR	,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, Kazakh SSR
AN/Kirg. SSR	,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, Kirgiz SSR
AN/Tad. SSR	,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, Tadzhik SSR
AN/Turk. SSR	,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, Turkmen SSR
AN/Uzb. SSR	,, ,, ,, ,, ,, ,, Uzbek SSR
SAGU	Sredneaziatskiy Gosudarstvennyy Universitet (Central Asian State University)
BR	Bakinskiy Rabochiy
IZ	Izvestiya
KP	Kazakhstanskaya Pravda
K	Kommunist
KT	Kommunist Tadzhikistana
KZ	Krasnaya Zvezda
NT	New Times
P	Pravda
PV	Pravda Vostoka
SK	Sovetskaya Kirgiziya
SU	Soviet Union
TI	Turkmenskaya Iskra
VVS	Vedemosti Verkhovnogo Soveta

CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW

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EDITORIAL

The holding of the XXVth International Congress of Orientalists in Moscow marks an important stage in the history of Soviet oriental studies and of Soviet oriental policies in general. If its impact on the various participants and on the world at large was considerably less than the Soviet Government had anticipated, this was certainly not due to any lack of effort on the part of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. The Congress was given very considerable advance publicity in the Soviet press and frequent meetings of ministerial officials and orientalists - one report said every month since 1958 - were held to consider the various organizational aspects of the Congress. Apart from the absence of any kind of common room where delegates could meet each other socially, the administrative arrangements made inside the University for the plenary and special sessions were adequate. That the arrangements made by Intourist fell far short of requirements and evoked loud and frequent complaints, particularly from Western scholars, must be attributed partly to the absence of facilities in Moscow for the accommodation of such a large party of people with widely varying tastes and standards.

Before the Congress there had been some speculation on how the Russians would handle it. Those familiar with Soviet publications on the official attitude to oriental studies and on the part which they ought to play in exposing imperialism and colonialism as practised outside, but not inside, the Soviet Union thought it probable that the XXVth Congress would be less academic than its predecessors and would be given a political angle. Expressions of this opinion brought angry protests from the Soviet sympathizers in Britain and particularly from those whose ignorance of the Russian language prevented them from reading Soviet publications.

In the event, the Congress was given a very definite political setting. In the report in PRAVDA of the opening plenary session it

was remarked that "until recently oriental studies have seemed to be a purely academic science far removed from present-day problems. Today this science finds itself in the thick of current events and this constitutes one of the distinguishing features of the present Congress." This theme was amplified in Mikoyan's opening speech which was almost wholly political and dealt largely with the national liberation movements of the East. In an interview given to PRAVDA on 9 August, B.G. Gafurov, Director of the newly-named Institute of the Peoples of Asia and Africa, was asked to say what the contribution of Soviet orientalists would be. He replied inter alia: "The works of Soviet scientists unmask the false theories of the apologists of colonialism. To groundless hypotheses about 'the white man's mission' and 'the organic backwardness of the East' we oppose the historic truth about the East." Any further confirmation which participants in the opening plenary session might have required about the extent to which Soviet scholarship is harnessed to policy could be found in the inscription which confronted them in the vast auditorium of Moscow University during the plenary sessions. It read as follows: "A Leninist cannot simply be a specialist in his favourite branch of science. He must at the same time be a political and social scientist with a lively interest in the destiny of his country. He must be familiar with the laws of social development and be able to use those laws; he must be an active participant in the political leadership of his country."

By far the most startling event of the Congress was the absence of any representation from the Chinese People's Republic. Soviet advance publicity had spoken of the presence of many hundreds of Chinese scholars as one of the respects in which the Congress would differ from previous ones when only a few Chinese from Formosa had been present. Throughout the opening and closing plenary sessions there was no Soviet mention of the Chinese People's Republic and no reason was given for the absence of its representatives. It is of course possible that the Soviet organizers, not to speak of some of the Asian delegations, may have been relieved at not having to cope with the many problems which a large Chinese delegation would have presented.

It is difficult to speak of the general effect of the Congress on the various participants with any degree of precision. The main Soviet effort was naturally directed towards the Asians and Africans whose number apart from the 115 representatives from the Soviet Eastern Republics, made up only about 15 per cent of the total of members mentioned in the official list. They may well have been impressed by the fine University buildings, by the special attention paid to them, and by the well-organized concerts of oriental songs, dances, and recitations. It is also probable that they were impressed with the wide range of the subjects on which Soviet scholars read papers and by the fact that, unlike those of the Western delegations, a large part

of them dealt with current Asian and African topics. Soviet proficiency in the modern forms of Asian and African languages, too, must have had its effect. But the Soviet organizers were also clearly anxious to please and impress Western orientalists and here they were much less successful. There were many criticisms of Soviet papers as elementary, unoriginal, and as containing too much propaganda. A notable example of the last was the paper read by A.Kh. Babakhodzhayev on "The 1919 Afghan War for Independence". This paper was delivered in Russian and translated sentence by sentence into Pashtu for the benefit of the half-dozen Afghans present, not all of whom seemed to be Pashtu speakers. The whole procedure had been very carefully rehearsed and the paper was simply a piece of violent anti-British and pro-Afghan propaganda designed to fit in with what appears to be the current Soviet policy of currying favour with the Afghans and of trying to damage their relations with the British. Such a performance seemed to be quite out of place in a congress of scholars. It was calculated to give Western orientalists a bad impression of Soviet scholarship as a whole and caused them to underestimate its importance. Another circumstance which contributed to this impression was the Soviet practice of preparing comments on papers submitted by foreigners on the basis of scripts which had been previously submitted to the Soviet Academy of Sciences. In some instances these comments were rendered ridiculous by the fact that many of the scripts had been substantially changed in the meanwhile and Soviet scholars found themselves making sharp attacks on statements which were not in fact made at all.

Whatever the Soviet aim was in respect of Western orientalists, there can be no doubt that these left the Congress with a lower opinion of Soviet oriental scholarship than when they entered it. It is not of course the fault of Soviet scholars that Western orientalists do not know Russian and are thus only able to judge of Soviet scholarship on the basis of the English and other translations of Soviet papers rather than on the great mass of Soviet literature which has not been translated. But the Russians could have done much more to avoid alienating Western goodwill, always provided, of course, that they wish to do so.

Ibn Sina manuscript

A valuable old manuscript of the Uzbek translation of Ibn Sina (Avicenna)'s CANON OF MEDICINE has been presented by a local inhabitant to the Uzbek Historical Museum in Samarkand. The manuscript dates from 1670. PV. 16.9.60

THE PARTITION OF CENTRAL ASIA

The entire political and economic reorganization of Transcaspia, the Steppe Region and Turkestan, and of the former semi-independent states of Bukhara and Khiva, stems from the demarcation (razmezhivaniye) of 1924. A recent book by A.A. Gordiyenko* gives an interesting and significant account of this demarcation and is analysed in the present article.

In 1924, after seven years of Soviet rule, Russian Central Asia was divided into five national areas: the more advanced and more numerous peoples - the Uzbeks and Turkmens - were formed into Soviet Socialist Republics, the smaller and less advanced into Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics (the Tadzhiks) or Autonomous Oblasts (the Kirgiz and the Kara-Kalpaks). Subsequently the Tadzhiks were promoted to an SSR (in 1929), the Kara-Kalpaks to an ASSR (1932) and the Kirgiz to an ASSR (1926) then to an SSR (1936), since when there have been no further changes.

At the time of the Revolution in 1917, Russian Central Asia consisted of three political divisions which cut across divisions of nationality - Russian Turkestan, the Khanate of Khiva, and the Emirate of Bukhara, the first being directly administered by the Russian Government and the last two being internally independent but acknowledging Russian suzerainty. In November 1917 Russian Turkestan fell under Soviet rule, but remained isolated from central Russia by the anti-Communist forces who controlled Siberia, until late in 1919. During this period, with the exception of one incident, Khiva and Bukhara were left unmolested by their revolutionary neighbour and remained still traditional, backward Muslim states. During the period 1917-20 Turkestan was ruled from Tashkent by a government of Bolsheviks and Left

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* SOZDANIYE SOVETSKOY NATSIONAL'NOY GOSUDARSTVENNOSTI V SREDNEY AZII. State Publishing House of Legal Literature, Moscow, 1959. 247pp. 2,000 copies.

SRs who were, to a man, Russian or Jewish or otherwise non-native, and who carried out a policy of extreme oppression of the native population on the theoretical grounds that the natives had no proletariat and therefore could not take part in the dictatorship of the proletariat.

At the end of 1919 permanent communications were re-established between Turkestan and Moscow. A powerful Turkestan Commission (Turkkommissiya) was despatched to Turkestan, which dismissed the heretical and disastrous Tashkent Government and made serious efforts to win over the native population to Communism while at the same time suppressing all separatist tendencies. One of the first actions of the new administration, and of the Red Army which had triumphantly brought it to Turkestan, was to attack Khiva and Bukhara and to establish, in the stead of their autocratic rulers, revolutionary governments. In the years 1920-3, the People's Republics of Khorezm and Bukhara, as they were called, came increasingly into the political and economic sphere of the RSFSR and of their neighbour Turkestan, in spite of the fact that they were guaranteed independence by treaty and that they had been specifically excluded from the Soviet Union when it was established at the end of 1922. For its part, Turkestan was still merely an Autonomous Republic within the RSFSR and not directly a member of the Soviet Union, whose constituent parts were the RSFSR, the Ukraine, Belorussia, and the Transcaucasian Federation.

The same period, 1920-3, had seen the re-conquest by the Soviet regime of Transcaucasia, the establishment in March 1922 of the Transcaucasian Federation (Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaydzhan), and the increasingly centralist rule of the Federation by the Union Government. Opposition to Moscow's centralist rule came to a head in October 1922 with the resignation of the whole Central Committee of the Georgian Communist Party in protest at the high-handedness of the Party's Caucasian Bureau (Kavbyuro) and was voiced for the last time at the XIIth Party Congress held in April 1923. This Congress, however, overwhelmingly approved the centralist tendencies of the Soviet Union and retained the Federation.(1) (It was not until December 1936 that the Transcaucasian Federation was dissolved and the three republics which composed it became individual members of the Soviet Union.)

By the end of 1923 it had evidently become obvious to the Party that the existing political divisions of Central Asia were no longer adequate. The notion of abolishing the Turkestan ASSR and the People's Republics, and of substituting national republics for them, does not seem to have been discussed at the XIIth Party Congress and the idea of national demarcation was first considered by the Party in January 1924 (see below). There can be no doubt that the architect, if not the originator, of the plan was Stalin, the very man who was

responsible for the Transcaucasian Federation. Federation was considered unsuitable for Central Asia, for reasons which have never been given but which almost certainly included the difficulties experienced with the Transcaucasian Federation and, more important, the fact that Central Asia, unlike Transcaucasia, was inhabited by peoples who while differing in language and nationality were yet united by their Muslim faith and Islamic way of life and whose intellectuals had long advocated the idea of a Turkic state. Evidently Stalin saw the best means of welding the national borderlands to the Russian State to be the use of their internal divisions: in the case of Transcaucasia this meant forcing the traditionally hostile Christian and Muslim peoples into one political unit; in the case of Central Asia - breaking down such cultural unity as there existed by creating national states among peoples to whom the concept of nationality was historically unimportant if not unknown. The principle of divide and rule was in fact applied to Central Asia, although this is a phrase which Communist writers and commentators never apply to the Soviet Union and which they invariably condemn as the baneful weapon of Western imperialism, pointing to the Indian sub-continent and to the arbitrary divisions of Africa. For a Communist, however, division by nationality is not only permissible but desirable, whereas division by religious criteria or by imperialist conquest is wholly to be condemned.

. . .

The partition of Central Asia was carried out with comparative ease in the course of about a year and was completed by the end of 1924. It is a subject frequently mentioned in Soviet works but rarely described in detail, and the appearance of A.A. Gordiyenko's book THE CREATION OF SOVIET NATIONAL STATEHOOD IN CENTRAL ASIA, which attempts to give the constitutional history of Central Asia in the period 1917-25, is thus of particular interest. The book is typical of post-Stalinist Soviet historiography: an attempt to use archive material and other primary sources, but to use them extremely selectively, in order to present the material in such a way as to conform to the current official line on the period of history under consideration. Gordiyenko's book contains some extremely interesting material, but much is left unsaid and it is frequently illogical, evasive and diffuse, a result, no doubt, of attempting to fulfil the conflicting demands of modern Soviet historiography.

Gordiyenko starts his book with a standard introduction (pp.3-36): an affirmation of the positive general principles of Soviet nationality policy which guarantees national sovereignty in the Soviet Union, a brief review of previous literature on the national demarcation,

and a brief account of Central Asia before the Revolution showing how the area was exploited by the Tsarist regime and by its native ruling classes, and how on the other hand an alliance grew up between the oppressed Russian immigrant workers and the down-trodden native peoples.

From the October Revolution to 1923

The first chapter, which comprises nearly half the book (pp.37-129) deals with the period from the October Revolution until the end of 1923. It is divided into three sections: Turkestan in 1917-20, Khorezm and Bukhara in 1920, and developments in all three areas between 1920 and 1923. Gordiyenko's attitude to the Tashkent Soviet Government is ambivalent: on the one hand he condemns it for its oppressive policy towards the native population and its "deviations" from the principles of Lenin's nationality policy, but on the other hand he sees the Government as the expression of Soviet rule and thus as historically justified. On 30 April 1918 under pressure from Moscow, the Tashkent Government proclaimed Turkestan to be a Soviet Socialist Republic within the RSFSR, but its relationship to the RSFSR was never defined because communications with Moscow were interrupted by the Civil War. During the latter half of 1918 and for almost the whole of 1919, Turkestan was isolated from central Russia, beset by internal and external enemies, and desperately short of food and other supplies. Gordiyenko describes the anarchy of the period in lurid terms. The settlers were guilty of "great power chauvinism" while among the natives "bourgeois nationalist" ideas were rife. Native Communists such as Ryskulov, the chairman of the Turkestan Central Executive Committee at the end of 1919, believed that the class war had no meaning for the natives whose first aim should have been to liberate themselves from the yoke of the Europeans (this idea in fact originated with Sultan-Galiyev, whom Gordiyenko does not mention). The arrival of the Turkestan Commission in Tashkent in November 1919 radically altered the situation: Ryskulov's plan for a Turkic republic with a Turkic Communist Party was rejected; stern measures, including confiscation and expulsion, were taken against the settlers; the Party and Soviet organizations were purged of unreliable and hostile elements; and Turkestan was proclaimed an Autonomous Republic closely tied to the RSFSR. By the constitution of March 1920, Turkestan was declared to be self-governing in all matters except defence, foreign relations, and the management of the railways and posts and telegraphs. Moreover, the RSFSR Government retained the right to confirm the republic's budget; indeed the economy of Turkestan had to conform to the general plans and laws laid down by the RSFSR.

The second part of Chapter I deals briefly with the establishment of Soviet People's Republics in Bukhara and Khorezm and their develop-

ment until 1924 (pp.99-112). The "full independence" of Khorezm and Bukhara was recognized by the RSFSR in treaties signed with the People's Republics in September 1920 and March 1921 respectively, but so Gordiyenko affirms, both republics in fact relied heavily on the RSFSR for political and economic aid. Military aid too against the Basmachis was perhaps even more important in establishing the dependence of Bukhara and Khorezm on Russia, but Gordiyenko does not mention this.

In the third part, Gordiyenko describes developments in Turkestan and the People's Republics from 1920 to 1923, a period characterized according to him by "acute class struggle" and at the same time by deliberate efforts to draw the native population into the administration and Party. In September 1920 there was held the IXth Congress of Soviets of Turkestan at which "for the first time the majority of delegates were natives". Both the newly formed Central Executive Committee and the new Central Committee of the Communist Party of Turkestan in 1920 had more natives than settlers. At the end of 1920 the Central Committee of the Turkestan Communist Party established three national departments - Uzbek, Kirgiz, and Turkmen - for work among the native population. Similarly the Central Executive Committee formed Kazakh, Uzbek, Turkmen and Kirgiz national departments. In August 1921 the Government of the RSFSR decreed that in principle Turkestan should be administratively divided by nationality: as a result on 7 August 1921 the Transcaspian Oblast was renamed the Turkmen Oblast. Gordiyenko proudly claims that at the XIIth Congress of Turkestan Soviets in January 1924, of the 356 delegates, 226 were native (and 130 settlers) and that at about the same time, of the 12,500 full members and about 9,000 candidate members of the Turkestan Communist Party, 5,843 were Uzbeks, 5,436 were Kazakhs and Kirgiz, 835 Tadzhiks, and 111 Turkmens - a total of 12,225 natives to 9,275 non-natives. But even these figures show a disparate proportion of settlers who probably amounted to one sixth of the population of Turkestan. Gordiyenko admits, however, that in the years 1922 and 1923 only 45 per cent of Soviet and Party workers were native.

During the same period, 1920-3 significant steps were taken to draw the People's Republics into the political and economic orbit of Turkestan and the RSFSR. In February 1922, the Bukharan and Khorezmian Communist Parties were merged into the Russian Communist Party. In May of the same year the Turkestan Bureau (Turkbyuro) - as the Turkestan Commission was then named - was transformed into the Sredazbyuro (Central Asian Bureau) which was given authority over all Communist organizations in Turkestan, Bukhara, and Khorezm. In March 1923 the economies of Turkestan, Bukhara, and Khorezm were unified and a Central Asian Economic Council was established which had authority over all three areas. Its members included representatives of Turkestan, Bukhara,

Khorezm and the RSFSR. The Council unified the monetary and taxation systems, and with the help of extensive credits and equipment from the RSFSR, began to re-develop river and railway transport and to establish industries. (It should be borne in mind that Bukhara and Khorezm were still officially independent and were not yet part of the Soviet Union.) Gordiyenko comments: "The economic unification of the Central Asian republics and the disinterested help given to them by the Russian people were clear demonstrations of the national policy of the Soviet regime in the East and constituted both a guarantee of the successful economic development of Turkestan, Bukhara and Khorezm and a firm basis for the establishment of national peace in Central Asia." (P.127) By the end of 1923, economic and political control over Khorezm and Bukhara was such that in Octoner 1923 Khorezm was declared a "socialist" republic, and in September 1924, Bukhara followed suit. Both republics were apparently then accepted into the Soviet Union, although Gordiyenko does not make this clear.

The national demarcation and the formation of states

In Chapter II Gordiyenko deals with the national demarcation of Central Asia and the formation of the national states. The chapter is divided into four sections: the ethnographic and social-economic reasons for the demarcation (pp.130-55); the process by which the demarcation was carried out (pp.155-200); the legal position of the republics as parts of the Soviet Union (pp.200-12); and the significance of the national demarcation (pp.212-19).

Gordiyenko first answers the question: why, since the political divisions of Central Asia cut across divisions by nationality, was a national demarcation not carried out before? He gives six reasons in answer: firstly, Turkestan developed more quickly towards socialism than Bukhara or Khorezm; secondly the economic backwardness of Khorezm and Bukhara compared with Turkestan; thirdly, the varying stages of development among the different Central Asian peoples; fourthly, national hostility among the various peoples inhabiting Central Asia, the presence of "nationalist deviations", and the shortage of reliable trained Communists; fifthly, "the necessity for a certain period of time in which to carry out certain important social and economic transformations. . . to develop national consciousness. . . and the idea of national demarcation among the native working-class. The national demarcation could take place only in the whole of Central Asia. . . It was impossible to put through this measure in Turkestan only since a large part of the population belonging to the nationalities living there were to be found in the Bukharan and Khorezmian republics. . ." (p.133); sixthly, the extreme shortage or complete absence among the more backward peoples of politically mature trained personnel. It is

noticeable that he does not here mention the fact that Bukhara and Khorezm were still guaranteed independent existence by their treaties with the RSFSR.

Gordiyenko emphasizes that the national demarcation was not an end in itself but rather the means whereby "the working masses would be brought closer to the organs of power. . . and the peoples better organized for the struggle for communism" (p.135).

Before the demarcation could be carried out it was essential to put an end to the economic and cultural inequality that existed among the different peoples. What were the obstacles in the way of this equality? According to Gordiyenko there were three: first, native distrust for the Russians; second the devastation of the country as a result of the Great War, the Revolution and the subsequent Civil War, and the widely differing cultural status of the Central Asia peoples. ("It was impossible because of these differences to establish the necessary single body of laws for all questions of social life, or easily to apply economic planning. . . or to apply a single education system" (p.140)); and third, the existence of national feuds among the Central Asian peoples: Gordiyenko mentions Turkmen-Uzbek hostility in Khorezm and Bukhara, Turkmen-Kazakh hostility in Transcaspia, and Uzbek-Kazakh and Uzbek-Kirgiz hostility in Turkestan and Bukhara. He describes also the national rivalries which existed within the organs of administration and the existence of "Uzbek chauvinism", the Uzbeks being at that time the most advanced of the Central Asian peoples.

Gordiyenko asserts that the Communist Party and Soviet Government had realized the necessity of demarcating Central Asia into national states "even in the first years after the October Revolution", but he says that they had considered that several factors were necessary before this would be possible. These factors were: careful preparation, the firm establishment of Soviet rule and the transformation of Bukhara and Khorezm into socialist republics. Gordiyenko here finds himself in difficulties, for it seems obvious from his quotations from the proceedings of the Turkestan Commission in 1920 (pp.148-50) that it was in fact Ryskulov who had put forward the idea of partition on national lines, although his plan was evidently for national states within a Turkic federation, and that it was the Turkkommissiya which had rejected the plan, a rejection which was confirmed by Lenin.(2) Gordiyenko emphasizes the fact that Lenin, while rejecting Ryskulov's plan, had ordered the Turkkommissiya "to draw up an ethnographical map showing the areas inhabited by the Uzbeks, Kirgiz [i.e. Kazakhs and Kirgiz] and Turkmen" and had further ordered them "to examine in detail the conditions for unifying or partitioning the three areas" (Reviewer's underlining). It is hard to accept, from this evidence, Gordiyenko's assertion that the Party and Government had finally

decided on demarcation from about 1920. Furthermore, Gordiyenko describes how in January 1921 the Kazakh Regional Congress at Auliye-Ata (Dzhambul) had raised the question of the Kazakhs of Turkestan being united with the Kazakh ASSR; yet in "1922-3" they were apparently still petitioning the Party authorities for this. Similarly the Turkmens of Bukhara, Khorezm and Turkestan frequently during the period 1922-3 had asked to be united, but it was not until April 1924, i.e. when the decision had been made to partition Central Asia on national lines that they were at last formed into a Turkmen Oblast.

There can be no doubt that, in spite of Gordiyenko's arguments, the Party did not decide to demarcate Central Asia until the latter half of 1923. Gordiyenko's evidence of the demands by the natives for national unions only confirms this opinion.

The second section of Chapter II describes the measures by which the national demarcation was carried out. On 31 January 1924 the Orgbyuro of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party, "taking into consideration the demands of the working masses for the national demarcation and the formation of national states in Central Asia", appointed Rudzutak, one of the original members of the Turkestan Commission, to examine the problem. During February and March the approval granted, or the decision made, by the Russian Communist Party was echoed in regional Party meetings in Central Asia, when detailed work started on the problem. In April the decision to demarcate was formally approved by the Politbyuro of the Russian Communist Party. On 28 April the Sredazbyuro appointed a special commission to report by 10 May on measures for carrying out the demarcation; this special commission appointed three sub-commissions an Uzbek commission (with Uzbek and Tadzhik representatives), a Turkmen commission, and a Kazakh commission (with Kirgiz and Kazakh representatives). These sub-commissions studied boundaries and made plans for national centres. On 10 May the sub-commissions reported to the Sredazbyuro in favour of national-territorial republics and rejected the plan put forward by the Kazakhs for a Central Asian federation to include the Kazakh ASSR. On 11 May the Sredazbyuro announced the decision to create Uzbek and Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republics which would become full-fledged members of the Soviet Union, and Tadzhik and Kirgiz Autonomous Oblasts; and to unite the Kazakhs of Turkestan with the Kazakh ASSR. The Sredazbyuro then appointed a territorial and an economic commission.

Unexpected opposition, however, came from Khorezm. On 8 May the Khorezmian Party and Government presented the Sredazbyuro with a report in which they declared themselves to be opposed to the national demarcation of Khorezm, and proposed instead that Khorezm as a whole should be included in the USSR. The chief argument for this was that

Khorezm and the Amu-Dar'ya oblast were one economic region "sharply differentiated from the rest of Central Asia both economically and geographically" (p.162). Gordiyenko ascribes the Khorezmian attitude to the secret and wicked schemes of bourgeois nationalists who had wormed their way into the Party. The Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party, however, evidently thought otherwise - at least for a time, and on 12 June the Politbyuro agreed to the demarcation of Turkestan and Bukhara, but "strictly observing the sovereign rights of states and the principles of expression of the will of the people. . . decided to leave the Khorezmian republic outside the plan for demarcation" (p.165). This was not the end of the story, however. Pressure was evidently brought to bear on the Khorezmian Party, although Gordiyenko does not say how, and on 26 July it petitioned the Russian Communist Party to be allowed to be included in the demarcation and asked that, apart from the Kara-Kalpak areas, the republic should be included in Uzbekistan.

With the Politbyuro's decision of 12 June to demarcate Turkestan and Bukhara, the process of demarcation passed from the period of study to the period of application. The Communist Parties of Turkestan and Bukhara were re-formed by nationality, but the Sredazbyuro was retained as the coordinating and directing body. At the end of June the Sredazbyuro appointed a territorial commission with representatives of 16 nationalities which was charged with the organization of political, Party, economic, statistical and national commissions. The tasks of the national commissions were, in the political field, to prepare plans for the republican constitutions, for the new administrations, to prepare election campaigns, and to summon Soviet constituent congresses; in the territorial field, to define state boundaries and administrative divisions; in the economic field, to work out national development plans for all branches of the economy. By September 1924 the new national boundaries had been determined.

Opposition to the national demarcation came, according to Gordiyenko from several directions, apart from the apostasy of the Khorezmians: some Party members accused the Party of "forgetting the basic tasks of socialist construction because of the national borderlands". Some local nationalists, however, went to the other extreme and saw the creation of national states as an end in itself. The Uzbeks and the Kazakhs demanded respectively the formation of a Great Uzbek state and a Great Kazakh state, the Uzbeks wanting to include the Kazakhs of the Syr-Dar'ya and Semirech'ye oblasts, and the Kazakhs wanting the Uzbeks of Syr-Dar'ya and Tashkent to be included in their territory. Moreover, "the Kazakh and the Uzbek representatives demanded the annexation to Uzbekistan of the Kara-Kalpaks of the Amu-Dar'ya oblast, while the Kara-Kalpaks in their turn raised the question of their unification with the Kara-Kalpaks of the Khorezm republic and of

the formation of a Kara-Kalpak autonomous oblast. The Kirgiz nationalists, besides their territorial claims, started talking about the necessity of creating in Central Asia separate 'state formations" of the Kirgiz tribes" (p.168). Another line of opposition came from "bourgeois nationalists in a bloc with the Trotskyites" who demanded that the national demarcation should take place only if a Central Asian Federation were formed. The pan-Islamists and pan-Turkists denied the necessity for uniting the Central Asian peoples into national states, asserting that Central Asia was inhabited by a Turkic nation and should become a Turkic republic. This idea, according to Gordiyenko was favoured particularly by the Uzbek and Tatar intellectuals.

None of these opposition groups were successful, however, and on 15 July the Sredazbyuro published its "theses" on the demarcation of Central Asia together with practical measures by which they were to be applied. Throughout the rest of July and August extensive propaganda was carried out among the local population for the demarcation plan. Evidently this resulted in local unrest since on 31 August the Sredazbyuro criticized the local Party and administrative organs for discussing the local application of the plan rather than its general theoretical principle and ordered them "not to allow public discussions which harmed national relations and which resulted in the decision of an important national problem being reduced to vulgar petty bourgeois nationalism" (pp.177-8). On 6 September the territorial commission of the Sredazbyuro defined the boundaries of the Turkmen and Uzbek republics, and of the Tadzhik and Kirgiz autonomous oblasts. On 15 September the Turkestan Central Executive Committee unanimously passed the law for the demarcation of Turkestan, on 20 September the Bukharan Government, and on 29 September the Khorezmian Government, followed suit.

On 25 September the Politbyuro of the Russian Communist Party having studied all the reports of the Sredazbyuro created a special commission under V.V. Kuybyshev to report on the situation in Central Asia. On 6 October, under the chairmanship of Rudzutak, a conference of Central Asian representatives took place in Moscow which further discussed the demarcation. On 11 October the Politbyuro finally took the decision for the national demarcation of Central Asia. It was then confirmed that Tashkent should belong to Uzbekistan, that the Kara-Kalpak Autonomous Oblast should be part of the Kazakh ASSR, that the Tadzhiks should be formed into an ASSR, not an AO as was first suggested and should be part of the Uzbek SSR. On 14 October the decision of the Politbyuro was confirmed by the All-Union Central Executive Committee which further specified that the Kirgiz AO should be part of the RSFSR (for reasons which Gordiyenko does not give).

During November Revolutionary Committees were set up in each new national state to administer it until the formation of the new national governments. These committees made the final decisions on details of the new boundaries and made preparations for the election of soviets. By February 1925 the work of the revolutionary committees was completed and government by soviets took over in the new republics. Thus, in just one year a radical and highly revolutionary measure was put through which totally altered the map of Central Asia without apparently causing any undue disturbances.

In the concluding sections of Chapter II, Gordiyenko considers the legal position of the Central Asian republics in terms of their constitutions and the constitutions of the USSR, and the significance in general terms of the demarcation. In his Conclusion (pp.220-47) he briefly describes the economic and cultural development of the republics since the demarcation.

Notes

(1) See Richard Pipes, THE FORMATION OF THE SOVIET UNION. Harvard, 1954, pp.263-82.

(2) See LENINSKIY SBORNIK, Vol.XXXIV, 1942, pp.323-6 for Lenin's comments on the Turkestan Commission's plan of 13 June 1920. This is partly quoted by Gordiyenko pp.148-50.

Russian translation of Muhammad Sadiq's work

Muhammad Sadiq's geographical work on the Khanate of Bukhara has been translated into Russian and edited by A.E. Madzhi. Muhammad Sadiq (known also as Gulshani) completed the book in 1909. Its importance lies in the fact that it is the first of its kind to be written by a local author. The book is divided into eight sections (a vilayet to each) instead of the usual division of the Khanate into 25 bekstvo; it contains a separate section on the economy of Bukhara and another devoted to the description of archaeological monuments. The book is to be published by the Tadzhik Academy of Sciences. KT. 6.9.60

THE ANNEXATION OF THE AKHAL OASIS BY RUSSIA

Sources - The Akhal oasis - British interests in Akhal in the 1870s - Russo-Teke relations in 1873-8 - Subjugation of the Tekes - Conclusion.

Sources

The Akhal oasis, unlike the rest of the Turkmen lands, was "united" with Russia as a result of armed conquest which served as a prelude to the annexation of Merv (now Mary). These conquests consolidated the position of Russia in Central Asia.

Three main sources have been used in compiling this article: "The Annexation of the Akhal Oasis to Russia" by D. Davletov (IZVESTIYA AKADEMII NAUK TURKMENSKOY SSR, SERIYA OBSHCHESTVENNYKH NAUK, No.2, 1960), whose main concern is to analyse the relations between Russia and the Teke Turkmens on the eve of the conquest. It is based on a variety of sources including MSS. in the Central State Military and Historical Archives (Military Academy) and the Central State Historical Archives of the Georgian SSR. The second part of Volume 1 of the ISTORIYA TURKMENSKOY SSR (ed. A. Karryyev and others, Ashkhabad, 1957) contains a description of the two campaigns culminating in the fall of Geok-Tepe in 1881. While Davletov follows the traditional Soviet interpretation of the attitude of the Central Asians to the annexation (strongly emphasized at the Historical Conference in Tashkent in May 1959, see CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW, 1959, Nos. 3-4) and says that the mass of the population was well-disposed towards the great Russian people, even if it was temporarily led astray by feudal and clerical elements, the ISTORIYA takes a much more moderate view, which will be quoted below. Both works denounce anti-Russian intrigues of British "agent provocateurs". It is typical that, while nothing improper is seen in the Russians conquering other people's land, all manifestations of British interest in it are represented as the basest possible intrigues on the part of the "imperialists" and "colonizers". Edmund O'Donovan, special correspondent of the London DAILY NEWS, is seen as the main villain in the crucial years 1879-81. In these circumstances his two-volume THE

MERV OASIS: TRAVELS AND ADVENTURES EAST OF THE CASPIAN DURING THE YEARS 1879-80-81 (London 1882) provides a useful check on the more fantastic episodes described by Davletov and the ISTORIYA.

The Akhal oasis

In the 19th century the Tekes were divided into two territorial groups settled in the Akhal and Murgab oases. In both of them the two main tribal branches of the Tekes were represented: the Otamysh and Tokhtamysh. About the middle of the century the Tekes had finally dislodged the remnants of the earlier Turkic and Iranian inhabitants of the oasis and became almost its sole masters.

The oasis lies along the northern slopes of the Kopet-Dag and occupies the southern border of the Karakum Sands. It stretches from Kizyl-Arvat in the west to Gyaurs in the east, a distance of 250 kilometres. Its width varies between 9-20 kilometres. The land is irrigated by a large number of streams and small rivers flowing from the Kopet-Dag, and the population engaged in agriculture and cattle-breeding. In 1887 there were 7,904 households with a population of 32,990 Turkmens and 1,700 others (G.N. Curzon, RUSSIA IN CENTRAL ASIA IN 1889, London, 1889, p.73). The position of the oasis across the route of Persian, Khivan and Turkmen raids was emphasized by its 43 fortresses and many fortified villages.

British interests in Akhal in the 1870s

"Akhal, a strategically important region from the point of view of the Russo-British rivalry in Central Asia, played a very important part in British colonizing schemes. For this reason all Russian plans and undertakings concerning Akhal were regarded with hostility by the governing circles of Britain." (Davletov, p.43.)

Davletov says that after the Russian conquest of Khiva in 1873 British agents were busy on the Persian-Turkmen frontier and incited the Turkmens against Russia. They encouraged "religious fanaticism", bribed the khans and ishans (sheiks or spiritual guides) and promised British military and financial help against Russia. Prominent among them was Captain Napier who in the summer of 1876 appeared at Bojnurd in Persian territory near Akhal. To make the situation more complicated, the British tried to get Persia interested in her Turkmen neighbours and suggested that a confederation of Turkmen tribes should be formed to resist the attempts of Russia to extend her Central Asian frontier. At British inspiration in the summer of 1876 the Shah, through Abdul Huseyn Khan, the ruler of Kuchan, established relations with the Teke khans and informed them that, if they acknowledged

allegiance to the Shah, he would not let the Russians disturb them. Subsequently Abdul Huseyn Khan and forty Turkmen notables went to Tehran to discuss the matter with the Shah. Although no agreement was reached, Russia felt alarmed and General Lomakin was ordered to capture Kizyl-Arvat in the spring of 1877.

On 12 May 1877 the first skirmish between the Russians and the Teke took place near Kizyl-Arvat. "The provocative anti-Russian activities of British agents and their myrmidons, the feudal Persian rulers and individual representatives of the Teke reactionary leaders managed to induce the backward part of the Akhal population to offer armed resistance to the Russian troops." (Davletov, p.45.)

The skirmish was followed by a British note, dated 9 July 1877, to the Russian Government which warned Russia against "evil consequences which might result from the present operations of the Russian army in the Turkmen steppes". (Central State Military and Historical Archive, Military Academy, MS. No.6899, fol.57.)

"In the Persian territories bordering upon Akhal the notorious British agents, Captain Napier, Captain Butler, Colonel Stewart, Captain Gill (Gill'), O'Donovan and others, started their rabid anti-Russian activities. Their strenuous intrigues could not but produce results in the end. As early as the beginning of 1878 General Lomakin reported that, induced by British agents, 'the Teke have completely stopped all their dealings with us, keep strict guards everywhere and do not let anybody pass from their side into ours and from ours into theirs'."

"Through some Teke khans and ishans who were their paid agents, the British imperialists even managed to organize a number of assaults on Russian posts. In some cases British agents who had penetrated into Akhal personally led such attacks, for example the Teke attack on the Chekishlyar post on 24 December 1878." (Davletov, p.45.)

Russo-Teke relations in 1873-8

The conquest of Khiva in 1873 opened for Russia the way into Turkmenia. "In these years the Teke were not united in their attitude towards Russia. The main reason for this was the prevalence of feudal particularism and internecine dissension. The feudal and tribal aristocracy - khans, chieftains and leaders of the reactionary Muslim clergy - were swayed by class interests and deliberately fostered this discord and strife. . . It is understandable that in such circumstances the attitude of the Akhal inhabitants to Russia was not uniform, although the mass of the toiling population wished to establish

friendly relations with the Russians which would be advantageous to both sides. This explains why, while supporters of rapprochement with Russia sent their representatives to the Russians with peaceful proposals, their antagonists tried to oppose them by all means and raided Russian posts and the settlements of the coastal Turkmens who rendered various services to the Russians." (Davletov, pp.38-39.)

In October 1874 a delegation from the inhabitants of strongholds close to Russian territory (Kizyl-Arvat, Kodzh, Zau, Kizyl-Cheshme and Bami) came to Krasnovodsk. Its leader, Sofi Khan, told Lomakin: "Our people have had more than enough of these continuous quarrels and disorder. Without your help we shall not have peace. Moreover, trade caravan traffic between the Tekes and Krasnovodsk is indispensable to all of us. We are short of the basic necessities of life: apart from wheat and sheep we have nothing and Khiva and Merv are far away." (Davletov, p.39.)

At this juncture the "anti-Russian party" led, significantly, by "inveterate brigands" Aman Ali Kaga, Bektash Shikh, Kepek Serdar and others, took steps to frustrate the negotiations. They raided Dashly-Kabil, a village 35-40 kilometres from Krasnovodsk inhabited by Yomuts loyal to Russia: "But, in spite of all the efforts of the anti-Russian party, it could not destroy the desire of the majority of the population of the oasis wishing to end arbitrary rule and internal discord and quarrels, and establish friendly relations with the Russians." (Davletov, p.39.)

The ISTORIYA, on the other hand, is not so sure about the desires of the Akhal-Teke. It says that, apart from the reactionary elements, "a large part of the toiling population of Akhal for good reasons feared the coming of Russian troops, seeing in them another conqueror. The haughty conduct of Tsarist generals and officials, outrages suffered only too often by Turkmen representatives in the Russian camp, and all sorts of requisitions and extortions practised by Tsarist authorities, particularly mass requisition of camels, kibitkas and foodstuffs for the troops, which sometimes degenerated into plain robbery, all this alienated from Tsarist Russia her former Teke adherents. . . The Tsarist Government, when sending troops to Turkmenia, did not do so to promote the interests of the Russian and Turkmen peoples, but to gratify its own predatory and colonizing aspirations." (P.123.)

In 1875 the Tsarist authorities had no intention of fighting the Tekes and tried to befriend them. Thus at the beginning of the summer of 1875 Lomakin obtained from Khiva three Teke children who had been captives there and returned them with gifts to Akhal, while his letter invited the oasis dwellers to maintain peaceful relations with Russian

territory. This favourably impressed the Tekes, and the "reactionaries", feeling the ground slipping from under their feet, held a council (maslahat) at the beginning of June. They decided to release the Yomut captives taken at Dashly-Kabil and to send messengers to the Russians and the khan of Khiva to express their "complete submission". This opened a short period of peaceful coexistence between the Russians and the Tekes. From all over Akhal chieftains and khans of fortresses came to Lomakin to offer their services and the Tekes brought their goods for sale in the Russian camp where a temporary bazaar was set up.

On 22 June a Teke delegation delivered to the Russians a letter from the four Khans, rulers of Akhal. It declared that, since Khiva, Bukhara, Afghanistan, Kurdistan and Persia wished to annex Akhal but found it difficult, they had raided and plundered the oasis. This being so, "we have decided that the only way to stop this difficult situation and save ourselves from all such attempts is to become subject to the great Russian "Ak-padishah" (White King) who is the most powerful of all rulers, and to request him to take our people under his exalted and gracious protection." They also asked that trade relations should be established between the Tekes and Russia and expressed their readiness to serve in the Russian army. (Davletov, pp. 40-41.) Lomakin, however, did not know how to deal with this emergency and answered the Tekes that he would report their request to the Tsar.

Thus in the summer of 1875 Russia could have easily annexed Akhal but the Tsarist Government had no clear conception of what its future administrative relationship to Russia should be. The situation was further complicated by the fact that Russia feared annexation would worsen her relations with Britain. As for the Tekes, they were willing even to become subject to the Khan of Khiva as a "servant of the White Tsar" and upon receiving Lomakin's indecisive answer, they sent a letter to the Khan requesting him to take Akhal under his protection. The Khan submitted the letter to the commander of the Amu-Dar'ya Military Department, Colonel Ivanov, and on his advice sent to Akhal at the end of the year a certain Musa Mutavali to govern the oasis as his deputy.

The chiefs of the Caucasus Military Department, including Lomakin, were against Khivan government of Akhal for the Khan was too weak to maintain his supremacy over the Tekes. Lomakin wished to replace it in Akhal with a "people's government", i.e. one conducted by a specially appointed khan who would act as a middleman between the Russians and the Tekes and carry out instructions from Russian authorities. As a candidate for that post he selected Nurberdy Khan, whom he took to be the head of the pro-Russian Tekes, and directed the

Akhal population to send all their announcements and petitions to Krasnovodsk only through him. (Davletov, p.42.) Lomakin's reliance on Nurberdy was later to prove unfounded.

The four Akhal Khans resented the favours bestowed on Nurberdy Khan by Lomakin, especially as the Khan's position was strengthened when at Lomokin's urgent request Musa Mutavali returned to Khiva. Once more unrest started in Akhal and spread throughout the Transcaspian district so that caravan traffic between Khiva and Krasnovodsk had to stop. To relieve the situation, Lomakin proposed to march at the head of an armed force to Ashkhabad, the centre of Akhal, and there call a meeting of Teke notables and induce them to elect a khan to be their sole ruler. But the Russian Government rejected this plan fearing that it would lead to an armed conflict with the Tekes and necessitate large expenditure on increasing the Russian army in Transcaspia; moreover, the Balkan situation was strained and Russia had no wish to endanger further her relations with Britain. Thus in the spring of 1876 Lomakin was forbidden from carrying out his scheme. This reluctance on the part of Russia made a bad impression on the Tekes and "the result was that anti-Russian sentiments spread in Akhal and subsequently they were exploited by British colonizers to further their imperialist aspirations directed against Russia." (Davletov, p.43.)

One of those "agents" was Captain Butler who in 1878 was sent by the Viceroy of India, Lord Lytton, to superintend the work on fortifying the chief Akhal fortress of Geok-Tepe. "To the same period belong the activities of a British agent provocateur O'Donovan among the Turkmens of the Gyurgen valley, who travelled about in the capacity of a correspondent of the DAILY NEWS." (ISTORIYA, p.124.) [As can be gathered from O'Donovan's book, he did nothing sinister on his travels.] All this had some influence on the Tekes' anti-Russian sentiments and O'Donovan wrote that ". . . I could not help thinking, and I had grounds for doing so, that they [Turkmens] were allowed by the Government of Lord Beaconsfield to base their hopes of aid on something more substantial than their own illusions. Certainly while there still existed any possibility of coming in hostile contact with Russia over the Cabul question, no better policy could have been adopted than that of allowing the Turcomans to hope that British soldiers might march from Herat to their assistance. And I feel convinced that they were not only allowed to believe it, but that it was directly told them. Finding themselves on the horns of a dilemma in which they might either fight alone or submit, they decided to try the former alternative, and then, if worsted, to turn round and join heartily with Russia in any movements she might consequently make eastward." (Vol.1, pp.468-9.)

The ISTORIYA adds, "in order to prevent the advance of the Tsarist troops in Turkmenistan, British agents tried by every means to hamper

the gathering of food supplies for the army, provoked disorders in the border districts of Persia, etc. The British attempted to induce the Persian Government to take action against Russia and they openly threatened the Shah that, should he suffer Russian troops to occupy Akhal, Britain would seize one of the islands in the Persian Gulf." (P.124.)

Subjugation of the Tekes

In these circumstances the anti-Russian party gained the upper hand in Akhal. The maslahat decided to prohibit the Russians from entering the oasis and the ancient stronghold of Geok-Tepe was fortified. The war started with a series of minor skirmishes fought in 1877-8 in western Turkmenia and the Kizyl-Arvat region. In 1879 Lomakin led the first Turkmen expedition and on 28 August the Russians unsuccessfully stormed Geok-Tepe, losing some 450 men killed and wounded.

From the point of view of the Russian Government the failure was very serious since "just in this period of transition from capitalism to the imperialist stage British expansion towards Afghanistan and Central Asia reached its peak." (ISTORIYA, p.125.) In 1878 the Second Afghan War broke out and in the early 1880s Britain assumed the control of the Emir's internal policy. This enabled the "British colonizers to try to forestall Tsarist Russia in conquering Turkmenistan". (Ibid.) They intrigued among the Turkmen tribes and in the Emirate of Bukhara, and "by bribing influential members of the feudal-bay leadership and clergy and by various anti-Russian provocations they tried to prevent further development of Russo-Turkmen relations and hinder the growing Russian orientation of the Turkmens, in order to prepare the way for subjugating Turkmen lands by imperialist Britain or the feudal oriental rulers, Turkmen neighbours, who were dependent on her." (Ibid.)

The ISTORIYA maintains that the Minister of War, Milyutin, understood the importance of Akhal in the British "colonizing" schemes and emphasized that it must be occupied by Russia if British influence should not spread in the future to the lands bordering upon the Caspian. Another Turkmen expedition was decided upon and General Skobelev who had lately distinguished himself during the Turkish war was appointed its head.

On 28 May the Russians captured Khodzha-Kala; in June Karry-Kala and Bami were taken. A railway line from Krasnovodsk was put under construction in order to supply the troops. In spite of the initial Russian success, the majority of the population supported its anti-

Russian leaders: the Khan of Akhal and Merv Nurberdy Khan (who in 1870 had been thought by Lomakin to be pro-Russian), his son Makhtumkuli Khan, Tykma Serdar, Kurbanmurad Ishan and others.

On 23 December the siege of Geok-Tepe started. In spite of great losses inflicted by Russian cannon fire the Tekes, helped by their compatriots from Merv, bravely defended the fortress. Finally, on 12 January 1881 part of the wall was destroyed by a mine and the fortress was taken. From a place in the mountains surrounding the Geok-Tepe plain the disaster was watched by O'Donovan who had originally intended to accompany the Russian forces on their march from Krasnovodsk and was refused Skobelev's permission. (ISTORIYA, pp.126-7.)

The fall of Geok-Tepe was followed by the capture of the village of Ashkhabad by the Russians on 18 January. The campaign was over and Akhal in Russian hands. Now Merv became the centre of the anti-Russian Tekes who still hoped that British help would save them from the Russians, but by 1884 they saw the futility of their expectations and Merv submitted to the Russians.

Conclusion

The fall of Geok-Tepe and the capture of Akhal by Russia sealed the fate of all the Turkmen lands, since the Teke disaster discouraged the chiefs of the still free districts from thinking of armed resistance. The result was that the rest of Turkmenistan was "united" in a "peaceful" way.

In spite of the bloodshed involved, Davletov believes that the conquest of Akhal was of "progressive value": "The toiling people of the Akhal and Tedzhen-Merv oases, who had for a long time inclined towards rapprochement with Russia, now saw a chance to realize their hopes of being saved from the oppression and arbitrary rule of their khans and the neighbouring feudal rulers. This is the chief reason why the annexation of Atek [district to the east of Akhal] and the Tedzhen-Merv lands to Russia was carried out peacefully." (P.46.) This reasoning, however, is difficult to reconcile with what Davletov says higher up on the same page - that in the conquered districts of Turkmenia the Tsarist authorities oppressed the population with all sorts of extortions and requisitions and, if the Turkmens resisted, force was used and hundreds of daykhan (peasant) holdings were ravaged. Thus he gives no satisfactory explanation why the Turkmens preferred this sort of oppression to that inflicted by their own native khans.

The end of his article is typical of all historical articles of its type: "Finally, it should be observed that, though the annexation

of Akhal to Russia was achieved by means of armed conquest, owing to its objective results and consequences it had great progressive importance and initiated a new historical epoch in the development of the Turkmen people." (P.47.)

An interesting commentary on the aftermath of the annexation of the Akhal oasis is provided by Lord Curzon in his RUSSIA IN CENTRAL ASIA. During his visit to Transcaucasia and Central Asia in 1888 Curzon recounts how in Baku he saw "drawn up on the landing-stage to greet the Governor-General a number of gorgeously-clad Turkmen,* robed in magnificent velvet or embroidered khalats, and their breasts ablaze with decorations. They, too, had come over to be presented to the Tsar. At the head of the line stood a dignified-looking Turkmen, with an immense pair of silver epaulettes on his shoulders. This, the general told me, was Makhtumkuli Khan, son of the famous Teke chieftain Nurberdy Khan by an Akhal wife, the hereditary leader of the Vekhil or Eastern division of the Merv Tekes, and the chief of the Akhal Tekes in Geok-Tepe at the time of the siege. Reconciled to Russia at an early date, he was taken to Moscow to attend the coronation of the Tsar in 1883, and is now a full colonel and Governor of the Tedzhen oasis - where but lately, in the exercise of his administrative powers, he, a Turkmen and an old Russian enemy, arrested a Russian captain serving under his command. And yet this was the man who, in 1881, told Edmund O'Donovan that 'it was the intention of himself and his staunch followers to fight to the last should Merv be invaded by the Russians, and if beaten to retire into Afghanistan. If not well received there, they proposed asking an asylum within the frontiers of British India.' Adjoining him stood his younger brother, Yusuf Khan, son of Nurberdy by his famous Merv wife, Gur Jemal, a boy of fifteen or sixteen at the time of O'Donovan's visit, but now a Russian captain; Maili Khan and Sari Batir Khan, chiefs of the Sichmaz and Bakshi, two others of the four tribes of Merv; old Murad Beg, leader of the Beg subdivision of the Toktamish clan, who conducted O'Donovan to the final meeting of the Great Council; and, mirabile dictu, Baba Khan himself, son of the old conqueror Kushid Khan, and hereditary leader of the Toktamish, the one-eyed Baba, who led the English party at Merv in 1881, and, in order to demonstrate his allegiance to the Queen, branded his horses with V.R. reversed and imprinted upside down. The three last-named are now majors in the Russian service. Baba's

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* The spelling of proper names has been altered to accord with that used in the article.

colleague of the Triumvirate of 1881, Niyaz Khan, is also a Russian officer, but did not appear to be present. The old Ikhtyar at the date of O'Donovan's arrival, Qajar Khan, who led the forlorn anti-Russian movement in 1884, is detained in St. Petersburg. Gur Jemal, the elderly matron and former chieftainess, of whom I have spoken, and whose potent influence was so diplomatically enlisted by Russia prior to the annexation of Merv, was also in Baku, waiting to receive the compliments, to which she was unquestionably entitled, from the lips of the Emperor. There were also present the Khans of the Sarik and Salor Turkmens of Iolatan', Sarakhs, and Penjdeh, and some imposing Kazakh notabilities with gorgeous accoutrements and prodigiously high steeple-crowned hats. The delegation brought with them rich carpets and a collection of wild animals as presents to the Emperor, who in return loaded them with European gifts and arms, and said in the course of his speech that he hoped to repay their visit to Merv in 1889 or 1890.

"I do not think that any sight could have impressed me more profoundly with the completeness of Russia's conquest, or with her remarkable talents of fraternization with the conquered, than the spectacle of these men (and among their thirty odd companions who were assembled with them, there were doubtless other cases as remarkable), only eight years ago the bitter and determined enemies of Russia on the battlefield, but now wearing her uniform, standing high in her service, and crossing to Europe in order to salute as their sovereign the Great White Tsar. Skobelev's policy of 'Hands all round' when the fight is over, seems to have been not one whit less successful than was the ferocious severity of the preliminary blow." (Pp.131-3.)

Tolstoy in Kirgiz

On the 50th anniversary of L.N. Tolstoy's death several of his books are to be translated into Kirgiz. The SEVASTOPOL STORIES has just been published and translations of CHILDHOOD, BOYHOOD and YOUTH are under preparation. P. 11.8.60

Death of Kirgiz composer

Karamoldo Orozov, "outstanding composer and popular artist of Kirgizia", died on 8 July 1960 aged 77. He was talented and well-known improviser and komuz player (a string pizzicato instrument), and composed many popular tunes for the komuz. In recognition of his services to the cultural life of Kirgizia he was elected a deputy to the Kirgiz Supreme Soviet and was awarded the Red Banner of Labour and the Badge of Honour. SK. 9.7.60

TURKIC NATIONALITY AND TURKIC SPEECH IN THE USSR IN 1959

AN ANALYSIS OF THE CENSUS RESULTS

By

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I. General Observations - II. Turkic Nationalities - III. Turkic Languages.

I. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

A report on the broad features of the numbers and distribution of the nationalities and languages of the USSR, based on the all-Union Census of 15 January 1959, was given in the Soviet official press of 4 February 1960.

From this report it is possible to gain a fairly full and a fairly accurate picture of the numbers and distribution of the people who are members of the different Turkic nationalities and who speak the different Turkic languages. It is still impossible, for reasons which will be apparent later, to obtain an absolutely complete picture.

It seems desirable in the first instance, therefore, merely to record the official Soviet statistics and to arrange, without comment, the statistical information so as to make the fullest possible deductions from them. Conjecture about details, comparison with earlier censuses, references to other sources of information and comment have been left, with one exception, for a supplementary article.

Information about the nationalities and languages of the USSR is given in two tables, each of two columns, in Section II of the official report. We shall refer to these as Table I and Table II.

Table I

Column 1 108 named nationalities of the USSR and the single classification 'Other Nationalities'.
The nationalities are listed in decreasing numerical order. The 'Nationalities of Dagestan' and 'Nationalities of the North' are treated as two units in this list, but are subdivided into 10 and 20 separate nationalities respectively under the two general headings. The 108 nationalities mentioned above include these separate nationalities of Dagestan and the North.
The total population of the named nationalities is 208,806,000; that of the 'Other Nationalities' is 17,000. These form 99.99 and 0.01 per cent respectively of the total population of the USSR. The figures for the nationalities are given in thousands, except for 10 of the 'Nationalities of the North' - nine of which are for numbers below 2,000 - and 11 others which range in numbers from 14,700 (Slovaks) to 600 (Tofalar) where figures are given to the hundred.

Column 2 The percentage of each nationality regarding the language of that nationality as its mother tongue. The percentage figures are given to the first place of decimals.

Table II

Column 1 A list of the 15 Soviet Socialist Republics with the total population and, in general, the major national composition of each.

Column 2 The percentage of the total population of the republic which each named nationality comprises.

Three general observations may be made at this stage. Firstly, in Table I the total population of the USSR is given as 208,827,000. The total obtained by adding the figures for the 108 named nationalities is 208,806,000. If the number for 'Other Nationalities', 17,000, is added to this, the total of 208,823,000 is reached. The discrepancy of 4,000 between the two figures for the total population of the USSR is doubtless due to the rounding off of individual nationality figures and is so small in proportion to the total population - it is in fact about 0.002 per cent of the total population - that it can be ignored. It is clear that all the population of the USSR is included in the list of nationalities.

Secondly, in Table II only certain nationalities are recorded for each republic. The exact distribution of nationality by republic for

any nationality except Russian - which is quoted for all republics - cannot, therefore, be ascertained. The difference between the total USSR figure for a given nationality in Table I and the sum of the figures for the same nationality given under the individual republics in Table II represents the numbers of that nationality in unnamed areas. This is clearly a fact of some importance.

Thirdly, since only selected nationalities are given in Table II, the point at which nationalities cease to be recorded for each republic and the percentage of the total population of each republic which is unrecorded is not without significance for a full understanding of the problem of distribution. But this, being a matter of conjecture, is not dealt with here.

It should be noted that the nationality of children is given as that of their parents; but if the parents are of different nationalities and cannot decide the nationality of their children, preference is given to the nationality of the mother.*

II. TURKIC NATIONALITIES

Of the 108 named nationalities of the USSR, 23 are Turkic. The total number of people of Turkic nationality is found, by addition of the individual figures, to be 23,099,500; or, in round figures, 23,100,000. This is 11.1 per cent of the total population of the USSR.

In the following Table 'A', columns (b) and (c) are taken from Table I: columns (a) and (d) have been calculated.

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* VSESOYUZNAYA PEREPIS' NASELENIYA 1959 GODA (Moscow, 1958), p.41.

Table A

Turkic Nationalities in the USSR

(a) Numerical order	(b) Nationality	(c) Number (thousands)	(d) Percentage of total population of USSR
4	Uzbek	6,004	2.9
5	Tatar	4,969	2.4
6	Kazakh	3,581	1.7
7	Azerbaydzhani	2,929	1.4
14	Chuvash	1,470	Under 1
19	Turkmen	1,004	
20	Bashkir	983	
21	Kirgiz	974	
33	Yakut	236	
36	Kara-Kalpak	173	Under 0.1
40	Kumyk	135	
42	Gagauz	124	
46	Tuvin	100	
47	Uygur	95	
49	Karachay	81	
54	Khakass	57	
55	Altay	45	
56	Balkar	42	
57	Nogay	41	
58	Turk	35	
71	Shor	15	Under 0.01
84	Karaim	5.9	
106	Tofalar	0.6	
	Total	23,099.5	11.1

Nationalities 1 - 3 are: Russian 114,588, 54.9 per cent; Ukrainian 36,981, 17.7 per cent; Belorussian 7,829, 3.7 per cent. These three comprise 76.3 per cent of the entire population of the USSR.

Nationalities 8 -13 are: Armenian 2,787; Georgian 2,650; Lithuanian 2,326; Jewish 2,268; Moldavian 2,214 and German 1,619.

Nationalities 15-18 are: Latvian 1,400; Tadzhik 1,397; Polish 1,380 and Mordvinian 1,285.

The Turkic nationalities may be classified by republics by abstracting the necessary data from Table II, columns 1 and 2. Details are given in Table 'B' below, together with statistics for the total population and the Russian population for purposes of comparison.

Table B

Turkic Nationalities by Republics

(a) Republic	(b) Nationality	(c) Number (thousands)	(d) Percentage of total population of the republic
RSFSR*	Total population	117,534	100
	Russian	97,845	83.2
	Tatar	4,077	3.5
	Chuvash	1,436	1.2
	Bashkir	948	0.8
	Kazakh	383	0.3
	Yakut	235	0.2
	Tuvin	100	0.08
	Azerbaydzhani	71	0.06
	Khakass	56	0.05
	Altay	45	0.04
	Recorded Turkic	7,351	6.2

* 'Nationalities of Dagestan' are included in the list of nationalities of the RSFSR. Since these include the two Turkic nationalities of Kumyk and Nogay, the total figures and the percentage of the recorded Turkic nationalities are certainly too small. Estimates of the numbers of the Kumyk and Nogay depend on the following figures (in thousands):

Table I:	'Nationalities of Dagestan' (Total USSR)	945
	of which, Kumyk	135
	Nogay	41
Table II:	'Nationalities of Dagestan' (RSFSR only)	795
	Lezgin (Azerbaydzhan only)	98

It is possible that all the Kumyk and Nogay are located within the RSFSR; in this case the total recorded Turkic population would be 7,527 or 6.4 per cent of the total population of the republic. A rather more accurate estimate may result from the following line of reasoning:

Total Dagestan nationalities in USSR	945
Lezgin in Azerbaydzhan	98
Therefore Dagestan nationalities less Lezgin in Azerbaydzhan	847

795 of these 847 (i.e. 94 per cent) live in RSFSR. If it is assumed that the separate peoples of the Dagestan nationalities live in the RSFSR in the same proportion as they do in the rest of the area of 'USSR minus Azerbaydzhan', it can be estimated that 127 Kumyk and 39 Nogay (i.e. 94 per cent of 135 and 41 respectively) live in the RSFSR. On this basis the totals for recorded Turkic nationalities should be 7,517; the percentage of the total population is still, however, 6.4.

UKRAINE SSR	Total population	41,869	100
	Russian	7,400	17.7
	Turkic not Recorded		
BELORUSSIA SSR	Total population	8,055	100
	Russian	729	9.1
	Turkic not Recorded		
UZBEK SSR	Total population	8,106	100
	Russian	1,101	13.6
	Uzbek	5,026	62.0
	Tatar	445	5.5
	Kazakh	335	4.1
	Kara-Kalpak	168	2.1
	Kirgiz	92	1.1
	Turkmen	57	0.7
	Recorded Turkic	6,123	75.5

KAZAKH SSR	Total population	9,310	100
	Russian	4,014	43.1
	Kazakh	2,755	29.6
	Tatar	192	2.1
	Uzbek	137	1.5
	Uygur	60	0.6
	Recorded Turkic	3,144	33.8
GEORGIA SSR	Total population	4,044	100
	Russian	438	10.8
	Azerbaydzhani	157	3.9
	Recorded Turkic	157	3.9
AZERBAYDZHAN SSR	Total population	3,698	100
	Russian	515	13.9
	Azerbaydzhani	2,481	67.1
	Recorded Turkic	2,481	67.1
LITHUANIA SSR	Total population	2,711	100
	Russian	231	8.5
	Turkic not Recorded		
MOLDAVIA SSR	Total population	2,885	100
	Russian	293	10.2
	Gagauz	96	3.3
	Recorded Turkic	96	3.3
LATVIA SSR	Total population	2,093	100
	Russian	556	26.6
	Turkic not Recorded		

KIRGIZ SSR	Total population	2,066	100
	Russian	624	30.2
	Kirgiz	837	40.5
	Uzbek	219	10.6
	Tatar	56	2.7
	Kazakh	20	1.0
	Uygur	14	0.7
	Recorded Turkic	1,146	55.5
TADZHIK SSR	Total population	1,980	100
	Russian	263	13.3
	Uzbek	454	23.0
	Tatar	57	2.9
	Kirgiz	26	1.3
	Kazakh	13	0.6
	Recorded Turkic	550	27.8
ARMENIA SSR	Total population	1,763	100
	Russian	56	3.2
	Azerbaydzhani	108	6.1
	Recorded Turkic	108	6.1
TURKMEN SSR	Total population	1,516	100
	Russian	263	17.3
	Turkmen	924	60.9
	Uzbek	125	8.3
	Kazakh	70	4.6
	Tatar	30	2.0
	Recorded Turkic	1,149	75.8
ESTONIA SSR	Total population	1,197	100
	Russian	260	21.7
	Turkic not Recorded		

Total Turkic recorded by republics: 22,305,000. This figure excludes Kumyk and Nogay. If the full total of 176,000 for these is included, the total Turkic population recorded by republics would be 22,481,000; if the lower estimate is used the figure would be 22,471,000.

Further useful information about the distribution of the Turkic nationalities may be obtained from the official tables by classifying by nationalities and indicating whether they are to be found in 'named locations' (i.e. named republics) or 'unnamed locations'. Figures for the latter are obtained by noting the difference between the total USSR figures and the sum of the figures for republics. The percentage of the total nationality in each of the named locations and in the whole of the unnamed location can then be calculated. Columns (a), (b), (c) and (d) are taken from Tables I and II, and the other columns show calculated results.

Table C

Turkic Nationalities by National Groups

		Named Location			Unnamed Location	
(a) Nationality	(b) Total No. of Nationality (thousands)	(c) Republic	(d) Number (thousands)	(e) % of Nat.	(f) Number (thousands)	(g) % of Nat.
UZBEK	6,004	Uzb.	5,026	83.7	43	0.7
		Tad.	454	7.6		
		Kirg.	219	3.6		
		Turk.	125	2.1		
		Kaz.	137	2.3		
		Total	5,961	99.3		
TATAR	4,969	RSFSR	4,077	82.0	112	2.3
		Uzb.	445	9.0		
		Tad.	57	1.1		
		Kirg.	56	1.1		
		Turk.	30	0.6		
		Kaz.	192	3.9		
		Total	4,857	97.7		

KAZAKH	3,581	RSFSR	383	10.7	5	0.1
		Uzb.	335	9.4		
		Turk.	70	2.0		
		Kirg.	20	0.6		
		Tad.	13	0.4		
		Kaz.	2,755	76.9		
		Total	3,576	99.9		
AZERBAYDZHANI	2,929	RSFSR	71	2.4	112	3.9
		Az.	2,481	84.7		
		Geo.	157	5.4		
		Arm.	108	3.7		
		Total	2,817	96.2		
CHUVASH	1,470	RSFSR	1,436	97.7	34	2.3
TURKMEN	1,004	Turk.	924	92.0	23	2.3
		Uzb.	57	5.7		
		Total	981	97.7		
BASHKIR	983	RSFSR	948	96.4	35	3.6
KIRGIZ	974	Kirg.	837	85.9	19	2.0
		Uzb.	92	9.4		
		Tad.	26	2.7		
		Total	955	98.0		
YAKUT	236	RSFSR	235	99.6	1	0.4
KARA-KALPAK	173	Uzb.	168	97.1	5	2.9
KUMYK	135				135	100
GAGAUZ	124	Moldavia	96	77.4	28	22.6
TUVIN	100	RSFSR	100	100		

UYGUR	95	Kaz. Kirg.	60 14	63.2 14.7	21	22.1
		Total	74	77.9		
KARACHAY	81				81	100
KHAKASS	57	RSFSR	56	98.2	1	1.8
ALTAY	45	RSFSR	45	100		
BALKAR	42				42	100
NOGAY	41				41	100
TURK	35				35	100
SHOR	15				15	100
KARAIM	5.9				5.9	100
TOFALAR	0.6				0.6	100
TOTAL TURKIC NATIONALITIES	23,100		22,305	96.6	795	3.4

It may be useful to indicate as far as possible the distribution of those Turkic nationalities which are not enumerated in specified republics by eliminating the republics in which they are recorded. For convenience the USSR may be divided into four groups of republics:

1. RSFSR.
2. Central Asia (Turkmen, Uzbek, Tadzhik and Kirgiz SSRs) and Kazakh SSR.
3. Transcaucasia (Azerbaydzhan, Georgia and Armenia SSRs).
4. Western Borderlands (Moldavia, Ukraine, Belorussia, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia SSRs).

Table D

Nationalities in Unnamed Locations

(a) Nationality	(b) Number in unnamed location (thousands)	(c) By elimination these must be in:
UZBEK	43	RSFSR; W. Border; Transcaucasia
TATAR	112	W. Border; Transcaucasia
KAZAKH	5	W. Border; Transcaucasia
AZERBAYDZHANI	112	W. Border; CA/Kaz.
CHUVASH	34	W. Border; CA/Kaz.; Transcaucasia
TURKMEN	23	RSFSR; W. Border; Transcaucasia; Tad.; Kirg.; Kaz.
BASHKIR	35	NOT RSFSR
KIRGIZ	19	RSFSR; W. Border; Transcaucasia; Turk.; Kaz.
YAKUT	1	NOT RSFSR
KARA-KALPAK	5	NOT Uzbekistan
KUMYK	135	Any republic. (See note in Table 'B'.)
GAGAUZ	28	NOT Moldavia
UYGUR	21	RSFSR; W. Border; Transcaucasia; Uzb.; Tad.; Turk.
KARACHAY	81	Any republic
KHAKASS	1	NOT RSFSR
BALKAR	42	Any republic
NOGAY	41	Any republic. (See note in Table 'B'.)
TURK	35	Any republic
SHOR	15	Any republic
KARAIM	5.9	Any republic
TOFALAR	0.6	Any republic

III. TURKIC LANGUAGES

Information about the numbers of peoples speaking the Turkic languages is given in Column 2 of Table I of the official report. In this the percentage of people of the nationality regarding the language of that nationality as their mother tongue is recorded. The mother tongue of children who have not yet learnt to speak is regarded as the language generally used in the family.*

The percentage varies considerably over the whole range of nationalities listed. The highest percentages are for Russian (99.8) and for the 7,000 people who comprise the Rutul of Dagestan (99.9); the lowest are for the Jewish (numbering 2,268,000, percentage 20.8), and the Turkic Karaim (16.5 per cent).

Of the Turkic nationalities only the Bashkir, Karachay and Karaim have less than 80 per cent of their numbers speaking their own national language.

The official tables do not give any information about the languages of those people who do not speak the language of their national group; nor is it possible to ascertain the state of the languages by republic.

In Table 'E' which follows, Column (d) has been calculated.

Table E

Turkic Languages

(a) Nationality	(b) Total No.of nationality (thousands)	(c) % regarding language of nationality as mother tongue	(d) No. regarding language of nationality as mother tongue (thousands)
UZBEK	6,004	98.4	5,908
TATAR	4,969	92.1	4,576
KAZAKH	3,581	98.4	3,524

* Op.cit., p.42.

AZERBAYDZHANI	2,929	97.6	2,859
CHUVASH	1,470	90.8	1,335
TURKMEN	1,004	98.9	993
BASHKIR	983	61.7	607
KIRGIZ	974	98.7	961
YAKUT	236	97.5	230
KARA-KALPAK	173	95.0	164
KUMYK	135	98.0	132
GAGAUZ	124	94.0	117
TUVIN	100	99.1	99
UYGUR	95	85.0	81
KARACHAY	81	73.9	60
KHAKASS	57	86.0	49
ALTAY	45	88.6	40
BALKAR	42	97.0	41
NOGAY	41	84.3	35
TURK	35	82.2	29
SHOR	15	83.7	13
KARAIM	5.9	16.5	1
TOFALAR	0.6	89.1	0.5
TOTAL	23,100	94.6	21,855

The figure of 21,855,000 as the number of speakers of a Turkic language as a mother tongue is a minimum, for it is possible that members of Turkic nationalities not speaking the language of their own nationality may use another Turkic tongue. It would be permissible to round off these language figures and, without much loss of accuracy, to consider the total number of people in the USSR who speak a Turkic language as 22m.

A G I T P R O P

SOME DETAILS OF AGITATION AND PROPAGANDA WORK IN THE MUSLIM REPUBLICS

The following article attempts to throw some light on the Party work of agitation and propaganda as conducted in Central Asia and Azerbaydzhan.

The words agitatsiya and agitator as used in Russian today have an entirely different meaning from the English 'agitation' and 'agitator' which almost invariably have a pejorative significance. According to the Soviet official DICTIONARY OF FOREIGN WORDS, agitatsiya is: "A powerful instrument of political education of the people in the spirit of communism and Soviet patriotism. It organizes the Soviet people in their fight for the victory of communism." Thus in the Soviet Union an agitator is on the side of the authorities whereas elsewhere he is always engaged in trying to subvert authority of one kind or another. Similarly the words propaganda and propagandist as used in Russian today do not have the somewhat disreputable meaning now usually attached to them in English. Agitatsiya and propaganda are often used to mean the same thing although the former refers more particularly to the activities necessary to disseminate propaganda. Thus while a 'propagandist' is usually a lecturer, a teacher or a writer, an 'agitator' is essentially a public relations man.

There is probably no essential difference between the Muslim and other republics of the Union as far as the methods and principles of agitation and propaganda are concerned. Rightly or wrongly all Soviet citizens are expected to react in the same way to official indoctrination.

. . .

I. Organizations - II. Methods - III. Agitation in Practice.

I. Organizations

Agitators - Propagandists and lecturers - The Society for the Dissemination of Political and Scientific Knowledge - Other organizations.

Agitators

Communist education of the "toiling masses" is carried on by various people and organizations who duplicate one another's work. The most numerous group in this vast propaganda network are the "agitators", usually organized into "agitation collectives" attached to the local agitpunkt or "red corner" (a sort of political and recreative club organized by local Party officials in every district).

The agitator's vocation is regarded as very honourable. He is "the transmitter of the Party policy to the masses. He sees and understands what inspires and interests the people who work with him, what shortcomings there are and how to overcome them. His task is to keep his comrades always informed about the internal and international situation of our country, to propagate the best methods of work and cause them to be adopted in production processes. He must initiate and supervise socialist competition, watch how [socialist] obligations are carried out and publicize the competition widely." (PART. ZHIZN' KAZAKHSTANA, No.8, 1958, p.16) In order to do all this, he must "be able to speak simply, appealingly and without phrase-mongering" (BR. 16.7.59) - an apparently unheeded stipulation in view of the highly elaborate jargon used by Soviet propaganda.

The agitators are not necessarily Party members - they may be what is described as "non-Party activists". They are recruited from among the local intelligentsia, outstanding workers and people enjoying general respect, and they operate in the establishments which employ them as well as in private homes and public places (po mestu zhitel'stva naseleniya). A minority are full-time professionals. They are appointed by the local Party cells and, as their morals must be beyond reproach, the Party carefully watch all aspects of their conduct at work and outside. Nevertheless there do occur agitators who "have no moral right to agitate others", like one Chernykh of the Kumdagneft' (Kum Dag oil trust) agitpunkt: he got drunk and started a brawl at a public place. (TI. 21.11.59) There are also cases when Party authorities seem to be contaminated with a "feudal-bay attitude to women" and neglect to appoint agitators from among native women -

thus in the Kazandzhik rayon of Turkmenistan there are about 400 agitators, only 18 of whom are Turkmen women. (TI. 20.6.59)

If the agitator's knowledge needs brushing up, he is sent to a special school or "seminar". Such schools exist in many towns and rayons as well as in some big kolkhozes and industrial establishments. An examplary school is run by the Party cell of Stalinabad airport. It has 42 students and the course lasts one year; lectures deal with politics as well as agitation methods and practice. (KT. 14.8.59) The same subjects are taught in Kirgizia where in October 1959 there were 284 agitation schools with over 9,000 students. These are impressive figures but it appears that many rayons and towns still have no such schools. (SK. 11.10.59)

Propagandists and lecturers

The propagandists and lecturers (lektory), attached to the primary Party cells do work very similar to that of the agitators. "Party propaganda is called upon to elucidate the scientific bases of the policy conducted by the Communist Party, to explain unceasingly to the workers the correctness of the Party policy and the necessity of active struggle to translate it into reality." (GT.SOV. ENCYCLOPAEDIA, 2nd edn. Vol.35, 1955, p.70) These people seem to be more closely attached to the local Party organizations than the agitators.

The Society for the Dissemination of Political and Scientific Knowledge

The lecturers are also associated with the Society for the Dissemination of Political and Scientific Knowledge which has branches in every republic. Its members are not only people of the same quality as the agitators, but also scientific workers and members of the lecturing staff of the VUZ and tekhnikums. Although their lectures cover the same range of subjects as those of the former two groups, it seems that atheist propaganda figures particularly prominently among the Society's activities. It is more refined than its crude counterpart practised by the agitator, for the Society's lecturers emphasize the "scientific" character of atheism and prove the falsehood of religion by illustrating their lectures with chemical experiments which "unmask religious miracles", lecture about the structure of the universe and seem to believe that demonstrating that thunder and lightning are natural phenomena is one of the most effective weapons at their disposal - this part of their atheistic repertoire is repeatedly referred to in the press.

The Society, founded in 1947, is a large organization. In October 1958 it had 7,470 members in Azerbaydzhan and in 1957 they gave 37,660

public lectures, the great majority of these in kolkhozes and industrial establishments. (BR. 19.10.58) In Kirgizia in November 1959 the Society had over 6,000 members who during the first nine months of that year gave 34,000 lectures. There is, however, much room for improvement: half the members do not lecture at all and many of those who are employed by educational establishments neglect their work to such an extent that they gave but 300 lectures in the first nine months of 1959 or less than 1 per cent (sic) of the total. (SK.4.11.59) In March 1958 the Uzbek branch had 11,500 members. (PV. 29.3.58)

Other organizations

Finally, propaganda and agitation are carried on by libraries, "universities of culture", local dramatic and musical societies and "agitation brigades" (not to be confused with "agitation collectives").

Each republic has a formidable army of people who educate the workers in the Communist orthodoxy. In 1958 in Kazakhstan there were 40,000 agitators in the countryside alone. (PART. ZHIZN' KAZ., No.8, 1958, p.16) In February 1960 Tadzhikistan had over 44,000 propagandists and agitators (KT. 20.2.60), and in October 1959 there were over 42,000 agitators in Kirgizia (SK. 11.10.59). Four months earlier Samarkand was being "agitated" by 92 agitkollectivs and 85 agitpunkts with 2,460 agitators (PV. 19.6.59), while at Baku "tens of thousands" of agitators were busy explaining to the population the new Seven-Year Plan (BR. 16.7.59). These figures will, of course, greatly increase if the membership of the Society for the Dissemination of Political and Scientific Knowledge is added. Thus the workers are being intensively educated by these various organizations.

II. Methods

Reaching the workers - Meetings and broadcasts - Visual aids - Shortcomings.

Reaching the workers

The workers cannot escape the agitation whose numerous variations reach them everywhere irrespective of place and time. It is carried on in the lunch-hour in the fields and factories, after work in various clubs, and even individually in private homes where the agitator does not hesitate to penetrate. Night-shifts in factories also get their share of agitation: for example, at the ferro-alloy plant in Aktyubinsk the agitator Kurakbayev gives talks to the workers on the tasks facing the ferrous metal industry, and there are also short meetings at which

results of socialist competition are estimated and problems of rationalization and strengthening factory discipline are discussed. As at night workers' mental concentration is somewhat lowered they must be particularly careful for the agitators' sharp eyes watch them unceasingly - thus when a machine operator fell asleep at work, the agitator immediately issued a "flash" (molniya - an impromptu one-sheet publication) bearing a caricature of the man asleep and a condemnatory doggerel. (PART. ZHIZN' KAZ., No.7, 1959, pp.25-26)

The agitator has numerous propaganda methods at his disposal. Even chess and draughts, available at the agitpunkts, as well as other types of "cultured" recreation are listed among the facilities the agitkollectivs provide for the "toilers". Propaganda methods can be roughly divided into two groups: one when the agitators and propagandists speak to the people directly or broadcast their talks and, secondly, the nagladnyye posobiya or visual aids.

Meetings and broadcasts

The first group covers meetings of all sorts and broadcasts. The most common type are the meetings held in kolkhozes and industrial establishments in the lunch-hour and after work. There the agitator may simply read aloud from a newspaper or "elucidate" the current Plan, always specifying what part in it the people he is talking to must play. This enables him to arrange a "socialist competition" on behalf of his audience and coax individual "socialist obligations" from the workers. Once these are taken, he carefully watches how they are being carried out, makes useful suggestions and finally publishes the results. He must know intimately the establishment employing him so that he can watch the staff and keep in touch with innovations in their particular branch of industry. These constitute another important subject of his talks - he lectures on "progressive methods" and sees that they are adopted; he also encourages the workers to become novatory who invent better, quicker and cheaper working methods.

All this is included in "political mass education", for increasing productivity and fulfilling or, still better, overfulfilling the Plan has a distinct political flavour - it hastens both the transition to Communism and the time when the USA will be "overtaken and surpassed" economically. Apart from this, there is the most important of all political propaganda: keeping the workers informed about the efforts undertaken by the Party to make their life still happier, and by the Soviet Government struggling to preserve peace endangered by the "colonizers and imperialist warmongers".

Finally, there are meetings where the agitator chats informally

with his flock - discussions, "question-and-answer evenings" and individual heart-to-heart talks, the last enabling him to play the role of a father-confessor. He must know the answer to all sorts of problems: political, social, economic and personal and be able to explain that the Party is always right.

Visual aids

"Visual agitation" is also very varied. The most common medium is the wall newspaper (stengazeta) produced by the agitator with the help of an "editorial college" recruited from among the workers of his industrial establishment or one of its departments, or a kolkhoz brigade, as the case may be. These papers are "the result of creative initiative and spontaneous activity of the workers' collective". (GT. SOV. ENCYCLOPAEDIA, 2nd edn., Vol.40, 1957, p.597) A good example of such a publication is the daily wall newspaper TEPLOVOZNIK (the Motorman) published at the locomotive repair establishment in Ashkhabad. Its virtue lies in its "ability to comprehend the wide and many-sided life of the establishment and its people, to propagate the new, and sharply castigate the obsolete. . . it writes about [socialist] competition and rationalizers, deals with the culture of production and fearlessly interferes in people's life and conduct." It publishes both good ("the leading workers today are comrades. . .") and bad news (turner Mirzoyev "wastes 25 minutes of working time needlessly every day"). This policy is warmly recommended: "Two - three words and everything is clear, and the target is, of course, reached quicker." (TI. 10.6.59) It is reached quicker also in agriculture: a brigade leaflet in the Lenin kolkhoz, Kolkhozabad rayon of Tadzhikistan, bore the caricature of a field worker, Saidov, who had neglected his work. His colleagues jeered and Saidov blushed, but by the following night he fulfilled the norm by 180 per cent. (KT. 24.7.58)

Minor versions of the wall newspaper are the already mentioned "flashes" and "battle cries", the latter stating how much the workers have already done, how much remains to be done and containing slogans designed to influence the readers' minds in that direction. The same purpose is served by "honour-boards" (doski pocheta) praising good workers, graphic representations of the progress of socialist competitions and the contribution of the factory or kolkhoz towards the Plan. Finally, there are various placards, maps illustrating some propaganda point, schemes of the flight of the sputniks, patriotic pictures and caricatures whose purpose is to make the workers hate the "enemies of peace", mobile exhibitions on scientific and atheist subjects and popular films on science, politics, social problems, historical events and a host of other topics. The list of visual aids is completed by shields (shchity) and slogans (lozungi) (usually big

pieces of red cloth with some inscription) bearing patriotic slogans and appeals to produce more for the State. These are displayed in factories, clubs, libraries and wherever people are to be found and, as they hang also across streets and on the outside of public buildings, their omnipresence successfully rivals even that of the wall newspapers.

Shortcomings

The four cardinal sins of propaganda and agitation are: formalism (when, for example, the significance of the Plan is explained to the workers but the part they themselves and their factory must play in it is not "elucidated"); shturmovshchina (last moment spurts to catch up on a badly spaced work-schedule); kampaneyshchina (synonymous with shturmovshchina) and kazenshchina (synonymous with formalism). These are repeatedly denounced by the press. Thus, for example, the Ordzhonikidze rayon of Uzbekistan used to suffer from kampaneyshchina - shown by the brisk agitation which followed the XXIst Party Congress in the kolkhozes and which subsequently considerably decreased in intensity. (PV. 5.6.59)

III. Agitation in Practice

In the towns - In rural areas

In the towns

In towns agitation is carried on in factories, educational establishments, and in "private homes and public places" - that is private homes, yards, "red corners", clubs, chaykhanas (tea houses) and agitpunkts. The city of Namangan provides an example close to the agitator's ideal conception of propaganda among town population. Until lately the city agitation suffered from kampaneyshchina until some Communist suggested that mass political education should be undertaken by the local Communists organized in groups, each working in the quarter of the city where they lived. Thus in the Oktyabr' Quarter there is a group of 20 Communists helped by the local intelligentsia, some 100 persons altogether. The "red" chaykhana ("red" presumably meaning "cultured" in the Soviet sense) has become their agitpunkt where the workers can read books and newspapers, and almost every night lectures and discussions take place. Every agitator has been allotted a number of houses which he visits regularly and chats with the inhabitants. Some private houses have been turned into minor agitpunkts - for example, that of the Boldadayevs in Tashkent Street is a place where the neighbours gather to listen to the agitator Rakhmanov;

his colleague, Karimova, has similarly adopted the Kadyrovs' house in Samarkand Street where she lectures on "perfidious aggressive exploits of the USA imperialist circles against the USSR and on the new schemes put forward by the Soviet Government seeking a complete general disarmament".

In the ten quarters of the city over 100 lectures have been given lately. Moreover, each quarter has "people's brigades" to deal with every case of "breach of the rules of Socialist community". For example, a certain Nishanov of the Oktyabr' Quarter used to drink and brawl, so he was brought before the "comrades' court" constituted by the local people. They condemned his "undignified" behaviour and "their truthful, good words have borne fruit: Nishanov started to behave as is seemly for a Soviet citizen." Or: "Sadullayev of the Karl Marx Quarter dishonourably treated his family and was rude to the neighbours. The agitators and members of the brigade often talked to him. Finally he saw his errors, promised to improve and has done so. Now he remembers with gratitude the Communists who have put him on the right path."

The agitkollektivs also lead a campaign among housewives to make them go to work. These and other efforts have been so successful that two types of misdeed are at last being eliminated: "The number of those observing religious ceremonies and guilty of immoral acts has been considerably reduced." (PV. 24.6.60)

The art of visual agitation is flourishing in Ashkhabad. The streets are decorated with shields, more than 100 in number, which impress upon the workers their obligations towards the Seven-Year Plan. These "mobilizing calls" declare: "Men and women workers, engineers, technicians and skilled personnel! We will win in the socialist competition between the factories of Ashkhabad and Stalinabad! By 20 December we will carry out the plan for the year 1959 and give our fatherland 25,000,000 rubles worth of above-quota produce!" This type of agitation flourishes also at the city factories, for example, the Dzerzhinskiy cloth mill has its own satirical paper KRYUCHOK (Hook) praising members of the Communist labour brigades and conducting a stern campaign against drunkenness, hooliganism and breaches of the "discipline of labour"; there are also the usual slogans as well as a special study group delving into the materials of the XXIst Party Congress. This study plays a beneficial role in raising production: one of the factory brigades, consisting of elderly women, has increased its output since they have joined the group. This is described as an example of "labour heroism". (TI. 10.6.59)

Some quarters of Baku, however, lag behind Ashkhabad. In the Azizbekovskiy rayon visual agitation consists of "standard appeals and

placards yellowed with age". The local oil industry establishments are just as bad: some of their slogans are ten years old and partly illegible. The Cabinet of Political Enlightenment is largely to blame for this: it has prepared a number of good slogans, like "let us produce this year 2,500 tons of oil above the Plan", but has not sent them to the factory agitators to be used. (BR. 25.8.59)

In rural areas

While in the towns agitation activities seem to be evenly distributed throughout the year, in the countryside they follow the agricultural curriculum though this dangerously smells of kampaneyshchina. The times of sowing and reaping, on which ultimate success of the plan depends, throw the agitators into a frenzy of activity: an exodus of the kolkhoz agitkollektiv (aided by the propagandists) to the fields takes place. There they lecture in the lunch-hour and again after work, use the local broadcasting system with loudspeakers to prompt the workers on, "visual agitation" flourishes and the agitator becomes an inquisitor always on the alert to find shortcomings and culprits to be acidly denounced in public. Field camps (polevyye stany) where the kolkhoz brigades rest and eat their lunch or even spend nights if working far from home, become the agitation centres. Thus the Oktyabr' kolkhoz in the Naryn rayon of Uzbekistan has 40 camps with an agitkollektiv of 87 persons. One of these camps sets an example for the others: it is "pleasantly decorated" with slogans and placards summoning the kolkhozniks to "struggle to realize the resolutions of the XXIst Party Congress". There are recent newspapers, a wireless set, a small library, a photographic [wall] newspaper (fotogazeta), and the agitators helped by the brigade activists publish "battle cries". The same purpose is served by the kolkhoz broadcasting centre which informs the population about the progress of socialist competition among the field and tractor brigades and the work of local cattlebreeders, denounces the brigades and individuals who "lag behind" and gives talks on subjects ranging from the ways to work better to atheism. The people are watched closely and their errors promptly corrected - an agitator reports that when cotton sowing in April was over, "some kolkhozniks decided to give themselves a rest and began to stay at home. I visited them and explained the harmfulness of such an attitude and they have understood." (PV. 15.5.59)

Some local Party cells have mobile agitpunkts. Those belonging to the Pavlodar rayon committee tour the fields while harvest is in progress. Aminov, the manager of one such agitation van (agitmashina), describes how he toiled during the harvest of 1958. His "collective" consisted of six people including a lecturer, cobbler and

barber (apparently the agitators should also provide the workers with facilities to look "cultured"). Their equipment includes a gramophone with loudspeaker and records, film projector, newspapers, magazines, slogans and placards. They displayed fotovitriny (a variety of wall newspaper with topical photographs) which specialized in denouncing bad workers: "in the morning we took photographs of a loafer whom the brigade leader had to wake up repeatedly or a driver who had abandoned his lorry or combine. . . In three hours the photographs were ready . . . and on a big sheet of paper we arranged a satirical display called 'The Photograph Accuses'". There were also fotovitriny bearing pictures of leading socialist competitors. "Battle cries" and "flashes" were published to keep the kolkhozniks informed about the feats performed by the best workers and progress of socialist competitions. In the harvest season Aminov's collective gave 45 lectures, organized 25 radio chats on the best ways to work, produced 30 film newspapers, conducted 10 evenings of rest with music, showed 45 films and published 30 "battle cries", "flashes", and fotovitriny. (PART. ZHIZN' KAZ., No.11, 1958, pp.46-48)

Agitation plays a big role also in cattlebreeding. For example, the work of the 13 agitators of the Lenin kolkhoz in the Leninpol' rayon of Kirgizia used to "lag behind the requirements of life" and the kolkhoz had the lowest milk yield in the rayon.(SK. 21.9.59) The cattlebreeders of the Mamlyutskiy sovkhoz in the North-Kazakhstan oblast, however, are being unceasingly inspired by the agitators to undertake obligations and take part in socialist competitions. The agitkollektiv has 55 members, the majority of whom work in the sovkhoz as milkmaids, tractor drivers and brigade leaders. The agitator Amrin, "a good political informant and skilled organizer of socialist competition" looks after a group of milkmaids. "Every day he informs them of the totals of the daily yields and names the better among them. Those who in five days obtained the highest milk yield receive from him a red pennant." The agitator Isakova is likewise responsible for some milkmaids. She gives them talks on politics and on the ways to get more milk from their animals. The agitator Vennikov is in charge of yet another group whose work used to be very unsatisfactory, so he explained to them that they had every possibility to improve and even to surpass their colleagues. Results promptly followed: when they were discussing the resolutions of the December Plenum of the Central Committee, two milkmaids were inspired to declare that in 1960 they would struggle for the first place in the sovkhoz and challenged another milkmaid brigade to socialist competition. The challenge was accepted (it is not clear if one could refuse without being considered unpatriotic) and now a brisk competition is going on. Thanks to the agitators' efforts, "the sovkhoz collective, inspired by the resolutions of the December Plenum of the Central Committee, is

struggling to carry out their obligations for the year 1960." (PART. ZHIZN' KAZ., No.3, pp.42-44)

A recent visitor to Central Asia reports that in the cities people seem to pay no attention whatever to the "visual aids" which are seldom in any way colourful, eye-catching or original. They are, however, such an essential part of Soviet life that their discontinuance would be unthinkable. The habit-forming qualities of Soviet propaganda must, however, make it increasingly difficult to inculcate new ideas.

Too few Tadzhik and Turkmen girls finish school

Of girls entering the first grade in Tadzhik schools, only 14 per cent complete the 10th grade. Most of those who give up school are from the native population. In the Pyandzh rayon, for instance, only one per cent of the pupils in the 8th-10th grades are natives. Consequently only 10 per cent of all women students at the university are from the local population.

Similarly in Turkmenistan 6-8,000 pupils leave school for no apparent reason every year. In the Mary oblast 1,500 girls left during the school year 1959-60. Of every 100 Turkmen girls entering the first grade only 15-20 finish middle school, and of every 100 admitted to the 8th grade, 30-35 finish school. Thus there is a shortage of women among the Turkmen intelligentsia; for example, of the 14,000 teachers in the republic only 1,300 are women.

KT. 7.8.60; TI. 18.8.60

Uzbek actors visit Turkmenistan

Actors from Bukhara have been giving performances of 15 Uzbek plays on contemporary and historical themes in the summer theatre at Chardzhou, Turkmenistan. Gulyam's FERGANSKIY RASSKAZ and the classical Uzbek plays LEYLI AND MEDZHNUN and ASHIK GARIB were amongst those performed and warmly received by the audience. TI. 21.8.60

THREE RECENT CENTRAL ASIAN NOVELS

The three novels here summarized are fairly typical of current fiction centred round Central Asia and Kazakhstan. All are by non-Asians - Russians or other Slavs - and all seem designed to appeal to an unsophisticated and non-Asian reading public. The main characters are Russians whose attitude towards the native peoples is of a patronizing and big-brother description. All three books are strongly reminiscent of the outpost-of-empire, white-man's-burden type of literature highly popular as boys' books in England at the turn of the century, but which has now virtually disappeared.

The authors are all aware of the need for strongly rubbed in morals and they are clearly conscious of the difficulty of complying with this need while maintaining their readers' interest. According to the long review of the EAGLE STEPPE in PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN' (No.8, 1960), Bubennov has failed to provide "a detailed description of the measures which the Party adopted or of the historic decisions which led to a radical change in the conditions of work in the collective farms and to the rapid improvement in agriculture." The conclusion is inescapable that however desirable such a description might have been from a political point of view, it could hardly have enhanced the entertainment value of the book.

* * *

I

WHERE THERE WAS SILENCE (TAM GDE BYLA TISHINA). By Yevgeniy Krivenko. Izd. TsK LKSMU Molod', Kiev, 1960.

The story, which opens in 1932, centres round three young people, Viktor Makarov, Nikolay Kostenko and Nataliya Petrova, civil engineers, who have come from Poltava in the Ukraine to the frontier zone of Turkmenistan to build a road. Their first taste of what lies ahead starts at Ashkhabad where they have to wait for their passes to the

frontier zone. Here they meet the older engineers of the region, who think of nothing but drink and an easy life; Makarov also meets Tkachev, who is in charge of road construction in the region. Tkachev paints a grim picture of the situation - only failures or politically unsound people come to Central Asia, old Trotskiists and Basmachis operate in the region, enemies are everywhere and Afghanistan is only just across the river. Tkachev puts Makarov in charge of a road which is being built from Mukry station to Gornyy in the Kugitang mountains where recently discovered sulphur deposits are now being prospected and mined; the road is to be the vital link between Gornyy and the railway which will carry the badly-needed sulphur to Soviet industries.

Toushan, a beautiful Turkmen girl who lives with Tkachev, gives Makarov a letter to her sister Dursun, who lives near Mukry station.

The Stalinabad train deposits the three young people at Mukry. Makarov discovers that the road is being built with spades and wheelbarrows by a handful of workmen who have no food, clothes or money. In the Turkmen village the Road Construction Office is a mud hut and a larger mud barracks houses all the workmen under appalling conditions. The office accountant has just died of drink, the foremen are drinking, the superintendent intends to steal the money and disappear. The workmen riot and demand their pay; half of them decide to leave.

A rich old Turkmen, Durdyyev, has bought Toushan's 14 year-old sister Dursun to become one of his many wives. Durdyyev is working against the Soviet regime which, he realizes, will deprive him of his lands, cattle and wives. He and Niyazov, another rich Turkmen also anti-Soviet, pretend to be pro-Soviet to allay suspicion, and the former works as watchman to the Road Construction Office while the latter gets himself elected as chairman of the aul soviet. Two other subversive characters are Buzhenikov, the new accountant, and a new road-building recruit, Dubinka. Behind these four works the mastermind, Anatoliy Kurlatov, an agent of the imperialists operating from Afghanistan, and rumoured to have been seen lately in Ashkhabad. A mysterious white-turbaned figure has also reappeared in the Kugitang foothills to the terror of the local population as previously his visits have been marked by murders and sabotage. A Soviet frontier guard outpost is stationed at Mukry; its C.O. is well alive to the situation and warns Makarov of all the dangers. But Makarov's mind is entirely engrossed in his road.

Makarov discovers that the road as officially projected will be flooded in spring; it will take years to build by hand and it will cost millions. He and his friends work out another project which will

make the road safe from flooding and be cheaper and quicker to build. The new project has to be approved by the authorities in Ashkhabad for money is only forthcoming on completed sections of the official project. On his own authority Makarov transfers some of his workmen to a camp in the mountains to work on his new projected route and appoints Nataliya as camp superintendent in spite of repeated warnings not to leave her alone and unprotected.

Unknown saboteurs burn Makarov's only lorry in the mountains; panic sets in, but Nataliya restores order. Down in the plain things are no better; Soldatenkov, Makarov's best foreman and leader of the Komsomol team, beats up Durdyyev after seeing him beat his young wife Dursun. This incident is seized upon by local enemies and Makarov and his team are accused of aggression against the native population.

Meanwhile Niyazov has a meeting with the imperialist agent, Kurlatov, who gives him money and his orders: on no account are the Kugitang sulphur mines to fall into Soviet hands, nor is the road to be completed. Soon Kurlatov will come to Mukry, collect his accomplices and when his work is done cross into Afghanistan. Kurlatov's girl-friend, Nina, who has refused to follow him on realizing the nature of his activities, finds herself in Mukry and soon joins Makarov's team in spite of the atrocious living and working conditions.

Things go from bad to worse: Nikolay, sent to Ashkhabad, returns without the necessary approval for the new road project. Makarov at his own risk, continues work on his project. But money and food are almost non-existent, and such little as the men get is immediately spent on drinking and gambling. Someone attempts to kill Makarov, but he escapes. The Turkmen workmen are incited to strike in support of Durdyyev whom Makarov has dismissed from his watchman's duties. Called to a meeting at the geologists' settlement, Makarov realizes that some high government officials, for reasons of prestige and gain, are also working against the mining and road projects. Dubinka (in Kurlatov's pay) works to frighten and demoralize the people, and drive them to drink. Only Soldatenkov and his Komsomol brigade remain loyal and firm. The others continue to riot from hunger and exhaustion. Earthquakes pile up rocks on a section of the newly-cleared road tract; blazing heat and an outbreak of malaria add to the hardships; Makarov himself is stricken with malaria.

Into this situation walks the big chief Tkachev with his girl Toushan, travelling on a tour of inspection. Immediately aware of the situation, he provides food, and most important of all - support and money for Makarov's project. Toushan decides to remain at Mukry, as head of the future kolkhoz, and to investigate the disappearance of her sister, Dursun.

Nikolay loves Nataliya; Nataliya loves Makarov. Makarov thinks that he loves Yulia Tumanova, his Poltava girl friend, now a well-known concert singer. He discovers that she is about to give a concert in Ashkhabad and goes to meet her, disobeying Tkachev's orders not to leave Mukry.

Meanwhile, the road builders reach an obstructing rock which has to be dynamited. The enemies put out anonymous notes to the effect that whoever touches the rock will die. Soldatenkov is now in charge, but he courageously disregards all warnings. As Makarov returns the rock is blown away, but a few hours later Soldatenkov is found murdered. A letter to Makarov discloses the murderer to be Durdyyev, who meanwhile disappears. A search of his house reveals Dursun, beaten almost to death and locked in an outbuilding.

Kurlatov and his accomplices assemble in a mountain cave and kidnap Nina. They plan to blow up the sulphur smelting shop which has just been erected at Gornyy. To celebrate the erection of this smelting shop and the completion of Makarov's road, the geologists and road builders are holding a dance. They are saved from destruction by Nina, who, escaping from the cave, has alerted the frontier guard. Kurlatov attacks, but in the fight that follows, in which Makarov is wounded, his party is defeated. Next day the wounded Makarov regains consciousness to find a loving Nataliya by his side and a bright future ahead. His task is completed, and a fleet of lorries carrying sulphur is just starting down the new road.

II

SECOND SPRING (VTORAYA VESNA). By M. Zuyev-Ordinets. Izd. Sovetskiy Pisatel', Moscow, 1959.

This is the story of a two-day journey undertaken by a group of young people, together with their machinery and equipment, on their way to found a new sovkhoz in the virgin lands. Their route lies across 250 miles of Kazakh steppe.

The opening chapters describe the life of Galim Nurzhanov, an elderly Kazakh schoolteacher in a small aul. His only son Temir, killed in the Second World War, had been a dreamer of great deeds and changes that would transform his poverty-stricken steppe into a fertile agricultural region. Many years later, Nurzhanov learns that the

virgin lands of Kazakhstan and Siberia are to be opened up, and realizes that his son's dreams are about to come true.

One night the small aul is awakened by the noise of motors and the light of headlamps. Nurzhanov watches an immense mechanized column travel across the steppe. A little later lights on the horizon and distress rockets indicate that the column has come to grief. Nurzhanov realizes that they must have come across the swamps of Shybyn-Utmes; he orders his coachman Kozhagul to saddle two horses to go to their help.

At Turksib station a large contingent of people, with their tractors, machinery, servicing equipment, building materials etc. are assembled to organize the last 250 miles of their journey to Zhangabyl where the headquarters of their new sovkhoz is to be. Under their director, Korchakov, they are divided into two columns, the first consisting of the heavy machinery and the second the lighter lorries and cars. Korchakov leads the second column of 113 vehicles and some 300 people.

From these 300 the author develops a number of personalities: Korchakov himself, a good organizer and leader; Kurman Gazizovich Sadykov (a Kazakh), an ex-major and the transport manager - a severe and demanding officer but respected by his subordinates; Vasya Mefodin, a driver and easy-going, life-loving boy, but with a shady past and easily influenced by the villain of the story, Shpolyanskiy, a rough Ukrainian. The three central characters are Shura Kvashnina, the young doctor who is to be in charge of the mobile medical unit of the future settlement; Boris Chuprov, correspondent of the local Komsomol newspaper, accompanying the expedition - an idealist and enthusiast, and in love with Shura; Nikolay Neuspokoyev, an engineer and the construction superintendent, also an idealist who left an easy life in Leningrad for the hardships of the virgin lands. He is good-looking and clever and Shura falls in love with him. He works with enthusiasm and fears nothing, but throughout the book he behaves badly; is critical, arrogant and rude to his equals and superiors and completely inhuman to his inferiors.

A rumour that swamps in the Shybyn-Utmes region, which the column has to cross, have been encountered by a geological expedition is discounted by Sadykov and the order given to start. In spite of difficulties the column completes the first day's journey according to plan. They camp for the night in the steppe; the villain Shpolyanskiy produces vodka and tempts Mefodin and another driver to drink, although Korchakov has forbidden the drivers to drink during the journey. The matter is reported to Korchakov who restrains Neuspokoyev from beating

up the drivers. To punish Mefodin, Sadykov takes away his lorry and appoints another driver. Mefodin loves his lorry and wishes to reform; Boris tries to intercede for him but Korchakov supports Sadykov's decision.

Next day the column travels on under heavy rain and at night comes unawares upon the swamps of Shybyn-Utmes. Two lorries are bogged down; working waist-deep in the mud the boys succeed in freeing one but the other has to be abandoned. Korchakov tries and fails to find a suitable crossing. The leaders meet to work out a plan of action: Sadykov and Neuspokoyev press for sending people back into the mud to find a crossing but Korchakov and the doctor, Shura, refuse to allow any further inhuman treatment.

It is at this moment that the two Kazakhs, Galim Nurzhanov and Kozhagul, arrive; they join the meeting, suggest a new route via the Sultan-Tau mountains and the column move into Nurzhanov's school in the aul for the rest of the night.

Here Mefodin makes a full confession of his past life to Boris, and of Shpolyanskiy's influence which led him to stealing and drinking. Boris spends the rest of the night reading the diaries of Temir, Nurzhanov's son who was killed. The diaries describe the superstitious resistance of the Kazakhs to any innovations and especially to the ploughing up of their pastures.

In the morning the convoy is visited by four Kazakhs from the nearby kolkhoz. They are received with friendliness and show great interest in bricks, which they have evidently never seen before. Later, Neuspokoyev, seeing the Kazakhs about to leave each carrying a few bricks (given them by the boys) accuses them of stealing and attempts to beat them up. Boris intervenes, and in his turn is prevented by Shura from beating up Neuspokoyev. This incident is seen by many people; Shpolyanskiy warns Neuspokoyev that it could be labelled as colonialism and racism, and be written up by Boris in the press.

Sadykov and Kozhagul return from a reconnaissance of the Sultan-Tau road and describe the difficulties which lie ahead to the drivers who, however, decide to attempt the crossing rather than turn back. Guided by Kozhagul and Nurzhanov the column moves off but their way is soon barred by a section of forest. They proceed to fell the trees under the guidance of Ipat Krokhalev, a Russian carpenter, an outstanding character vividly described throughout the book. A falling tree injures a Leningrad boy, who cannot face the hard life ahead and asks to be sent home; he is the only defector. Meanwhile Mefodin gets hold of his lorry, starts it with a duplicate key made by Shpolyanskiy, and makes off; the latter has incited him to steal it, sell its load and share the profits.

The convoy starts off again, but later in the night encounters another obstacle: melting snows have cut a deep ravine in a narrow gorge. The escaping Mefodin has also been stopped by this, and his trial is organized immediately. But Mefodin is recognized as being willing and able to return to the right path and is absolved. Shpolyanskiy's crimes are exposed and he is put under arrest.

Under Neuspokoyev's direction a timber bridge is rapidly built. The first two lorries cross safely, but the bridge collapses under the third. Neuspokoyev's pride is wounded by failure and he refuses to find another solution or to cooperate further. A proposal is made to build a dam of earth and stones across the ravine; this work is carried out throughout the night and its success arouses Neuspokoyev's jealousy and anger. The ravine is safely crossed and one last obstacle lies ahead - a steep ascent which the lorries cannot take. On their own initiative the people push and pull the lorries upwards. Galim Nurzhanov, whose weak heart has been overstrained by the night's heavy work, collapses with a heart attack and dies at dawn.

Boris, more than ever in love with Shura hears from her that she is fully aware of Neuspokoyev's selfishness, dishonesty, cowardice and emptiness, but she loves him and intends to stand by him in her future life.

By dawn, with all difficulties overcome, the column faces a wide steppe road leading them to Zhangabyl.

III

EAGLE STEPPE (ORLINAYA STEP'). By Mikhail Bubennov. OKTYABR', 1959, Nos.7-10.

Leonid Bagryanov is 13 years old at the time of the German occupation in the Second World War, his father is killed and he sees his native village wiped out by the Germans. He also meets a wounded Soviet officer, Zima, who tells him stories of his native Altay. Later he moves with his mother to Moscow, becomes an engineer, and falls in love with a Moscow girl, Svetlana. On hearing the call for volunteers to work in the virgin lands, he remembers Zima's stories and with Svetlana decides to go to the Altay region.

With a party of young people they reach Barnaul, meet Zima, who is the agronomist of the MTS at Zalesikha, a village near the Kazakh border, and follow him there. In Zalesikha Bagryanov meets Deryaba, leader of a group of young farm workers who engage in hooliganism; Deryaba becomes his sworn enemy. Krasnyuk, director of the MTS, patronizes Deryaba and works against Bagryanov. After many difficulties Bagryanov's brigade moves to another village, Lebyazh'ye, and from there to their camp in the steppe.

In the steppe Bagryanov hears from a native chaban (shepherd), Beysen, how his sheep are dying for lack of food; he is distressed to see his land ploughed up, the pastures shrinking, and complains bitterly. Sever'yanov, president of the kolkhoz, describes to Bagryanov the desperate situation in the virgin lands and the reasons for failure: shortage of men and machines.

Under great difficulties Bagryanov's brigade begins the ploughing. He encounters Imambay, the horse herdsman of the kolkhoz, whose pastures Bagryanov is ploughing up, thus forcing him to move far away, to Lake Baklan'ye, a region of salt lands, leaving his house and possessions.

Three love stories develop in the novel: Bagryanov and Svetlana (but Bagryanov finds himself attracted also to Khmel'ko, the woman agronomist at the kolkhoz); Vanya Sobol', a tractor driver, and Tonya; An'ka, a girl in Bagryanov's brigade, whose lover is Deryaba the hooligan.

Bagryanov, short of men, sends An'ka to Deryaba entrusting her to win over some of his gang to come and work for him. An'ka lets out this secret to Deryaba who conceives a plot to ruin Bagryanov by terrorizing the brigade and sends two of his gang to work for him.

The difficulties in Bagryanov's brigade multiply: he cannot get sufficient food and his people begin to hunt and eat suslik (marmot). The big boss, Krasnyuk arrives for an inspection, gets fed on susliki and trouble follows. Deryaba's hooligans make this worse by bad ploughing; Deryaba sets a wolf on the camp as part of his campaign of terror, but Bagryanov kills it. Severyanov, after an argument with Bagryanov, dies of a heart attack and the village holds Bagryanov responsible for his death. The hooligans desert and one of them, with Deryaba, goes into hiding.

Following Severyanov's funeral, drunkenness, violence and ill-feeling towards Bagryanov break out in the village. That night one of the brigade is murdered and suspicion falls on Vanya Sobol' and on some others from the village; they are arrested. In fact the murder was committed by Deryaba.

Unable to stand the strain, after a quarrel with Bagryanov Svetlana deserts with one of the brigade. The two of them wander through the steppe; Svetlana is bitten by a viper.

At last the brigade begins the sowing, but Krasnyuk dismisses Bagryanov as brigade leader.

Imambay, the banished horse-herdsman, gives refuge to Deryaba and his friend thinking they are deserters. Soon Imambay and his son realize that he is the murderer and when Deryaba tries to run away they hunt him. Deryaba perishes.

Svetlana, nursed and restored to health by some local inhabitants, returns to the brigade. The authorities of the Central Committee accept Bagryanov's plan for the creation of a large sovkhoz in the Eagle steppe and Zima is appointed as its director. A new settlement begins to rise on the site of Bagryanov's old camp.

None of the novels is a literary masterpiece and the themes of all three are similar: the triumph of young, mainly Russian idealists pioneering in new lands against appalling difficulties presented by nature, reactionary and criminal elements, and sheer bureaucratic inefficiency.

WHERE THERE WAS SILENCE is, from a literary point of view, very poor. The characters are little more than dummies, alternately pompous or sentimental. The author seems solely concerned with the plot, though periodically he remembers his duty and rattles off a few pages of propaganda. The outstanding impact of the book is the picture of the appalling hardships suffered by the people building the new Soviet society and economy. Men and girls live, sleep and eat in the only existing one-room barrack; there is no technical or mechanical aid for the road builders; everything is done by hand or with the most primitive tools. But one has to remember that the story is set in the 1930s.

The local Turkmen are presented as either rich oppressors of the poor and enemies of the Soviets (such as Durdyyev, Niyazov etc.), or as the oppressed poor who welcome and help the new regime, such as the girls Toushan and Dursun. The minor Turkmen characters in the book are just as unconvincingly drawn as the others.

Both here and in SECOND SPRING the authors develop an identical situation, in which the leaders of these pioneer enterprises show no

concern whatsoever for the welfare and safety of the people entrusted to them. The leaders never spare themselves, but are blind and thoughtless to the needs of others; their sole interest is the success of the enterprise. Thus Makarov in WHERE THERE IS SILENCE is shown as completely irresponsible, ignoring all warnings which could have prevented misfortune, including Soldatenkov's murder, and in SECOND SPRING Neuspokoyev and Sadykov try to drive their men beyond endurance. The only worth-while thing in life appears to them to be the heroic deed or podvig, whether undertaken personally or collectively.

In SECOND SPRING, however, the secondary characters are on the whole infinitely more vivid, alive and interesting than the heroes. Ipat Krokhalev, the Russian carpenter, is one; but this is not an all-Russian collective, there is a Kazakh boy who acts as interpreter, Sadykov speaks in Kazakh with Kozhagul. Everyone, and Sadykov especially, treats the Kazakh teacher, Nurzhanov, with the utmost respect, though towards Kozhagul the Russians show amusement and curiosity; to them the simple Kazakhs are both exotic and extremely backward.

From a literary point of view EAGLE STEPPE is probably the best of the three. The descriptions of steppe scenery have distinct merit.

N E W S D I G E S T

The following items are taken from newspapers and periodicals received during the period 1 July-30 September 1960. A list of abbreviations used will be found at the beginning of the Review.

ADMINISTRATIVE AND TERRITORIAL CHANGES

Administrative changes

There were no administrative changes in the appointments recorded by CARC during the period under review.

Territorial changes

Azerbaydzhan

A new residential suburb, Sallakhan is to be constructed in "greater Baku". The new district (mikrorayon) will be 40,000 square metres in extent and consist of blocks of flats. The first stage should be completed in 1961. BR. 10.9.60

Kirgizia

The town of Osh is being enlarged by 212 hectares, taken from the Osh rayon. SK. 16.9.60

CONFERENCES

The Writers' Union of Kazakhstan held a plenary session at Alma-Ata in April 1960. A. Tadzhibayev's report to the session was followed by a discussion on the problems of cinema, drama and television in the republic.

In the course of the discussion, the speakers brought out the deficiencies of contemporary Kazakh drama: there are no good plays with

a contemporary subject; of 150 Kazakh plays 15 are on historical subjects and only these are popular - they are still presented while the 135 plays on modern themes have long been forgotten.

It was suggested that playwrights fail to give a profound analysis of their characters, without which no play can be good. Discussing the problem of the hero, Z. Shashkin explained that the hero is, in fact, our epoch, and "our ideal is the idea of production". He added that "those playwrights who impose casual episodes, details and speeches on the hero, are wrong; he himself should create his own situation and destiny."

L. Galimzhanova thought the general weakness of Kazakh plays is that the characters are very rarely interesting people: "They think little, feel little and dream little."

Some young playwrights were criticized for being influenced by neo-realizm, thus narrowing the scope of the characters to small details. "Our aesthetics," said A. Salynskiy, "require characters whose perspective of the development of the world is active, strong and intelligent." He added that the only sympathetic character he could find was in Tadzhibayev's play ONE TREE - NOT A FOREST.

One of the most important points in the discussion was the problem of technical skill (mastery). It was agreed that both the construction and the style of contemporary Kazakh plays are deficient in this.

In discussing film making in Kazakhstan, the director of the film studio, K. Sironov, criticized writers for not taking cinematographic art seriously, and producers for working exclusively on scripts of Moscow authors. "Among writers invited there were undoubtedly talented people, but many of them had done only great harm." In conclusion Sironov said, "it is not that we want to refuse the help of professional playwrights from Moscow or from any other town, but we must think of training our own local script-writers."

PROSTOR, 1960, No.7

EDUCATION

A new department of the University of Moscow has been founded for students from Asia (including Soviet Asia), Africa and South America. This new "Friendship University" is not a government institution but is directed by an elected council and as such is "autonomous and democratic".

The first year began on 1 October 1960 with 500 students; the authorities had received 35,000 applications for the 500 places. Short-listed candidates were invited to Moscow for an entrance examination - fares and expenses paid. Friendship University will take 2,000 students, so that each year 500 new students will be admitted. In the course of their first year the students will learn Russian (students from the Asian part of the Soviet Union, two foreign languages) and then go on to the various faculties.

There are no fees at the University which also pays the living expenses of the students. VOKRUG SVETA, 1960, No.9

IRRIGATION

The Irtysh-Karaganda canal

Central Kazakhstan is unusually rich in natural resources and its industry is rapidly expanding. The shortage of water hinders industrial development and the problem is particularly acute in Karaganda and Temir-Tau.

The Irtysh carries through central Kazakhstan over 900 cubic metres of water per minute and is the obvious source from which the industrial districts can be supplied. Eight projects for using it for irrigation have been drawn up, of which the so-called Shiderty bed version has been chosen as the best. The canal will therefore flow from Yermak on the Irtysh to Karaganda. (For detailed course see CAR, 1960, No.2, p.148.)

The length of the canal will be 514 km. and pumping stations will raise water to the total height of 475 metres. Its surface will be between 20-40 metres wide; the width of its bed will vary between 5-10 metres and the depth will be between 4-6 metres. Seventy-five cubic metres of water per second will pass through its starting point, which corresponds with the flow of the Dnieper at Mogilev.

The canal will supply the industrial districts of Ekibastuz, Maykain, Bozshakul', Karaganda and Temir-Tau. Moreover, it is intended to construct a branch canal which will remedy the shortage of water in the upper reaches of the River Ishim and irrigate a number of rayons in the Akmolinsk oblast. Later the canal may be extended by a further 500 km. to the Dzhezkazgan industrial region from where a branch will flow to the Atasu rayon where new mines are being opened up. Apart from industry, the canal will make it possible to develop agriculture in the parts of the Pavlodar and Karaganda oblasts adjoining the industrial districts.

IRTYSH — KARAGANDA CANAL.



The canal will very considerably lower the cost of water. Irtysh water supplied to Ekibastuz via covered conduits would cost 60 kopecks per cubic metre while the canal water will be obtained at 2 kopecks; now the water Karaganda receives from local resources costs 70-80 kopecks per cubic metre and the canal will lower the price to 18 kopecks.

The first sector of the canal from the Irtysh to Ekibastuz, 140 km. long, will be completed in 1963 and the rest in 1965.

VOKRUG SVETA, 1960, No.7; P. 3.4.60

The Chim-Kurgan reservoir

This reservoir, under construction on the river Kashka-Dar'ya, will be the largest in Uzbekistan. It will cover 50 square kilometres and have a cubic capacity of 500m. cubic metres. Part of the work finished by 1 May 1960 made possible this year the cultivation of 10,000 hectares of land in the Surkhan-Dar'ya oblast. PV. 7.9.60

The Khan-Khauz reservoir

The project for the Khan-Khauz reservoir (between the Murgab and Tedzhen rivers), has been confirmed by the Ministry of Water Supply of the Turkmen SSR. This will be the largest reservoir in Turkmenistan with a capacity of 435m. cubic metres of water, and will irrigate 45,000 hectares of desert. (See also CAR, 1960, No.2, p.140.)
TI. 22.9.60

LINGUISTICS

In a short article entitled "The Tadzhik Dialects and their Location" (VESTNIK TNIK LENINGRADSKOGO UNIVERSITETA, 1960, No.14, Seriya istorii, yazyka i literatury, vyp.3), N.A. Melekh gives a classification of the Tadzhik dialects illustrated by a map showing their location. The map (reproduced facing) is based on data from 1940, and later publications were used only in the case of some dialects. The author explains that the region south of Stalinabad is at present populated by people who come from other parts of the Republic and also from other republics. The establishment of communication and cultural relations between various parts of the Republic has also been a cause of linguistic changes; the literary language propagated in schools, radio, press and theatre is another important factor. A large percentage of the population of central Tadzhikistan is Russian or Turkic speaking.

A result of the mass migration of the mountain Tadzhiks to the newly irrigated regions (Vakhsh valley), is that the dialectal composition has undergone changes; some data shown on the map may, therefore, be out of date.

The author classifies Tadzhik into three groups and several subgroups as shown on the map. This is the first attempt at visual representation of the Tadzhik dialects.


Tadzhik dialects and their location
Dialects.
Sub-dialects.
20 0 20 40 60
J.P.
S S R
Chust
Pap
Asht
Leninabad
Kanibadam
Isfara
Ura-Tyube
Samarkand
IV
KIRGIZSKAYA S S R
TURKESTANSKIY KHREBET
Matcha
ZERAVSHANSKIY KHREBET
Yagnob
GISSARSKIY KHREBET
Surkhob
KHR. PETRA PERVOGO
Obikhingou
Ramit
Regar
STALINABAD
DARVAZSKIY KHREBET
Vanch
Khovaling
YAZGULEMSKIY KHREBET
Bartang
Kulyab
Kurgan-Tyube
Pyandzh
Vakhsh
Kafirnigan
RUSHANSKIY KHREB
Khorog
Anderabad
Mul'vodzh
Pyandzh
A F G H A N I S T A N
Central group
North-West group
South-East group

PRESS

A new periodical PARTIYNANA ZHIZN' started publication in Uzbekistan in July 1960. Another new journal, entitled KOMMUNIST UZBEKISTANA, sponsored by the Central Committee of the Uzbek CP has recently made its appearance; this is a Russian language periodical which deals with theoretical and practical questions of Communist construction.

P. 11.8.60

THE BORDERLANDS OF SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA

HERAT, 1856-7

In 1959 the Soviet Academy of Sciences published a book on the little known episode of the Anglo-Persian War of 1856-7, P.P. Bushev's GERAT I ANGLO-IRANSKAYA VOYNA 1856-1857 GG. This is a solid work of 250 pages with an appendix of 24 relevant documents, indexes of proper and place-names and a bibliography of 255 titles in Russian, English, French and Persian. The value of the book as historiography is reduced by the fact that like all Soviet writing on Persian and Afghan history it is a book with a purpose, the purpose being to adduce evidence that British relations with these countries were essentially sinister and connected with British designs on Central Asia.

The following article is a summary of the book's argument and narrative.

. . .

I. British Policy in Persia - II. Anglo-Persian Relations 1851-5 - III. The Seizure of Herat by Persia and Anglo-Persian Negotiations - IV. Military Operations - V. The Paris Treaty - VI. Sources and Literature - VII. Editorial Comment.

I. British Policy in Persia

"One of the most important aims of Great Britain's foreign policy in the 18th and 19th centuries was the seizure of colonies and of the opportunity for their all-round exploitation, and also the creation of bases on the route from the British Isles to the East." (Bushev, p.3)

As a result of the wealth plundered by Britain from her colonies her industrial capacity grew immensely and by the middle of the 1850s a need was being felt for new markets. The British bourgeoisie "seized colonies and opened new markets by force of arms" and "subordinated to

their needs the whole home and foreign policy of the State" (p.4). Their prey was Persia, Afghanistan and Central Asia. By 1852 the Indian market was so swamped with British goods that the British economy was thrown between 1855 and 1857 into one of its recurring crises of over-production. To the British bourgeoisie expansion in Central Asia and China seemed to be the answer.

Herat was to be the British base for aggression in Central Asia. Besides being naturally rich it was strategically placed. In the war against Persia in 1856, besides the conquest of the markets of Persia, Afghanistan, Central Asia and Transcaucasia, Britain's aims were:

(1) the establishment of bases on the islands of Qishm and Kharak and at Bandar Abbas, Bushire and Muhammarah in the Persian Gulf;
(2) the establishment of consulates in southern Azarbaijan, Gilan, Mazandaran, Khorasan and Asterabad to increase British economic and political influence in Central Asia and Transcaucasia;
(3) the economic and political subjection of Afghanistan and her transformation into a base for aggression against Central Asia and Transcaucasia;
(4) the formation in Herat of a government dependent on Britain and the stationing there of a British resident and garrison, or the seizure of the khanate.

II. Anglo-Persian Relations, 1851-5

Persia

Persia was a backward, agrarian and feudal country. The import of foreign, mainly British, goods had harmed domestic handicrafts. Class differences had broken out into rebellion in the Babi movement of 1848-52. The British were trying to force the Persians to accept British consulates in the north of the country and were using the campaign against the slave-trade as a pretext to gain bases on Persian territory in the Persian Gulf. Mirza Taghi Khan had, indeed, carried out certain reforms which had had the effect of slightly strengthening the Qajar dynasty, but they should not be overemphasized: they were all, except the reform of the Army, repealed by Aga Nuri Khan, the sadr-i-azam (prime minister).

The Persian Army remained badly trained, officered and equipped. The majority of the Shah's forces was composed of the retinues of vassal khans and maliks, so that there was a lack of discipline and central control. During the first half of the 19th century British officers were employed as instructors in the Persian Army: however,

only the regular army was affected by their instruction, which, indeed, left much to be desired. If the Army's weapons were out of date and the soldiers did not know which end to load their rifles "it is obvious that this was to a considerable extent the result of the British military instructors' 'training'." (P.36) This state of affairs was no accident, since "naturally this condition of the armed forces of Persia facilitated the aggressive activity of the British plunderers" (p.37). The Army consisted, on paper, of 100,000 men organized in 82 regiments. However, the illiteracy and corruption of the officers together with bad organization and the lack of a satisfactory supply system reduced the Army's effectiveness. Contemporary British sources tended to exaggerate the strength of the Persian Army with the obvious aim of making British victories more impressive.

Herat

On the death of Yar Muhammad Khan in 1851 his son Sayyid Muhammad Khan succeeded to the throne. Sayyid Muhammad Khan was a stupid and erratic ruler who to strengthen his position at home sought the support now of Persia, now of Britain. Herat itself was split between Afghan and Persian factions and the picture was complicated by the conflicting interests of Dost Muhammad Khan, ruler of Kabul (whose son had married Yar Muhammad Khan's daughter), Kuhandil Khan, ruler of Kandahar (who had received a petition from the inhabitants of Herat), and of Britain, who pretended to be interested in "saving" Herat from Persian occupation. The growing predominance of the Persian faction alarmed Britain because it "hindered her aggressive plans in relation to Persia, Afghanistan and Central Asia" (p.39). The British envoy in Tehran, Lieut.-Col. Shiel, demanded assurances from Persia which were refused. He was, however, assured that Persia would not attempt to occupy Herat unless Dost Muhammad or Kuhandil Khan first attempted to do so. It was in Persia's interest to keep Herat and Kandahar independent and weak as buffers between herself and Afghanistan.

In 1851 an attempt by Kuhandil Khan to occupy Herat was foiled by the Persians, who rejected his proposal that they should carry out a joint occupation.

In 1852 Shiel reported to Palmerston that the sadr-i-azam had renewed his demands that Britain should assume responsibility for the defence of Herat against Kabul and Kandahar, when Persia would cease to interfere in the affairs of the khanate. In the same year the Shah proposed that Britain and Persia should replace Sayyid Muhammad Khan with their own nominee and should join in persuading Kuhandil Khan to renounce the occupation of Herat. Shiel, in the absence of instructions, agreed to send agents to Kandahar if the Shah would, in return, renounce

all rights to Herat. The Shah agreed but demanded that the British should not allow the occupation by Kandahar of even a part of Herat. Shiel, who had still received no instructions, refused. As a result the Persians occupied Herat. The British made protests in Tehran, exerted diplomatic pressure on the Persian Chargé d'Affaires in London [who was, writes Bushev, "sent out of the capital of England to the provincial town of Coventry" (sic) (p.43)*], broke off diplomatic relations and finally ordered the fleet to seize the island of Kharak. However, the resignation of the Cabinet prevented this from being done. Finally, with Russian help the British in January 1853 got from Persia a written renunciation of interference in the affairs of Herat. Although this document was so composed that all that was granted in its first part was taken away in the second, the British accepted it because events elsewhere distracted their attention. This agreement forced the Persians to work secretly. Nevertheless they "still calculated on seizing Herat in favourable circumstances" (p.50).

In 1854 the head of the Afghan party in Herat, Isa Khan, became head of the garrison and so in effect seized power. The Persian party petitioned the Shah to "save" Herat and Persian troops were sent. The British immediately made a military demonstration in the Persian Gulf. However, in the same year Sayyid Muhammad Khan was turned out and replaced by Muhammad Yusuf Khan. "It is quite obvious that Muhammad Yusuf Khan's seizure of power in Herat in September 1854 took place with the support of both the Afghan and the Persian group since his candidature suited them both. He was a prince of the Sadozai dynasty and at the same time an officer of the Persian Army, an émigré who had fled from Herat to Persia and owed it to the Persian Government that he had become ruler of Herat." (P.53) He declared himself a vassal of the Shah. Dost Muhammad saw him as a Persian puppet and renewed his advocacy of his son's claims to Herat. The British supported Isa Khan.

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* Palmerston in answer to Disraeli, Debate on the speech from the Throne, 3 February 1857: "The Opposition also recognized the importance of Herat to the defence of India. . . when the right hon. Gentleman [Disraeli] was in office in Lord Derby's Administration, and when it had been alleged that the Persian Government entertained an intention of annexing the territory of Herat. . . what was the consequence? Why, the Government of Lord Derby sent the Persian Minister to Coventry, told him that they would have nothing more to do with him until that annexation was revoked." Hansard, 1857, p.166.

Even if Mr. Bushev's knowledge of English does not extend to the common idiom "to send to Coventry", his knowledge of international usage should tell him that no government can banish a foreign envoy to a provincial town. -Ed. CAR.

In 1855 British aggressive intentions against Persia made further progress with the treaty with Dost Muhammad. This treaty was unequal in that while Dost promised to be "friend of the friends and enemy of the enemies" of the East India Company, the Company made no such promises to him. So Dost became "drawn into the orbit of the expansionist policy of Britain which was directed in the first instance against Persia and the khanates of Central Asia". (P.48) The treaty was not, however, without benefits for him as he received money, arms and recognition as the ruler of an independent Afghan state.

The Mirza Hashim Khan Episode

With the Mirza Hashim Khan episode in the summer of 1855 Anglo-Persian relations began sharply to deteriorate. Mirza Hashim Khan was a Persian subject in the employ of the British Embassy in Tehran. In September 1854 the British Chargé d'Affaires in Tehran, Thomson, had attempted to appoint him secretary of the Tehran Embassy and (after the Persian Government had refused its consent to this) to make him British agent in Shiraz, to which also the Persian Government was opposed because it did not wish to give official recognition to the existence of a British consulate in Shiraz. Thomson had accepted the Persian Government's refusal and the Foreign Minister Clarendon had agreed with him. Nevertheless the new British representative in Tehran, Murray, renewed the demand that Mirza Hashim Khan should be appointed secretary of the British Embassy in Tehran or British agent in Shiraz. When the Persian Government, as before, refused, Murray threatened to break off diplomatic relations, obviously acting on instructions from London. Mirza Hashim Khan's wife was detained by the Persians and Murray demanded her release. Yet when the Persians agreed to release her Murray stipulated fresh conditions, including a public apology. The rupture of diplomatic relations which took place on 20 November 1855 was obviously brought about deliberately by Murray in connexion with the British bourgeoisie's "intensified expansion in Asia, in particular against Persia" (p.58), which began towards the end of the Crimean War. The rupture was viewed with disfavour by the Opposition in Britain and was much regretted by the Persian Government.

III. The Seizure of Herat by Persia and Anglo-Persian Negotiations

Even before Murray's departure from Tehran the Persian Government had begun negotiations with Lord Stratford de Redcliffe, British Ambassador to Turkey, asking him to regulate the conflict. Stratford de Redcliffe, however, declared that he was not empowered to act. The British Consul in Tehran, Stevens, was instructed by London not to enter into political negotiations with the Persian Government.

Kuhandil Khan, ruler of Kandahar, died on 12 August 1855. Dost Muhammad immediately occupied Kandahar. The Persians believed that he did this with British sanction and would next occupy Herat and on these grounds the Shah sent an expedition against Herat. In fact Dost wanted and intended to occupy Herat but he was delayed by the complex situation in Kandahar. "All this, of course, does not justify the Persian Government's interference in the internal affairs of the khanate of Herat" (p.66). The ending of the Crimean War meant that Britain again had attention to spare for the East, and caused the Shah to regret his expedition. Considerations of prestige, however, made it impossible for him to retreat. He therefore simultaneously made all efforts to take Herat (so as to use it as a counter in negotiation) and began negotiations with Stratford de Redcliffe. Stratford de Redcliffe did all in his power to make the negotiations fruitless and on instructions from London stipulated that the conflict could only be regulated after the siege of Herat had been raised. The Shah refused but this was no more than a gesture. Subsequent correspondence shows the willingness of the Persian side to make concessions on Herat. Farrukh Khan, Persian envoy extraordinary to Paris, was empowered to conduct negotiations with Stratford de Redcliffe at Constantinople (on his way to Paris) and to agree to Murray's return to Tehran and the evacuation of Herat. The British, however, had sent an ultimatum to the Shah threatening war unless Herat were evacuated before Farrukh Khan had even reached Constantinople. The British ultimatum made no mention of the Hashim Khan pretext for war, which had been dropped in favour of the occupation of Herat which was a more substantial casus belli. Without waiting for an answer the British Government instructed the Governor-General of India (the war was carried on by India "in order to by-pass Parliament" (p.85)) to prepare an expedition against Bushire and the island of Kharak. The Persian reply stated that Farrukh Khan had instructions to discuss with Stratford de Redcliffe both Murray and Herat so that Clarendon deceived the House of Lords in February 1857 when he declared that the Persian reply was "a mere letter of pretences" with no mention of Herat. Moreover, this reply was received in time for military action to be stopped and, since it made it clear that Persia was ready to negotiate, it is obvious that this should have been done. The fact that the war was not stopped "testifies eloquently to Britain's aggressive designs in relation to Persia" (p.71). In the British answering note of 10 October 1856 "in essence the British ruling circles declined a peaceful regulation of the conflict with Persia" (p.71).

Herat finally fell on 26 October 1856 after a siege which had been carried on by the Persians with "lack of decision and energy" (p.77).

Farrukh Khan found his position in Constantinople difficult. The negotiations were protracted and were carried on by the British side in

an insulting and arrogant tone. The negotiations had "already been doomed to failure by the British side" (p.80). Furthermore, when they began Britain was in essence already at war with Persia, although Farrukh Khan only learnt this from the Indian press in December 1856.

During the first stage of the negotiations, from 30 October to 21 November 1856, Stratford de Redcliffe put the following demands:

(1) the evacuation of Herat;
(2) compensation to be paid by the Persians for any loss suffered by the inhabitants;
(3) Persia to abandon its claims to Herat and to guarantee its independence;
(4) Persia to agree to a new trade agreement with Britain and to the expansion of the network of British agents in Persia;
(5) the sadr-i-azam to be dismissed and replaced by "a person who will further a correct understanding" (p.89) of Anglo-Persian relations.

These demands were not published in the Blue Book and were given to Farrukh Khan orally. When Farrukh Khan agreed to the evacuation of Herat Stratford de Redcliffe put forward new demands, and finally in an ultimatum demanded immediate evacuation of Herat and compensation of its inhabitants. Farrukh Khan signed an agreement providing for unconditional evacuation and declared himself ready to come to a satisfactory agreement on compensation.

On 24 November Stratford de Redcliffe presented five fresh demands and insisted on complete Persian agreement to all his demands, both new and old. Farrukh Khan refused to accept this memorandum and sent to Tehran for instructions. Meanwhile he received news (26 November) of the fall of Herat, but stressed that he continued to hold by his agreement on unconditional evacuation. The British, however, continued to demand unconditional acceptance of all their demands and the negotiations bogged down.

On 4 December, emboldened by a telegram from the French Foreign Minister inquiring why the Persian envoy was delaying so long in Constantinople (this telegram was intended to give him moral support), Farrukh Khan in a memorandum to Stratford de Redcliffe wrote that he had gone as far as he was empowered to do and that if the British Government was dissatisfied and went to war then his previous agreement on the evacuation of Herat and other points would become invalid and non-existent. Stratford de Redcliffe refused to accept this memorandum.

The next day (5 December) Farrukh Khan threatened to leave Constantinople unless he received assurances that no British expedition

would land on Persian soil and that Britain would make no further demands. However, he lacked the necessary consistency and firmness and on the 10th agreed to stay and await Tehran's answer on the five demands made on 24 November. Stratford de Redcliffe insisted on preliminary agreement to all the British demands. But Farrukh Khan agreed only to the earlier demands in return for a British assurance that Persia would not be attacked. Stratford de Redcliffe was instructed by London that these terms were impossible and that he must insist on the dismissal of the sadr-i-azam. These instructions and the news from India that war had been declared on 10 November caused Stratford de Redcliffe to break off negotiations.

British statesmen did all in their power to mislead Parliament and public about the negotiations. They passed over in silence the fact that Farrukh Khan had agreed to the evacuation of Herat and the compensation of its inhabitants, and explained the failure of the talks by alleging that Farrukh Khan was only in Constantinople on his way to Paris, although he stayed there two and a half months. Palmerston declared on 16 July 1857 that Farrukh Khan signed no conditions which could have bound his Government to anything; in fact, however, Farrukh Khan signed an agreement to evacuate Herat and only demanded guarantees that his country would not be attacked in December when he had heard of the dispatch of the British expedition to the Persian Gulf.

"In summing up the negotiations it must be noted that all Persia's attempts to regulate the conflict with Britain by peaceful means failed because of the position taken up by British ruling circles who wanted war." (P.94)

IV. Military Operations

Long before the official declaration of war on Persia the British Government had begun its preparations. "For the realization of her aggressive plans in Persia Britain had to secure the collaboration of the neighbouring countries of Muscat and Afghanistan" (p.82). Britain counted on gaining possession of the islands of Qishm and Ormuz and the port of Bandar Abbas which the Imam of Muscat leased from Persia, and on using the Imam's Arab troops in military operations in the deserts of southern Persia. The East India Company sent General Brett to obtain the Imam's help. Whatever he may have told Brett, however, the Imam of Muscat had no intention of supporting the British, and in April-May 1856 he renewed his lease of Qishm, Ormuz and Bandar Abbas from Persia for 20 years on terms which forbade him to transfer the territories to anyone else or to allow foreigners there.

In order to subordinate Dost Muhammad Khan to the East India Company and to make him their ally in the war against Persia the British concluded a treaty with him (26 January 1857) by which, in return for a monthly subsidy of 100,000 rupees, Dost undertook to maintain 18,000 troops and to allow British officers to serve with the Afghan Army as observers. The British also gained control of Afghan foreign policy and the right to keep an agent in Kabul. In return Dost received a guarantee of the safety of Kandahar, Kabul and Balkh against Persian aggression.

This treaty had been preceded by a British attempt to attack Herat from the east by land through Afghanistan. In August 1856 Colonel Cavenagh of the Indian Army was sent to Kabul to plan joint Anglo-Afghan military operations against Persia. It was obviously as a result of an agreement between Cavenagh and Dost Muhammad that in October 1856, 5,000 men under Brigadier Neville Chamberlain set out for Kabul. By 21 November they had reached Safid Koh to the west of Jalalabad. "However, the freedom-loving Afghan tribes did not allow the British troops to pass and made them turn back."

[Little need be said about Bushev's treatment of military operations (pp.95-129). British victories he considers unimpressive as they were won against a weak and ill-equipped opponent who offered little resistance. In the one case where resistance was shown, the storm of the Reshire fort, he accuses the British of letting a sepoy regiment bear the brunt of the assault according to "the normal British tactic". General Outram and the British press are accused of shameless exaggeration in their accounts of the campaign. Nevertheless, he notes also that Persian historians either pass over in silence the movements of the Persian forces or present them in an apologetic spirit. The British, he concludes, gained a complete military victory; "however, the general economic and political situation forced the British ruling circles to renounce the realization of their military plans in Persia."]

V. The Paris Peace Treaty

The debates in Parliament on the Government's policy in Persia and China show that opposition to that policy was very strong. The strain of the Crimean and now the Persian and Chinese wars was having its effect on Britain's economic position: the ordinary people were hurt by the rising cost of living while the rich felt the effect of the recently increased income-tax. There was a campaign in the country to reduce taxation. "Lack of money to carry on two wars simultaneously forced the British Government to renounce one of them. Palmerston

preferred to stop the war with Persia." (P.139) This was the real reason why the Treaty was so "merciful", as British historians usually write. There is no truth at all in the theory held by some Soviet orientalists that Palmerston was forced to make peace with Persia by the Indian Mutiny. News of the Mutiny could not have reached England earlier than March-April 1857, when the Treaty was already signed. Even in April the Government attached so little importance to the news from India that they were arranging to send European units from Persia not to India but to China.

The Treaty itself gave the British less than they had refused to accept in Constantinople: Farrukh Khan had refused to agree to the dismissal of the sadr-i-azam, which had previously been considered essential, or to compensation for the inhabitants of Herat, arguing, falsely, that the occupying forces had caused them no loss but had been provided for from Persia. The British accepted the Persian plea that Mirza Hashim Khan had voluntarily renounced his employment in the British Embassy and no longer needed British protection. It is true that the Shah renounced sovereignty over Herat, but Article 7 of the Treaty allowed him to undertake military operations outside Persia (i.e. in Herat) in case of an infringement of the Persian border by any state (i.e. Afghanistan), provided that Persian troops returned home afterwards, and this gave him a convenient loophole for interference in Herat which he later used.

The Treaty gave Britain nothing worth even the paper wasted on it, to make no mention of the money and blood. It was in fact a victory for Persia. The British received no bases in the Persian Gulf and failed to acquire Herat as a base for aggression against Central Asia and Transcaucasia. Herat was under Persian influence until 1863 when "Britain, weakened by the rising of the peoples of India in 1857-9, had to agree to its incorporation in Afghanistan". Britain failed also to conclude a favourable trade agreement and even lost her "right of protection" together with some other privileges.

The war, however, displayed the weakness of the Qajar dynasty and facilitated the entry of foreign capital into Persia, a process which finally made Persia a semi-colony of the imperialist powers.

VI. Sources and Literature

Bushev devotes a whole chapter to an examination of his sources, which he divides into British, American, French, Persian and Russian. Only the first and the last two will be dealt with here.

He gives British historians short shrift: "Their interpretation of the facts does not permit an elucidation of the real essence of the policy of the British colonizers and has the aim of justifying it" (p.173), and: "to mask the genuine aims of the war - that is the main task of British historians" (p.182). On the claim that Herat was a bastion of defence against Russia he writes: "All the inventions of British bourgeois historiography about the Russian threat to India hardly require serious refutation" (p.176).

The Blue Book on Anglo-Persian relations provides Bushev with many quotations but he considers that so many documents are omitted and the others are so abridged that it must be considered a work of falsification.

Bushev considers the most reliable source to be Hansard, although he is quick to add that the revelations contained in it were made with "narrow, party aims" (p.181). Nevertheless his own use of this source is somewhat selective.

Persian sources, Bushev writes, are "scant and unoriginal" (p.187) and "follow bourgeois historiography, especially British. This, in effect, leads to a refusal to unmask British aggressive policies in Persia in the 19th century" (p.188). Instead Persian authors preach pan-Iranian doctrines and assert Persia's right to Herat and to a considerable part of Central Asia up to the Amu-Dar'ya and the Caucasus. An exception is Sa'id Nafisi's SOCIAL AND POLITICAL HISTORY OF PERSIA IN THE PRESENT AGE which contains a correct appraisal of British policy. Some Persian writers give false accounts of military operations, Bushev writes, and exaggerate the successes of the Shah's forces. Recent Persian publications of documents from archives are reduced in value by lack of a qualified commentary.

In pre-revolutionary Russia no monograph or article was devoted to the Anglo-Persian war of 1856-7. Bushev consequently deals with general histories of Central Asia, memoirs and books of travel descriptions. He is especially critical of the works of S.N. Yuzhakov (THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN QUARREL, St.Pb., 1885; AFGHANISTAN AND BORDERING COUNTRIES, St.Pb., 1885) for carelessness in reporting facts and for accepting the thesis of the Russian threat to India. He considers the most important Russian works of this period to be M. Grulev's THE RIVALRY OF RUSSIA AND BRITAIN IN CENTRAL ASIA (St.Pb., 1909), and M.A. Terent'yev's RUSSIA AND ENGLAND IN CENTRAL ASIA (St.Pb., 1880), and THE HISTORY OF THE CONQUEST OF CENTRAL ASIA (St.Pb., 1903-6). Terent'yev "unmasked" the false thesis that there was a Russian threat to India, but, writes Bushev, did not carry this correct argument to its conclusion by discovering the British threat to Central Asia.

In Soviet Russia also, until Bushev's book appeared, there had been no monograph or article devoted to the war. Moreover, Bushev writes, in works published up to the end of the Second World War the views characteristic of pre-revolutionary orientalism prevailed: insufficient stress was laid on British aggression in Persia and credence was given to the British claim that Herat was essential to the defence of India against Russia. One Soviet book (M.G. Reyser's AFGHANISTAN, Moscow, 1946) even asserts that "Russian troops were encamped under the very city walls [of Herat] threatening British well-being in India" (p.196). Bushev identifies these troops as Samson Khan Makinskiy's (Samson Yakovlevich Makintsev's) "Russian batallion", Russian deserters in the Persian service who had no connexion with the Russian Army. Even later works are convicted of inaccuracy: M.S. Ivanov's OUTLINE HISTORY OF PERSIA (Moscow, 1952), states erroneously that Murray broke off diplomatic relations because of the Persian invasion of Herat. Among recent works Bushev commends a number of degree theses (including his own) and the works of N.A. Khalfin - THREE RUSSIAN MISSIONS (Tashkent, 1956), and BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST (Tashkent, 1957). These works, he writes, are valuable, in spite of individual faults, because they are based on a wide selection of archive material.

VII. Editorial Comment

In connexion with the alleged British expedition through Afghanistan under Neville Chamberlain (see above, p.411) the following quotation is of interest: The Earl of Derby, House of Lords, 3 February 1857: "I heard with dismay and I heard with satisfaction, first of the advance of troops on Kabul, and then of their retrograde movement, though I am at a loss to understand the cause of the first advance of that small body of troops. (The Earl of Clarendon was understood to deny that such a movement had taken place.) Well, then, perhaps when the papers which have been promised to us are laid upon the table they will throw some light upon the subject. . ." Hansard, Vol.144, col.40. Bushev is familiar with this speech, from which he quotes in another connexion, but he does not use this quotation. He bases his assertion that such a movement took place on a report in the TIMES, 17 January 1857, and on the reports of the Russian "military agent in London", Colonel N.P. Ignat'yev, at present in the Military Science Archive of the Central State Military-Historical Archives of the USSR.

The most important parts of Bushev's book are those dealing with Britain's allegedly aggressive policy in Persia and Central Asia. His account of the military operations is interesting but of secondary importance and his criticisms of the negotiations at Constantinople

and the Treaty of Paris go little further than contemporary criticisms in the House of Commons.

Bushev undertakes to prove the existence of aggressive British plans from "the evidence of authoritative politicians and soldiers of Britain and Russia", but his British witnesses are not numerous or weighty: both Rawlinson and General Outram "more than once wrote that the aim of the British invasion of the Persian Gulf was to obtain bases - the islands of Kharak and Qishm and the ports of Bushire, Bandar Abbas and Muhammarah" (p.24); and: "Rawlinson asserted that 'Britain. . . had the right to (territorial) compensation'"(p.25). Cowley in a note of 3 March 1857 to Farrukh Khan wrote that Britain had wanted "to possess valuable parts of Persian territory. . ."(p.25) but had subsequently refrained. John Jacob and John Lawrence, Bushev writes, urged upon Canning the occupation of Quetta, Kandahar and Herat. Finally the Quartermaster-General of the Indian Army, MacGregor, in a "secret note" on the defence of India urged that Herat be made into a border province of India (after the subjection of Afghanistan) as a first step towards solving the Russo-Indian question by driving Russia out of the Caucasus and Turkestan. Bushev also gives quotations from the Deputy Governor of the Caucasus, A.I. Baryatinskiy, the Chief of Staff of the Caucasian Military District General D.A. Milyutin, and Baron Turnau to show that they regarded British operations in Persia and Afghanistan as a threat to Russian Turkestan and the Caucasus.

Like most Russian and Soviet historians Bushev greatly overestimates the effect which statements by military officers and other advocates of a "forward policy" such as Sir Henry Rawlinson had on British policy. In fact they were of no more significance than the recorded statements of Tsarist Russian officers advocating a Russian attack on India. That Russia never seriously contemplated such an attack has been admitted by British historians for at least fifty years. But Soviet historians have a particular reason for trying to perpetuate the myth of British designs on Central Asia. The plain truth is that whatever some British generals and minor politicians may have wanted, British imperial expansion stopped short at the northern frontiers of India. Subsequent to the Herat affair dealt with by Bushev, Russian colonialist expansion continued even into the Soviet period when Khiva and Bukhara, the last of the independent khanates, were eventually swallowed up in 1921. It is precisely this truth that Soviet historians seem anxious to obscure.

RUSSIAN-INDIAN TRADE IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

The following article is a slightly abridged translation of "Some Projects for the Organization of Russian-Indian Trade in the 18th Century" by Ye.Ya. Lyusternik and Ye.G. Shapot which appeared in UCHENYYE ZAPISKI LGU, SERIYA VOSTOKOVODCHESKIKH NAUK, 1960, Vyp.9: ISTORIYA I FILOLOGIYA INDII.

The article is a detailed and well-documented account of a number of schemes for establishing trade relations between Russia and India in the 18th century, not one of which, as the authors admit, was ever put into practice. It seems likely, therefore, in view of this fact, that the main aim of the article is not to fill a gap in our knowledge of the period but to stress the alleged difference between Russian and British intentions towards India at that time and to demonstrate that Russia's intentions have not changed from that day to this. As in the days of Peter the Great so now, the Russians want from India only "mutually profitable trade on a foundation of equal rights". From the time of Peter the Great until now the Russian people, in the person of the "best people" of Russia, have felt admiration, and later sympathy, for the peoples of India. This admiration and sympathy have developed under the influence of the October Revolution and the acquisition by India of independence into "friendly and many-sided collaboration between the two countries." This attempt to show that Russia's approach to India has always been in the spirit of the Panch Shila, even in the time of Peter the Great is not new; see CAR, Vol.VI, No.4, pp.448-61, and Vol.VIII, No.1, pp.87-89. It is worth while remembering that, however accurate a reflection of the present it may be, this theory leaves out some facts about the past. V.V. Barthold, for example, writing in 1925 about the foundation of Orenburg, says: "Under the influence of the enfeeblement of Turkey and the khanates of Central Asia vast plans of conquest were being elaborated in Petersburg. . . Kirilov insisted on the necessity of accepting the subjection of Abdul Khair [Khan of the Kazakh Lesser Horde]. . . He demonstrated that 'otherwise we could lose not only the numerous new peoples who have become our subjects, or wish to do so, with many such towns as Tashkent and Aral, but also the chance of acquiring the provinces of Bukhara and Samarkand and the rich locality of Bodokshan.' These last words

reveal that in Central Asia at this time, as earlier in Manchuria and Mongolia, plans under elaboration provided for the annexion to Russia of regions which in the event remained outside the boundaries of the Russian Empire. The rich locality of Bodokshan, i.e. the province of Badakhshan, is now part of Afghanistan." (V.V. Barthold, LA DECOUVERTE DE L'ASIE, Paris, 1947.) It appears, therefore, that conquest was not entirely contrary to the nature of the men who wanted "mutually profitable" trade with India.

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Peter the First's attempts to establish trade-routes - State encouragement and concessions to traders - The Orenburg trading company and commerce through Central Asia - Failure of trade expansion on British conquest of India.

In the study of the history of Russian-Indian relations the numerous projects for the organization of trade between the two countries which were put forward in Russia in the 18th century are of undoubted interest. It was not only among the ruling circles that such projects occurred. Their authors were frequently individual civil servants and prominent scholars.

M.V. Lomonosov, the great Russian scientist, V.N. Tatishchev, the prominent historian, I.K. Kirilov, one of the founders of scientific cartography in Russia, I.P. Rychkov, distinguished geographer and economist and others attached great importance to the development of Russian-Indian economic ties. They showed great initiative in seeking out trade-routes to India and were active in attempting to establish direct trade between Russia and India.

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Peter the First's attempts to establish trade-routes

The beginning of the 18th century in the history of Russia was marked by a further development of productive forces. Industry was developing, economic ties within the country were becoming stronger, trade was widening its scope and there was an increase of specialization in the agricultural regions. Trading capital already represented a considerable economic force. The process of the political centralization, broadening and strengthening of the Russian State was continuing. Russia's international connexions - her trade with the countries of Western Europe and the East - grew.

Nevertheless, in spite of considerable successes, Russia's economy lagged behind that of the most fully developed countries of the time - England, France and Holland. Russia depended on other states for many types of industrial manufactured goods. Native industry could satisfy neither the growing demands of the population nor the military needs of the State. Frequent and lengthy wars exacerbated the position. The country felt the need of large sums of capital.

Moreover, Russia was cut off from the seas and this favoured a state of affairs where foreign trade was to a considerable extent in the hands of foreigners, especially Dutch and English, who pushed Russian merchants aside in every way possible.

Russia was faced with complex historical tasks: to liquidate her economic backwardness and (immediate tasks closely connected with this) to fight for the seas and to expand and reinforce her economic and cultural ties with other countries. Russia, wrote Marx, could not leave in the hands of the Swedes the mouth of the Neva, which was the only exit for the sale of the products of northern Russia any more than she could leave the mouths of the Don, Dniester and Bug and the Kerch Straits in the hands of nomad Tatar plunderers.(1)

Peter the First's historical merit lay in understanding these tasks and putting into effect a broad programme of economic and cultural transformations in the country. A considerable place in his programme had been set aside for the development of foreign trade, in particular with the countries of the East. Eastern markets became important to Russia not only as suppliers of valuable raw materials - silk and cotton - but also as consumers of Russian manufactures. Peter wanted to set up direct trade relations with Eastern countries and also to further the development of the transit trade with the aim of making Russia the middleman between West and East.

Plans for establishing direct trade with India formed part of Peter's foreign policy. "The Transformer of Russia was moved by the hope of enriching the Empire with the products of temperate climes and of bringing Russians into communication with India. His repeated attempts to overcome the natural inconvenience in intercourse with this, the furthest removed part of the world from the North, prove what great profit he foresaw from the Indian trade."(2)

Peter regarded the Central Asian khanates of Khiva and Bukhara as the gates of India. In search of convenient routes he equipped a number of expeditions to study the Caspian Sea and the rivers which flow into it. There is record of the following expeditions sent by Peter in 1714-19: the expedition of I.A. Bukhgol'ts and the geodesist Likharev to the upper reaches of the Irtysh; the expedition of Prince

A. Bekovich-Cherkasskiy to Khiva in 1716-17 "to bring the khans of Khiva and Bukhara to submission" and investigate the routes to India; the embassy of Florio Beneveni to Bukhara in 1718-25.(3)

The search for trade-routes to India was one of the factors which defined Peter's policy with regard to Persia.

As is well known no trade-routes between Russia and India had been established either through Khiva and Bukhara or through Persia. The difficulties of gaining control over (osvoyeniye) such complex and far-flung land communications were complicated by the constant danger of attack by the nomad Kirgiz-Kaysak Hordes. Therefore it was no accident that attempts were made to find direct sea routes to the East, including one through the Arctic Ocean.

Thus in 1713 Peter the First received F.S. Saltykov's plan to establish a direct northern sea route to the countries of the East, in particular China and India. "Then, wrote Saltykov, it will be possible to send ships from your State to the merchants of the East Indies, in which will be profit and great wealth for the State, while it will be nearer to trade thither from your State than from others."(4)

In 1716, independently of Saltykov's proposals, two trading houses of Petersburg submitted a request to the Senate for permission to carry on trade with Japan and the East Indies. They proposed to establish a trade-route from the Northern Dvina through the Arctic Ocean and the Gulf of Ob', then by river to Lake Baykal and then by the rivers Selenga, Indigirka, Shilka and Amur to the Eastern Ocean.(5) It is known that this request was given to Ya.V. Bryus(6) and that he sympathized with the plan to establish a trade-route to the East Indies and advised Peter the First to begin a scientific survey of the Siberian coast with the aim of finding a passage from the Arctic Ocean to the Pacific.

Peter equipped several expeditions to study the northern sea route.(7) They amassed a huge amount of factual material and had great scientific significance but in fact did not manage to find a northern sea route to India.

In 1723 Peter attempted to establish trade relations with India by the already familiar sea route around Africa. He sent Vice-Admiral Vil'ster to the island of Madagascar and the East Indies. In the first item of his instructions Peter directed him to leave Petersburg and "set out on a voyage to the East Indies namely to Bengalen [sic]."(8)

Vil'ster's task was to set up trade relations with India and to conclude a treaty with the Great Moghul. This is shown by the fourth

item of his instructions: "When with God's help you shall have arrived at the indicated place in the East Indies, then present yourself there to the Great Moghul and try by all measures to incline him to permit trade to be carried out with Russia, and make a treaty with him, and establish which of their goods are in demand in Russia and also which Russian goods are needed in his regions."(9)

While preparing his expeditions to India Peter acquainted himself with the past history of Russian-Indian relations. As early as March 1716 he demanded from the Senate material on Semen Malenkov's embassy to India(10), "what goods were sent with him, Malenkiy [sic], and what Malenkov and his companions on their arrival in Moscow declared about their stay and journey." Delay in delivering the requested information called forth corroboratory edicts from the Governing Senate to the Treasury dated 9 and 30 April of that year.(11)

In his eagerness to establish with India not only trade ties but also diplomatic relations Peter demanded that the documents under preparation for the despatch of ambassadors in 1716 should be composed and phrased in a spirit of respect for the Indian ruler. With this aim he ordered: ". . . contrary to previous custom there should be sent to the Khans and to the Moghul of India from his Imperial Majesty letters of credence (gramoty veryushchiye). . . And the title which has been given to the Moghul of India . . . should be checked in the original and written down and the letter should be written to the Moghul accordingly."(12)

Peter emphasized the peaceful aims of his policy and the mutually profitable character of the trade which he was eager to establish with India. "Be as diligent as possible, he directed his envoy to the Great Moghul in 1723, to bring about between both countries a useful and favourable commerce."(13)

As is known, Peter's efforts to establish diplomatic relations and direct trade connexions with India were not crowned with success. However this problem remained a crucial one for the Russian State for the rest of the 18th century. The demands of the economic development of society gave birth to new plans and proposals for trade with the countries of the East including India.

It is worth while mentioning in this connexion a manuscript headed "A means of carrying on commerce in the states of the Great Moghul, to the town of Balkh. . . to Bukhariya (sic) and the other towns and provinces belonging to it; also to Khiva and other places". (14) The manuscript is written in folio in the clear cursive of the 18th century. There is some foundation for dating it in 1727. For example, referring to Beneveni's embassy which was in Bukhara from 1718

to 1725, the author notes: ". . . it is now two years since the above mentioned envoy left Khiva."(15)

Relying on information acquired by the Tsar's envoy, Beneveni, the author of the document thought it possible to trace a route to India through the khanates of Khiva and Bukhara. Regular Russian-Indian trade through Bukhara, however, he considered possible only if that khanate should be ruled by "a khan of good deeds, a bold man possessing all the power". If this condition were met, in his opinion it would be "possible freely to hope for favourable commerce for the benefit of the Russian people both with the Moghul in India and with all other countries".(16)

The author of the manuscript considered the organization of trade with India through Khiva to be more difficult because of the political complications connected with A. Bekovich-Cherkasskiy's expedition. Nevertheless, of the several routes to India from Central Asia the author preferred the route through Khiva. He proposed that the Khiva khanate be subjected to a Russian protectorate whose main aim he saw as confirming "on a permanent basis the laudable commerce of all the tropical Indies by land and sea routes. . ."(17)

The plan posed concrete tasks: to put in order the road from the river Yaik [Ural] to Khiva, to supply trading caravans with water and accommodation along the route, to establish routes between the Amu-Dar'ya and the Caspian Sea and to protect the trade routes from constant brigandage. After these steps had been taken, the author considered, "our intended trade with India and all the surrounding lands, when we have founded in Khiva as it were an arsenal of trade from both sides, would doubtless take place with the greatest force and success and this empire would derive great benefit."(18)

One of the essential preliminary conditions for the establishment of direct Russian-Indian trade ties, the author believed, was the consent of the Moghul ruling circles, "whether that court will accept our trade".(19) He proposed as mediators in the negotiations the khans of Bukhara and Balkh or the Black Kalmyks. It is obvious from this that the author envisaged Russia's trade with India as organized on the scale of the State and as based on equal rights, not imposed by force.

Considerable interest is presented also by another manuscript headed "On Kamchatka and Okhotsk".(20) The manuscript is written in folio in the cursive of the 18th century and can be dated to the '30s of the century.

The author considered Okhotsk to be a convenient port for carrying on trade with the East as far as India. He noted that before the

conclusion of the Treaty of Nerchinsk with China (1689) the river Amur had been a convenient trade route. But in so far as the Amur had been lost to Russia "although it is further and more difficult, yet all that the Russian interest demands may conveniently be done through Okhotsk."(21)

The author, who was an advocate of the development of the Eastern trade, laid out in detail all the advantages and benefits which could accrue to the State from the development of trade through the port of Okhotsk.

The fact deserves attention that both these manuscripts belonged to V.N. Tatishchev and were presented by him as a gift to the Academy of Sciences. This prominent Russian scholar was at the same time an important State functionary. In the line of his employment Tatishchev was in the thick of the problems connected with the organization of trade with Central Asia, Persia and India.(22) In economic matters he held the view that a country's wealth consisted in flourishing crafts, industry and trade. He made considerable efforts to develop production of cotton and silk in Astrakhan' and to organize trade with the East.(23) He collected information on trade with Khiva and Bukhara (24), ascertained the trade-routes through Central Asia to India, arranged the dispatch of trading caravans to Khiva and Bukhara, gave privileges to Armenians, Indians and Bukharans trading in Astrakhan', etc.(25) So Tatishchev's interest in the various projects for the organization of trade with the East was not accidental.

State encouragement and concession to traders

From the middle of the '30s of the 18th century attempts to establish a trade-route to India through Central Asia became more determined. It was no accident, therefore, that in the '40s-'60s it was in Orenburg that there appeared a pleiad of energetic advocates of a Russian-Indian economic rapprochement: V.N. Tatischev, I.K. Kirilov, I.I. Neplyuyev, (26) P.I. Rychkov and others. The very emergence of this town was connected with the search for routes to Central Asia, Persia and India and the desire of the ruling circles and influential merchants of Russia to arrange direct trade with India. Russia's policy towards the Central Asian khanates was to a considerable extent determined by her attempts to make safe the roads to India.

In 1734 Councillor of State I. Kirilov and Murza Tevkelev, who was attached to him as his interpreter, put forward a proposal for the organization of trade with the countries of Asia, including Khiva, Bukhara and India.(27) The authors of the project attempted to demonstrate the necessity of founding a new town on the river Or' which

should become the centre of Russian trade with Central Asia and adjacent countries. In demonstrating the advantages of their project Kirilov and Tevkelev wrote: "It is much easier for a caravan to reach Khiva from this fortress than from Astrakhan' because it is always possible to receive enough water and wood on the way and one can travel in summer, in the month of September, not in winter. But because of lack of water in the steppe caravans always leave Astrakhan' in winter."(28)

To improve the organization and safety of trade for caravans the authors considered it essential to found yet another town in the lands of the Kara-Kalpak people, "near the Aral lake on the river Syr' where there ought to be a resting place for Russian trading caravans which have to go from the new town to Bukhara, Vodokshan and India."(29) Thus Kirilov and Tevkelev's conception contained new, important and more concrete proposals by comparison with the plans for the organization of trade with India which had been advanced earlier.

The resolution of the Empress Anna Ioannovna on the project followed on 1 May 1734. It confirmed the foundation of a town at the mouth of the river Or' where it flowed into the Ural. This decision was motivated by the fact that the town "is extremely necessary not only for restraining the Kirgiztsy [i.e. Kazakhs], but also for opening a free trade route to Bukhara, Vodokshan [i.e. Badakhshan], Balkh and India, which the Emperor Peter the Great desired extremely and, sparing neither treasury nor men, he sent Prince Aleksandr Cherkasskiy from Astrakhan'."(30)

Subsequent official documents relating to the foundation of Orenburg bear witness no less vividly to the fact that questions of trade with India were considered of first-rate importance. The town's privileges, published 7 June 1735, are indicative in this respect.

The first point of the previleges proclaims the right "of all Russians and of every people (except fugitives from our service and peasants subject to poll-tax), merchants, craftsmen, raznochintsy, and also foreigners, merchants and artists of foreign European states, and the local Bashkir people and those who live with them, and our new subjects the Kirgiz and Kara-Kalpak peoples, and visitors from Asian countries - Greeks, Armenians, Indians, Persians, Bukharans, Khivans, Tashkentians, Kalmyks and others of whatever title and faith. . ." to come, settle, live, trade and practise any craft.(31)

The privileges also guaranteed the liberty of goods from customs duties for the first three years. The authorities were directed to set aside without payment space for courtyards, store-rooms and warehouses, and shops, supply timber and stone from the State's stores and

give ten-year, interest-free loans.

Both in his project and in practice Kirilov paid great attention to the establishment of Russian-Indian trade ties. He collected information on the routes by which Indian and Central Asian merchants carried on their trade, on goods and prices, and on India itself.

In February 1735 Kirilov asked to see an Indian merchant who was staying in Astrakhan' with the intention of receiving more reliable information from him. In his narrative the Indian gave a detailed description of the four trade-routes which led from India to the countries of Central Asia, Afghanistan, Persia and Russia (Astrakhan'). All these roads met at Delhi, the capital of the Moghul Empire.

The information on Russian-Indian trade is interesting. From the narrative it can be seen that not long before 200 Indian merchants had arrived in Russia every year, but that later this figure had fallen to 80 and even less. The merchant explained this by reference to events in Persia and Bukhara, and mainly to plunder of the caravans by nomad peoples. "But if there were free transit through Bukhariya, as that road is near and more convenient for all goods, then he would expect up to 600 Indian merchants to travel to Russia yearly, and they would bring a great amount of goods as the merchants wish to have free commerce with Russia. Also they would carry Russian goods back with them."(32)

It is difficult to check the accuracy of these figures. But other facts adduced in the narrative - a description of India, a list of goods exported from India to Russia and from Russia to India and other information also - correspond with data from other sources and are beyond doubt.

There is some foundation for connecting the results of the interview with the Indian merchant Barayev [sic - the name is clearly corrupt] and the instruction of the Empress Anna Ioannovna dated 11 February 1736. Its contents permit the supposition that after the interview with this merchant and the receipt from him of more detailed information, new proposals were made to the Court on the subject of trade with the East. The above mentioned instruction was, apparently, an answer to these proposals. This document dealt with measures for the development of trade with Central Asia and India.

In the fifth item of the instruction Kirilov was directed: ". . . in order to address the Indian company which was in Bukhara and has now returned to India, send the Indian marvari [banker] Barayev, giving him a copy of the privileges and up to 1,000 rubles to buy

goods, on condition that he pays this money back into the Treasury on his return. For the purposes of his dispatch we have ordered that his business in Astrakhan' be put in the care of the Senate while his chattels are sequestrated until his return, lest they get lost while he is away."(33)

So, from what has been quoted and from the other points of the instruction it appears that the ruling circles of Russia took energetic steps to develop trade with India through Central Asia.(34) To acquaint the Indian merchants with the favourable conditions of settlement and trade in Orenburg the envoy Barayev was provided with a copy of the privileges granted the newly built town.

The Orenburg trading company and commerce through Central Asia

The '40s of the 18th century are characterized by increased activity on the part of the authorities and merchants of Orenburg in broadening trade with Central Asia and India. I.I. Neplyuyev, the Governor of the Orenburg Region (kray), was an extremely determined advocate to trade development by all possible means between Russia and India and was tireless in demonstrating its benefits. V.N. Vitevskiy, the author of a lengthy monograph devoted to the life and work of Neplyuyev, wrote that he learned of the visits of Indian merchants to Bukhara, Khiva and Balkh where they eagerly bought up Russian goods imported from Orenburg and he had the idea of "establishing for Russian merchants a caravan trade route to India itself".(35) While doing all in his power to promote the development of trade through Central Asian merchants Neplyuyev at the same time gave energetic help to Russian merchants in their attempts to set up direct trade connexions with Indian merchants. He found tireless adherents in his closest assistants P.I. Rychkov and M.A. Tevkelev.

In 1750 Neplyuyev wrote a project "For the spread of Orenburg commerce to Khiva, Bukhariya and India".(36) Tevkelev took an active part in drafting the project. In this document, together with other measures which were intended to make trade with these countries safe, Neplyuyev proposed the foundation of a company with a fifteen year monopoly of trade.

The project provided for the company's composition from among the richer merchants trading in Orenburg. Among them were named the Moscow merchant Gavrila Zhuravlev; a Greek Ivan Mikhaylov, son of Mavrodiya; a Simbirsk merchant from the Orenburg department Ivan Tverdyshev, owner of a copper smithy; a local Tatar Abdul Khayalin and Aleksey Kekin from Rostov.(37) "If they do not want to combine, the project says, then, even though they will be trading separately, each

with his own goods and through his own people, nevertheless let them be called a company and combine in their councils and correspondence and let no others trade thither, unless one of them for any reason drops out when a worthy man from those who are willing should be put in his place, and which of these people shall be best, to them let the guidance be entrusted."(38) This gave an outline of the regulations of the proposed trading company.

The project also sketched out a programme of activity. The company was to found trading houses in the city of Bukhara, the most important towns of the khanate of Bukhara and also in Khiva. It would have its representatives in these places. The company was to equip caravans from Orenburg to Bukhara and other trading centres of Central Asia and thence to India. "And if. . . passage through those peoples shall be confirmed to be safe, then such small caravans should be sent every year and we must try to reach India itself. For which purpose in the caravans should be employed Tatars, Armenians or Greeks, or Russians of the common sort but who know the language and customs perfectly."(39)

Besides introducing Russian goods into Asian countries the company was also given the duty of attracting Asian, including Indian, merchants to Orenburg.(40)

Neplyuyev's views on the role of foreign trade as the most important source for strengthening the economy and political might of a landowning state linked him with the most prominent economists of the time. His project was a link in the chain of innumerable plans for overcoming Russia's economic backwardness and taking her foreign trade out of the hands of European companies, firms and private traders.

To present his project to the Senate Neplyuyev sent Rychkov to Petersburg. At the beginning of 1751 this document was approved in its basic provisions. However, their realization, especially in connexion with the Indian trade, made no progress. Neplyuyev revealed in his memoirs that to his chagrin he did not "achieve success in beginning the trade with India which I had undertaken for Russia's benefit". (41)

Nevertheless the Orenburg functionaries continued their efforts in this direction and put forward new projects for arranging trade with India. Thus we know of P.I. Rychkov's work "An explanation of the methods for carrying on Russian commerce from Orenburg with the Bukharan, and thence with the Indian, areas".

In his practical activity and in his scientific works, including the most fundamental of them, the "Topography of Orenburg", P.I. Rychkov

in spite of all difficulties and failures continued to demonstrate the possibility and advisability of establishing direct trade routes with India.(42)

At the beginning of the '50s Rychkov defended Neplyuyev's project. He intended to go himself to Bukhara to organize trade with Bukharan and Indian merchants. Rychkov explained his subsequent failures to execute his plans for trade with India by the Central Asian line by reference to insecure communications and the constant threat to caravans represented by nomad hordes. "And therefore, he wrote, I was forced to elucidate the most useful means of carrying on trade over the Caspian."

Rychkov proposed that traders and their goods should be sent along the river Ural to Gur'yev and then, holding to the eastern half of the Caspian, to Krasnovodsk Bay. He considered it essential to found here, on territory not belonging to Persia, a trans-shipment point for goods and a fortress for their defence. From here the goods were to be shipped to Balkh, Badakhshan and, further, to India. It was supposed that the defence of the caravans would be entrusted to Russians or, if an agreement could be made with them, to Bukharans.

In contrast to his predecessors in Orenburg who considered that the main thing in trade with Asian merchants was that they should bring gold and silver into the country, Rychkov was in favour of their importing other goods also.(43) In his view Russia's main exports ought to be textiles and furs, as well as lead, copper, iron and other metal wares. At that period the local iron and copper ores in the Orenburg Governorate-General were permitting a comparatively rapid development of industrial production.

Rychkov wanted "our local Asian commerce to spread and multiply over all tropical Asia to India itself".(44) By "commerce" he understood not only trade but also business and manufactures.

The projects put forward by Rychkov did not lead to the flowering of Russian-Indian trade he had dreamt of. The safer routes proposed by him proved of no help. In spite of all the importance of the problem of communications, by this period it was not they which formed the main obstacle to the establishment of direct and firm trade relations between Russia and India. The real causes must be sought in the basic changes which had taken place in the interior and exterior position of India in the third quarter of the 18th century.

Failure of trade expansion on British conquest of India

In the '50s and the beginning of the '60s took place the final disintegration of the Moghul State - a feudal power which in its heyday had included within its boundaries almost the whole of India.(45) A new outbreak of feudal discord was crowned by the disintegration of the unified state system. The position was further exacerbated by the invasion of Afghan forces under Ahmad Shah who in 1747-69 carried out a series of campaigns of conquest in India.

Characterizing the interior political situation which took shape in the country in the middle of the 18th century Marx wrote: "The supreme power of the Moghul was overthrown by his lieutenants. The might of his lieutenants was broken by the Marathas. The might of the Marathas was broken by the Afghans, and while they were all fighting each other the British made an unexpected appearance and managed to subjugate them all."(46)

The conquest of the Indian provinces of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa by the East India Company in the '50s and '60s of the 18th century served as a starting point for the process of the transformation of India into a British colony. Unrestrained plunder of the country by the British colonizers began. Streams of gold flowed from India to Britain and made fruitful the industrial revolution which had begun there. The conquest of India gave incredible acceleration to the process of the creation of the material and technical basis of British capitalism.

India, quite recently one of the greatest powers in the world, lost her political independence. The age-long international ties which connected India with many countries, especially those of Asia, were broken off. Trade relations gradually decayed. The British colonizers monopolized the foreign trade of India helped by the extension of the scope of the Navigation Acts to this newly acquired colony.(47)

It is in these circumstances that the main reason is to be found for the failure of attempts to establish direct trade relations and communications between India and Russia. But these opposing factors did not reveal their decisive significance immediately. Britain's conquest of India extended over almost a hundred years. At the end of the 18th century aggressive wars were taking place in the regions of India furthest removed from her Central Asian frontiers.

Orenburg functionaries of the end of the 18th century continued to make plans for direct trade between India and Russia. This is proved by the note of the Mufti of Orenburg Muhammad Jan Husain with the

title "A description written by Mufti of the Mahometan law Muhammad Jan Husain of the tracks leading from Orenburg to the capital of the realm of India, then the roundabout route from Gur'yev to the above-mentioned Indian capital, thence turning as far north as Petropavlovsk and thence along the Russian frontier to Gur'yev, with distances in versts; also about the inhabitants, capitals, etc."(50)

Muhammad Jan Husain had in view three possible trade-routes to India: the first from Gur'yev to Delhi (or Shah Jehanabad, or Shagi Ziga Nabat as it is called in the project), the second from the fortress of Orsk through Bukhariya to Delhi and the third from Petropavlovsk through Tashkent, Kashgar, Tibet and Kashmir to Delhi. The author gave a detailed description of each of these routes. He preferred the first which brought his project near the proposals of P.I. Rychkov.

Among the historical sources which deal with the question of Russian-Indian trade at the end of the 18th and beginning of the 19th centuries one is of especial interest - the "Description composed from written and oral information collected from a native of Asia, the prisoner Gabaydulla Amirov [presumably Abdullah Amir], who has wandered for more than 30 years and has spent most of his life in various parts of India".(51)

None of the projects for establishing Russian-Indian trade in the 18th century was ever put into practice and consequently they had no practical role. However, an analysis of these documents is of considerable scientific and historical interest and permits the following conclusions to be reached:

(1) The organization of direct, regular trade with India and the blazing of direct trade-routes to that country were at the centre of attention of Russia's ruling circles in the 18th century and were raised to the level of a matter of state.

(2) Together with and independently of the plans for establishing diplomatic and trading relations with India which were being worked out by the Tsarist Government, projects for Russian-Indian trade ties were being put forward by individual State functionaries, scientists and traders.

(3) Prominent Russians of the 18th century (P.F. Saltykov, V.N. Tatishchev, I.K. Kirilov, P.I. Rychkov, I.I. Neplyuyev) were active advocates of the establishment of Russian-Indian trade ties, worked out projects and tried to put them into practice. The great Russian scientist M.V. Lomonosov devoted a special work to this problem, "A short description of the various voyages in the northern seas and the demonstrations of a possible passage by the Siberian Ocean to East India".(52)

All these projects were distinguished by a desire to set up peaceful trade and good-neighbourly relations between Russia and India.

During subsequent centuries the traditions of respect and sympathy for the Indian people and its ancient culture, sympathy with its just battle, and a desire to establish with it good-neighbourly relations received further development among the best people of Russia who expressed the aspirations and hopes of her peoples.

Only the victory of the great October Socialist Revolution in Russia and the conquest of independence by the Indian people have created the conditions necessary for the establishment and growth of friendly and many-sided collaboration between the two peoples in the name of their benefit and world peace.

Author's Notes

Abbreviations:

TsGIAL - Central State Historical Archives, Leningrad.
AVPR - Archives of Russia's Foreign Policy, Archive Section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

(1) Karl Marx. SECRET DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY. London, 1899, p.87.

(2) A. Malinovskiy. "Information on the Despatch to India of Russian Envoys, Couriers and Merchants with Goods and of the Arrival of Indians in Russia from 1469 to 1751". TRUDY OBSHCHESTVA ISTORII I DREVNOSTEY ROSSIYSKIKH, Pt.VII, Moscow, 1837, p.175.

(3) TsGIAL. fund 1374, case 2399, pt.1. Correspondence on steps considered necessary to develop trade with India, Bukhara and Khiva; A. Popov. SNOSHENIYA ROSSII S KHIVOYU I BUKHAROYU PRI PETRE VELIKOM, St.Pb., 1853; F.I. Soymonov, OPISANIYE KASPIYSKOGO MORYA. St.Pb., 1763; Ye.L. Shteynberg, PERVYYE ISSLEDOVATELI KASPIYA (XVIII-XIX cc.), Moscow, 1949.

(4) Fedor Stepanovich Saltykov (d.1715), a supporter of political, economic and cultural changes in Russia. His proposals have been published from P.N. Tikhanov's MS. "The Propositions of Fedor Saltykov". Manuscript from P.N. Tikhanov's collection;

Appendix No.5 to the minutes of the meetings of OLDP [Society of Lovers of Ancient Literature](PAMYATNIKI DREVNEY PIS'MENNOSTI I ISKUSSTVA, Vyp.83, St.Pb., 1891); P. Pavlov-Sil'vanskiy. PROYEKTY REFORM V ZAPISKAKH SOVREMENNIKOV PETRA VELIKOGO. St.Pb., 1897, pp.32-35. Saltykov developed his proposals in a memorandum to the Tsar of 1714 headed "Expressions of Benefit to the State".

(5) A.S. Sgibnev. "Russian Attempts to Establish Relations with Japan". MORSKOY SBORNIK, 1869, No.1. St.Pb., p.40.

(6) Ya.V. Bryus (1670-1735), Russian functionary and scholar, one of Peter the First's closest associates.

(7) The expedition of the geodesists Yevreinov and Luzhin in 1719 and the expedition to the mouth of the Ob' in 1721. The 1st and 2nd Kamchatka expeditions (1725-30 and 1733-43) were subsequently carried out according to Peter's plans. (See A.V. Yefimov. IZ ISTORII RUSSKIKH EKSPEDITSIY NA TIKHOM OKEANE. Moscow, 1948.)

(8) A. Malinovskiy, op.cit., p.176. (See also A. Zaozerskiy, "An Expedition to Madagascar During the Reign of Peter the Great", in the book ROSSIYA I ZAPAD, Coll. No.1. Petrograd, 1923, pp.91-102.)

(9) A. Malinovskiy, op.cit., p.178.

(10) The Mission headed by the Moscow merchant Semen Malenkov had been dispatched to India by order of the Great Treasury in 1695. This was the first Russian mission to reach the capital of the Moghul Empire. It was received with favour by the Emperor Aurangzebe (1658-1707) and received a number of trade privileges.

(11) MATERIALY VOYENNO-ISTORICHESKOGO ARKHIVA GLAVNOGO SHTABA, Vol.1. St.Pb., 1871, pp.226-35, 252-3, 257-8.

(12) Ibid., p.239.

(13) A. Malinovskiy, op.cit., p.178.

(14) Leningrad Section of the Institute of History of the AN/SSSR. Manuscript book collection, no.410, sheet 21.

(15) Ibid. sheet 6 reverse. In another place the author mentions the accession of the Emperor Peter II which took place 7 May 1727.

(16) Ibid., sheet 20.

(17) Leningrad Section of the Institute of History of the AN/SSSR. Manuscript book collection, no.410, sheet 8 reverse.

(18) Ibid., sheet 10 reverse.

(19) Ibid., sheet 20 reverse.

(20) The manuscript is kept in the archives of the AN/SSSR among V.N. Tatishchev's Questionnaires on Siberia, fund 21, inventory 5, no.149, sheets 417-26.

(21) Ibid., sheets 417-18.

(22) In 1737-41 Tatishchev was I.K. Kirilov's successor in the construction of Orenburg, in 1741 he headed the Kalmyk Commission and in 1741-5 he was the Governor of Astrakhan'.

(23) See the archives of the AN/SSR, fund 95, inventory 5, no.42, sheets 153 and 220; fund 95, inventory 5, no.41, sheets 215-20.

(24) See "Eleven Geographical and Historical Problems of Bukhariya and Khiva" by V.N. Tatishchev. The MS. is kept in the MS. Section of the Library of the AN/SSSR and was published in N.A. Popov's book TATISHCHEV I YEGO VREMYA, Moscow, 1861, pp.560-3.

(25) N.A. Popov, op.cit., pp.365-6.

(26) I.K. Kirilov (1689-1737), prominent geographer and cartographer. The foundation of Orenburg is connected with his work.

I.I. Neplyuyev (1693-1773), Russian statesman and diplomatist. An active supporter of the changes brought about by Peter I. Head of the Orenburg Region 1742-58.

(27) See "Extract from a Project by Councillor of State Kirilov and Tevkelev on the Foundation of the Orenburg Commerce with 18 Asian Provinces: Khiva, Bukhariya, India, etc." AVPR, fund "Russia's Relations with Khiva, 1734-40", inventory 134/1, case 1, 10 sheets. The extract was made by the chancellory of the Orenburg Governorate-General.

(28) AVPR, fund "Russia's Relations with Khiva, 1734-40", inventory 134/1, case 1, sheet 4.

(29) Ibid., sheet 3.

(30) POLNOYE SOBRANIYE ZAKONOV ROSSIYSKOY IMPERII, Vol.IX, 1830, p.312.

(31) Ibid., p.345.

(32) AVPR, fund "Russia's Relations with Khiva, 1751-54", inventory 134/1, case 1, addition to sheet 10.

(33) Ibid., inventory 134/17, case 1, addition to sheet 10; see also TsGIAL, funds 1329, 1736, inventory 1, case 44, sheets 73 reverse and 74.

(34) See O.F. Solov'yev, IZ ISTORII RUSSKO-INDIYSKIKH SVYAZEY. Moscow, 1958.

(35) V.N. Vitevskiy. NEPLYUYEV I ORENBURGSKIY KRAY V PREZHNEM YEGO SOSTAVE DO 1758 G., Vol.III. Kazan', 1897, p.826.

(36) AVPR, fund "Russia's Relations with Khiva", inventory 134/1, case 1, sheets 2-5 reverse.

(37) Ibid., sheet 4 reverse. A. Malinovskiy wrote about this proposal in his cited work but made no reference to his source. See also V.N. Vitevskiy, op.cit., p.827.

(38) Ibid., sheets 4, reverse 5.

(39) Ibid., sheet 4 reverse.

(40) Ibid., sheet 5 reverse.

(41) ZAPISKI IVANA IVANOVICHA NEPLYUYEVA (1693-1773). New complete edition, St.Pb., 1893, pp.141-2.

(42) "The gentleman who composed the 'Topography of Orenburg' by his diligent labours makes clear among other things. . . that he owns the most convenient method of bringing about a growth of interest. . . (i.e. the growth of State income. -Authors) to be the carrying on of Russian trade with Bukhara and thence with India, for which he justly deserves the thanks of every patriot and especially of every Russian merchant." (YEZHEMESYACHNYYE SOCHINENIYA I IZVESTIYA O UCHENYKH DELAKH, November 1763, St.Pb., pp.401-8.)

(43) See SOCHINENIYA I PEREVODY, K POL'ZE I UVESELENIYU SLUZHASHCHIYE, July 1762, St.Pb., pp.610, 615.

(44) Ibid., p.615.

(45) The state of the Great Moghuls existed from 1526 to 1761.

(46) K. Marx and F. Engels, WORKS, Vol.9, p.224.

(47) The Navigation Acts were a series of acts of the English Parliament directed at the promotion of English trade and industry and their protection from foreign competition. The Acts forbade foreigners to trade in the English colonies without Government permission. They were repealed only in the middle of the 19th century.

(48) Mufti - a Muslim theologian and jurist. Representative of the higher Muslim clergy, approximating to a Christian Bishop or Metropolitan.

(49) Muhammad Jan Husain, first Mufti of the Orenburg Muslim Congregation which was organized in accordance with Catherine the Second's edict of 22 September 1788. Did much work among the Kazakhs, the mountaineers of the northern Caucasus and other peoples with the aim of bringing them within the Russian Empire. Frequently rewarded for his services by the Tsarist Government.
Husain was connected with the Free Economic Society. See MATERIALY PO ISTORII KAZAKHSKOY SSR (1785-1826), Vol.IV, Moscow-Leningrad 1940, App.21; M.P. Vyatkin. "The Journal of the Orenburg Mufti". ISTORICHESKIY ARKHIV, Vol.II, Moscow-Leningrad, 1939.

(50) The State Saltykov-Shchedrin Public Library, manuscript section. P.N. Tikhanov's collection, No.149, sheets 62 reverse - 76.

(51) See Pavel Nebol'sin's OCHERKI TORGOVLI ROSSII SO STRANAMI SREDNEY AZII, KHIVOY BUKHAROY I KOKANOM [sic] (SO STORONY ORENBURGSKOY LINII). St.Pb., 1856, App.III.
Passages from a description of the wanderings of Gabaydulla Amirov had been published even earlier in the magazine AZIATSKIY VESTNIK, 1825, Bk.1, pp.26-37, Bk.2, pp.102-20, Bk.3, pp.180-9, Bk.4, pp.241-56. (See also E.Ya. Lyusternik. RUSSKO-INDIYSKIYE EKONOMICHESKIYE SVYAZI V XIX V. Moscow, 1958, Ch.I and App.1.)

(52) See M.V. Lomonosov, POLNOYE SOBRANIYE SOCHINENIY, Vol.6, Moscow-Leningrad, Izd. AN/SSSR, 1952, pp.417-98. V.A. Perevalov, LOMONOSOV I ARKTIKA, Moscow-Leningrad, 1949. V. Antsiferov, LOMONOSOV I SEVERNYY MORSKOY PUT', Moscow-Leningrad, 1940.

THE POSITION OF THE INDIAN WORKING-CLASS, 1870-1939

The symposium INDIYA I AFGANISTAN (ed. A.M. Osipov, Moscow 1958) contains three articles on the Indian working-class during the British period: L.V. Shaposhnikova's "The Position of the Indian Proletariat and the Workers' Movement at the End of the 19th and Beginning of the 20th Century", L.A. Gordon's "The Position of the Working-Class of Bombay between the Two World Wars" and S.F. Levin's "The Position of the Indian Railway Proletariat on the Eve of and After the World Economic Crisis of 1929-33". All these articles rely to a great extent on official British information to which they give a Marxist interpretation. The following is a short summary of these articles in the order in which they are listed above.

* * *

I. 1870-1918

The position of the proletariat

"Large-scale capitalist production began to develop in India in the middle of the 19th century. Simultaneously there developed a proletariat whose ranks were filled by ruined peasants and craftsmen." The peasants had been ruined by colonial land reforms and an oppressive tax system, the craftsmen by the competition of factory industry. "The breakdown of the peasant economy proceeded much more quickly than the development of industry, which was unable to absorb the pauperized village population. There thus resulted a latent agrarian overpopulation."

"The heterogeneous composition of the Indian working-class (national, caste and religious differences) slowed down the unification of the workers." Both caste and religious differences were for obvious reasons fostered by the colonial administration and local capitalists but, nevertheless, the class-consciousness of the working-class grew.

The formation of a permanent Indian proletariat was also hindered by the rapid turnover of labour in the factories. Indian industry was still backward in that some factories were open only part of the year and provided only seasonal work, while some of the workers, although they had lost their land, "frequently continued to be personally dependent on the money-lender or landowner". Some of them, again, had land and regarded factory work as a secondary source of income.

"The double oppression to which the Indian worker was subject - from the British imperialists and the Indian capitalists - and the existence of a reserve army of workers in the form of hidden agrarian overpopulation determined the basic features of the material position of the working-class." The factory owners, for instance, were able to demand an inhumanly long working-day and to offer a wage so low that it did not even suffice to restore the worker's energy.

It is true that the mill-owners of Lancashire, who were alarmed by Indian competition, began a campaign in 1870 for factory legislation in India. The resulting Factory Acts, however, were ineffective: the first (1880) applied only to factories of more than 100 workers using mechanical power; the employment of children under seven was forbidden and the working-day for children from 7-12 was limited to nine hours; nothing was said of women's working conditions. The second Act of 1891 further limited the working-day. Both these Acts, however, were evaded and "factory legislation had no effective influence on the length of the working-day".

Because of the surplus of the supply of labour over the demand the value of labour dropped to a level below its worth. "The Indian worker's real wage could not ensure the restoration of the energy lost in the process of production. In addition this wage fell steadily." Over the period as a whole the index of wages rose by eight per cent while that of food prices rose by 30 per cent. Even though the purchase of food absorbed the greater part of a worker's wages an average family of three people with an income of 14 rupees could not buy for its members the necessary 3,000 calories per day.

"Inhuman conditions of work, a beggarly level of wages and hard living conditions led to the physical exhaustion of the bulk of the Indian proletariat."

The workers' movement

No sooner had it appeared than India's industrial proletariat began its battle against its exploiters. "At first these protests were fortuitous in character and directed mainly against individual

capitalists." The strike movement began in the 1870s and developed in the 1880s. These strikes bear witness to the class-consciousness of the progressive part of the Indian proletariat, and show some organization.

In the 1890s the strike became the dominant form of the working-class's fight for economic rights, and as time went on they became more stubborn and protracted. Joint action by workers of various branches of industry began to take place. Workers' unity, however, continued to be hindered by artificially inflamed Hindu-Muslim rivalry.

At the beginning of the 20th century the strike battle, although still without organization, began to take on a class character. Religious and caste differences were being erased in the course of the common struggle. The workers' protests already had a political overtone. The Indian working-class's determination to take part in the struggle for independence was shown by the wave of strikes during the revolutionary upsurge of 1905-8.

II. The Working-Class of Bombay, 1919-39

[L.A. Gordon's article takes the story into another stage but restricts it to one city. However, the author in his introduction writes that the Bombay proletariat was exceptionally large (500,000) and formed the "militant vanguard" of the Indian workers' movement, while social conflicts showed themselves with especial sharpness in the city. For this reason, he argues, Bombay can be taken as in some ways typical of a country suffering capitalist exploitation under foreign imperialism.]

The colonial regime in India left its imprint on the condition of the working-class: it was responsible for the preservation of feudal forms of exploitation, for the immense relative overpopulation and for arbitrary police rule - all of which produced a "sharp deterioration in the condition of the working-class".

The most important feature of capitalist exploitation in colonial India was the sale of labour at a price several times below its full worth. The existence of inexhaustible reserves of labour "allowed the bourgeoisie not to pay for the upkeep of the workers' families". "In countries with a developed capitalist economy the increase in the working-class takes place mainly by means of its own natural reproduction. For this reason the bourgeoisie is here forced to assure the proletariat a wage which permits the existence not only of the worker himself

but of his family also. In colonial India, where relative overpopulation many times surpassed the active labour force, the increase could quite easily take place from this reserve of surplus labour. As a result the lower wage limit reached the value of the minimum necessary for the existence of one worker only, but not his family." This meant that his family also had to work, and this in its turn helped to preserve the lower and worse forms of capitalist production - those "based on the cruel exploitation of female and child labour". The preservation of these forms of production is, of course, characteristic of all capitalist countries, but they were especially well developed in colonial India. The women worked in workshops which used no mechanical power and took work home for their children to do. Official British figures do not include these children. The Indian workers, therefore, "suffered not only from the development of capitalism but from its insufficient development". [It should be mentioned here that the USSR is still, or at any rate was until 1956, one of the few countries where women work in coal mines. -Ed.]

"Feudal survivals" - caste, religious and national distinctions - continued to hinder the unity of the working-class and to be supported by the authorities and the capitalists. Money-lending and bribery and corruption, both inevitable consequences of the surplus of the supply of labour over the demand, also tended to depress the condition of the working-class.

"The combination of all these features brings about a special colonial form of the capitalist exploitation of the working-class, characterized by the acquisition by the capitalist not only of the surplus value but also of a considerable part of the necessary product. Meanwhile the condition of the working-class steadily deteriorated. Colonial exploitation faced the working-class literally with physical destruction."

The slump brought widespread unemployment. The real wage of the Bombay textile workers during the slump cannot be calculated merely by comparing nominal wages with the cost of living, as is normal, but must also take into account the number of unemployed. If this is done it appears that real wages were lower in 1938 than in 1914. The disproportion is increased when one considers also the fact that the workers' social and cultural needs had much increased.

"The peculiarities of the position of the working-class in colonial India conditioned the distinctive nature of its class struggle. The first task of the Indian proletariat was to destroy colonial forms of exploitation. Therefore the direct political aim of the workers' movement to overthrow imperialist rule. The role of the working-class in the Indian people's victorious struggle for independence shows that it coped honourably with this task."

III. The Railway Workers, 1929-33

S.F. Levin begins his article with a survey of the reasons for which the railways of India were built, in which he states that they were primarily designed to facilitate the exploitation of the country and served also as a profitable field for the investment of British capital: by 1870 India's railway debt had passed £55m. They also had a military role, especially in Burma and on the North-West Frontier.

Although the British capitalists in building the railways did not have the interests of the Indian people in mind, Levin notes, the development of railways had one good result in that it accelerated the development of capitalism and of a working-class. The railway workers are the oldest and most progressive section of the Indian working-class and, because they are scattered over the country, have had the greatest "revolutionizing" influence on other sections of the working-class. Nevertheless the railway workers, like workers of other industries, suffered from the preservation (helped by the Government and railway administration) of caste, national and religious differences.

The railway administration made profits in two ways: by plundering the peoples of India through railway loans and debts, etc., and by exploiting the railway workers. The existence of an immense reserve of labour, caused by comparative agrarian overpopulation, meant that labour could be bought at a price lower than its true worth. In 1930 one half of the labour force was receiving less, sometimes much less, than 20 rupees per month. According to the calculations of the Indian economist R. Mukerjee the minimum sum necessary to keep a worker and his family was 30 rupees 13 annas. The result of this disproportion was malnutrition and a crippling load of debt.

Working conditions also were unenviable. Although the working-day was officially limited to 11 hours with a 60 hour week, the workers not infrequently worked 70-84 hours per week and in any case the limitation applied only to salaried staff, not to workers hired by the day. A piece-work and bonus system was in force but did not work to the benefit of the worker: if he overfulfilled his norm the company took half the profit, while if he underfulfilled his norm he paid the whole of the deficit. In fact this system merely made work more intense and reduced wages.

As in other industries, the workers were also affected by bribery and corruption among the administration, by the system of fines and deductions (which were often made whether there had been any fault or not) and by the high cost of accommodation.

The slump caused a drop in industrial production and trade and, consequently, in freight traffic, and the Indian railways began to lose money. The companies met this challenge by attempting to put the whole burden on the shoulders of the workers: the railways were rationalized, with reduced rates for piece-work, workers were dismissed and wages were reduced (although they had already been falling behind the cost of living). By 1932 wages had fallen by 40 per cent in comparison with 1929.

Responsibility for this state of affairs falls on the Anglo-Indian Government, which either owned or controlled all Indian railways. This fact of governmental ownership or control had a bearing also on the labour movement on the railways, since any protest of the Indian workers against working conditions was both a political act (since the railways were Government owned or controlled), and a protest against national oppression (since the managerial positions were occupied by Britons or Anglo-Indians).

Labour relations on the railways were, therefore, of first importance to the Government, which tried to gain control of the workers' movement by means of "yellow" workers' organizations. An example is provided by the local committees of railway workers and employees which vetted the workers' demands and put before the management only those which met with their approval. The Government also made use of Social Reformists "connected with the British Labour Party" to split the workers' organizations and prevent their unity.

Neither of these tactics worked however. Strikes took place at Lilloa (1928: 28,000 workers involved), on the Southern Indian Railway (1929: 17,000 workers) and on the Great Indian Peninsular Railway (80,000 workers involved). These strikes helped to reunite the railway workers and to unmask the treachery of the Social Reformists. The strikes of 1930-3 frequently had a clearly political character.

S I N K I A N G, 1 9 2 8 – 59*

History, 1928–49 – The principles of local national autonomy – Administrative history, 1949–59 – Administrative divisions – Trade and industry, 1949–57 – Material welfare and culture – Diagrams of administrative organization at various levels.

K.F. Kotov's book MESTNAYA NATSIONAL'NAYA AVTONOMIYA V KITAYSKOY NARODNOY RESPUBLIKE (NA PRIMERE SIN'TSZYAN-UYGURSKOY AVTONOMNOY OBLASTI) appeared in Moscow in 1959. It is a work apparently based on printed, mainly Russian, sources which contains less information specifically on Sinkiang than its title leads one to expect. The author's stated aim is to "trace, on the example of the Sinkiang-Uygur Autonomous Region the most multinational area of the Chinese People's Republic, the process of the construction of local national autonomy in the Chinese People's Republic, to show its essence and legal position and also the basic achievements of the people's democratic state in liquidating factual economic and cultural inequality between nations." Considerable space has been given in the following treatment to the pre-Communist history of Sinkiang, to which Kotov devotes an introduction.

Throughout the article English translations have been used for the Chinese administrative divisions as follows:

Chinese	Russian	English
chou	okrug	district
hsien	uyezd	county
ch'ü	rayon	area
hsiang	volost'	rural area

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* For previous articles on Sinkiang see CAR, 1956, No.1, pp.72–75, No.4, pp.432–47; 1957, No.2, pp.144–62; 1958, No.1, pp.76–88, No.3, pp.264–71; 1959, No.1, pp. 84–89 and 93–96, No.4, 398–408; 1960, No.1, pp.80–85, No.3, pp.332–3.

History, 1928-49

The following section is a summary of Kotov's introduction. During the period 1929-33 Governor Chin Shu-jen, a nominee of the Central Government, carried out an oppressive policy. All administrative posts were held by Chinese and the regime was characterized by Great-Han chauvinism. The Kuomintang's policy of economic and national oppression called forth a revolt in 1931-4. "Since the Kuomintang armed forces proved incapable of suppressing this movement, the local satraps began to manoeuvre. Chiang Kai-shek's Government was forced to make some temporary concessions. . . In April 1933 a new Government was formed in Sinkiang headed by Sheng Shih-ts'ai." The new Government's declarations of support for national equality, the democratization of the administration, etc., were "demagogic" screens for its activity. Therefore the fight of the Uygur and Kazakh peoples for freedom from the oppression of the Chinese Government and their own feudal leaders had failed. The reason for this was that there was no proletariat or Communist Party to lead them. As a result the local feudal leaders managed to obscure the class nature of this national battle and to preach the unity of the interests of all classes of one or another nationality. Such feudal leaders were Sabit Jamulla, Muhammad Bugra, Shamansur, etc.

> [Here Kotov gives an account of the growth of the Chinese Communist Party under the influence of the October Revolution and of its nationalities policy. "Shoulder to shoulder with the great Han nation the national minorities took part in the revolutionary battle."]

This process was especially evident in Sinkiang, where "under the influence of the revolutionary battle of the Chinese people in all areas of the province the national liberation struggle of the peoples inhabiting it was widely developed."

Under the new regime the Kuomintang continued to harry progressive elements. Sheng Shih-ts'ai, "champion of the reactionary regime of Chiang Kai-shek in Sinkiang", introduced fascist methods of government. In 1939 over 1,000 "progressives" were imprisoned and in 1940, 28 were buried alive. In 1941 Sheng created the provocative organization "Six Stars for the Study of Marxism-Leninism" which was, in fact, a secret-police force. In 1941 an American Consulate was established in Urumchi, and with their help Sheng organized the pro-fascist "Committee for Carrying our a New Census" which "occupied itself with the physical destruction of Communists and other revolutionaries". [In fact the American Consulate in Urumchi was not established until 1943. -Ed.]

In the last 12 years of Kuomintang rule in Sinkiang over 12,000 "of the best fighters for the people's cause" died in Kuomintang gaols, including three Chinese Communists - Chen T'an-chiu, Mao Tse-min and Lin Chi-lu. This was accompanied by intensified national and economic oppression of the non-Chinese nationalities of Sinkiang. In March 1944 the Government decreed that 10,000 horses should be supplied to the Kuomintang Army. In August as a result of this decree the peasants and nomads of the Nilkh county of the Ili district rose in revolt. The Nilkh area was completely liberated by November and the capture of Kuldja soon followed. The revolt was led by a Central staff formed on 12 November in Kuldja, of which Akhmedzhan Kasimi was a member. The formation of a regular army was declared on 8 April 1945. [Kotov calls this army the National Army of Sinkiang. -Ed.]

This revolt was a national liberation movement of the broad toiling masses of the various nationalities led by "such fighters for democracy" as Kasimi, Sayfuddin Azizov, etc. The revolutionary battle of the masses of the nationalities of Sinkiang merged into that of the Chinese people. "The progressive representatives of the national minorities became convinced that only the victory of the Chinese people . . . could bring freedom to the nationalities of the country." Consequently the battle of the national minorities took place under the influence of the Chinese people led by the CPC. The revolutionary battle of the national minorities of Sinkiang was inspired by the victories of the Communist army and encouraged by their reforms in newly liberated areas.

The National Army had completely liberated the Tarbagatay district by July 1945, the Altay district by September and the towns of Aqsu and Bay by October. This encouraged an armed uprising of the "working masses" of Tashkurgan who were soon joined by the Aqsu, Kashgar and Yarkand districts.

The Kuomintang, having failed with force, now tried to regulate the "Sinkiang question" by peaceful means. The Central Staff accepted their representations, and negotiations began in Urumchi in October 1945 and lasted for 8 months. A preliminary agreement was signed in January 1946 and the final agreement on 6 June 1946, to come into force on 1 July. The agreement provided for some democratization of social and political life: a coalition government was to contain 15 Uygurs and 10 representatives of other nationalities; the local languages were to be given equal status with Chinese at all levels of the administration; freedom of speech, assembly and organization were guaranteed, as was the continued existence of the National Army.

The Coalition Government contained as Vice-Chairman Akhmedzhan Kasimi together with Sayfuddin Azizov, Rakhimzhan Sabirov and Abdukarim

Abbesov, all members of the revolutionary movement. Their political programme provided for all the democratic freedoms, friendship with the Soviet Union, aid to peasants and nomads, the development of industry, transport and public health, democratic elections, etc.

Kuomintang reactionaries, however, foiled this programme: the elections to local "organs of State power" were carried out by means of terror, blackmail and falsification and produced no essential changes. In effect all the points of the treaty remained unfulfilled. Far from decreasing, the Kuomintang armed forces in Sinkiang increased by 500 per cent by the end of 1946. The Kuomintang secret police retained its power. Representatives of the local nationalities were not appointed to local judicial posts.

In the spring of 1947 the Kuomintang forces, having regrouped, began an attack on the free areas and began to persecute the democratic elements throughout the province. The representatives of the national liberation movement left the Government.

At this the Kuomintang formed a new government under "the Uygur nationalist and agent of the Anglo-American imperialism, Masud". "Carrying out the will of his masters" Masud began to persecute the democratic elements in Sinkiang, helped by the "nationalist bands of Osman, Janim Khan, Yulbars and Kalibek [? Qali Beg] and the bands of the head of the 'black hundreds' Sung Hsi-lien". [Sung was in fact the commander of the Chinese forces in Urumchi. -Ed.] "Replying on the support of the Kuomintang and the American imperialists they tried to submit the national liberation movement to the interests of the Panturkists' fight for the unification of the mythical 'Turkic nation' (natsiya tyurkov), for the creation of a 'Turkic state'." The peoples of Sinkiang, however, understood the role of Masud and gave their support to the Central Staff.

In January 1948 the "Union for the Defence of Peace and Democracy", a form of Sinkiang national front, was created under the guidance of the CPC and did much to help the national liberation movement in the province.

Under the impact of the National Army's successes Masud's Government ceased to exist. At the beginning of 1949 a new interim government was formed under Burhan. This government formally broke with the Kuomintang and joined Communist China on 26 September 1949.

In October the Chinese National Liberation Army entered Urumchi.

[As might be expected, Kotov's account of this period is incomplete, its most glaring omission being any treatment of Soviet influence in Sinkiang during Sheng Shih-ts'ai's governorship. Governor Sheng is regarded as being a faithful subordinate of Chiang Kai-shek. Consequently Kotov does not mention Soviet armed intervention in 1933 (the "Altay Volunteers"), or Soviet economic penetration under the terms of the "Secret Pact" of 1931 and the "Tin Mines Agreement" of 1940. Sheng Shih-ts'ai's interest in Communism is alluded to only when Kotov mentions his creation of a "provocative" organization for the study of Marxism-Leninism in 1941.

It appears likely from some verbal similarities that Kotov's account is based on an earlier article by A.G. Yakovlev, "The National Liberation Movement of the Peoples of Sinkiang (1944-9)", UCHENYYE ZAPISKI INSTITUTA VOSTOKOVEDENIYA, No.XI (KITAYSKIY SBORNIK), 1955. The two articles have the same general viewpoint. Kotov, however, does not go as far as Yakovlev on the question of the 1931-4 uprisings: Yakovlev writes that they were "on the whole reactionary" and "pursued the aims of the creation of an 'independent Muslim state'". Kotov has also given less emphasis than Yakovlev to the alleged machinations of British, American and Japanese imperialists in Sinkiang. Neither Soviet author mentions the man who is named by most Western writers as the leader of the 1944 Ili revolt (Kasimi is named merely as a member of the Central Staff), Ali Khan Türe, who is said to have had Soviet backing. -Ed.]

The principles of local national autonomy

Kotov gives five principles. The first four, which are of little but theoretical interest, are: democratic centralism; the democratic dictatorship of the people; equal rights for all nations and national groups; and the national territorial principle. The fifth is the principle of the "nativization" (korenizatsiya) of the apparatus of self-government, seen as implying the translation of the proceedings of the government into the languages of the local nationalities and the introduction of members of these nationalities into the local administration. The first thing involved is the "education and re-education" of national "cadres": by 1958 specially established schools and courses had produced 400,000 "cadres" from among the local nationalities.

Kotov also stresses the necessity of using the local languages in State administration. Apart from measures to develop these languages (reform or creation of scripts, etc.) by a special Party decree of March 1957, every Chinese "cadre" was bound to learn within 3-5 years

one of the minority languages of the region in which he worked.

The process of "nativization" obviously aroused nationalist aspirations in some places, since Kotov emphasizes that the term must not be confused with "Uygurization", "Tibetization", etc. and that it does not mean the removal of Chinese and other "cadres". Furthermore "in mixed regions where Chinese and other nationalities are in a minority, workers of the basic nationality promise to show essential tact and the maximum attention to their interests and needs".

Besides being opposed by "local nationalists", "nativization" was also unwelcome to "great power [i.e. Chinese] chauvinists". While the former wanted "autonomy only for the basic nationality", the latter ignored local peculiarities and opposed the inclusion of representatives of local, formerly oppressed, nationalities in the apparatus of self-government.

Both these tendencies were condemned by the VIIIth Congress of the CPC.

"Democratic centralism" is a system which claims to give the national minorities "unlimited opportunities to develop their economy and culture, national in form and socialist in content", while reserving to the "central organs" of government the general task of guiding the regional People's Committee (Narodnyy komitet) with the right of changing or annulling "inexpedient" measures of the regional People's Committee or Assembly of People's Representatives. The various departments of the life and economy of the region are under the guidance of both the regional People's Committee and the appropriate central ministry.

Apart from the normal functions of State organs the "organs of self-government" have various duties of which the following are the most important:

Economic construction: to work out the regional plan and control its fulfilment, and to work out and control region, district, county, city and rural area expenditure; to manage the region's State-owned industrial and trading establishments; to carry out "socialist transformations" in industry, trade and agriculture.

Cultural construction: to manage public health, social security, public assistance, primary and secondary education, educational and scientific organizations and foundations; to control and observe the organization of higher education, physical culture and sport.

In 1958 the autonomous regions were given greater control over their finances. Besides the above general responsibilities the Sinkiang-Uygur Autonomous Region has the right to create social defence brigades and to work out proposals for autonomy, which, however, have to be confirmed by the Permanent Committee of the All-Chinese Assembly of People's Representatives.

Kotov emphasizes that "in no field of economy or State control does the Sinkiang-Uygur Autonomous Region have full plenary powers. It carries on its activity according to State direction and under the control of the central State organs of the CPR."

Administrative history, 1949-59

Immediately after the liberation the Kuomintang system of rule was abolished and the Chinese Army set up "organs of military control", that is to say, military committees collaborating with the local People's Governments, in all districts except the three northern ones "where organs of people's power had already been set up" [presumably by the National Army of Sinkiang -Ed.]. The role of the military committees was, in the words of Lyu Shao-tsi, "to crush reactionaries by force and simultaneously protect and inspire the people and help them to set up Conferences of People's Representatives - organs of people's power of all degrees which. . . will gradually receive full power."

This system was especially necessary in Sinkiang because of the presence there of Kuomintang bands and secret societies. In many areas reactionaries infiltrated into the State apparatus and sabotaged the measures of people's power. Out of 95 employees of the State institutions of Kashgar 53 were "after painstaking investigation unmasked as spies of various intelligence services".

In order to crush exploitation and reaction representatives of the military committees were placed in each newly created administrative institution to agitate among the "cadres". "Lackeys of imperialism and reaction" were shown the door.

The first constitutional document of the CPR, accepted 1 September 1949, proclaimed a policy of local national autonomy and the creation of "united democratic governments" containing representatives of each nationality. In December of that year a "united democratic government" was founded in Sinkiang with 31 members - nine Uygurs, three Kazakhs, two Chinese, two Dungans and one representative of each other nationality. [As there are 13 nationalities in Sinkiang this system accounts only for 25 members. -Ed.]

(Reproduced with due acknowledgment from *China's Changing Map* by Theodore Shabad, Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1956.)

To replace the old Kuomintang baotsya system a new system of local administration was set up: local people's governments were established in districts, counties, areas, rural areas and villages (kishlak). Of the ten district chairmen four were Uygurs, three Kazakhs, two Chinese and one Mongol. Of the 78 county chairmen 45 were Uygurs, 13 Kazakhs, 11 Chinese, four Mongols, three Kirgiz and one Tatar.

In the second half of 1950 a reorganization began of the already existing organs of people's power in the three northern districts of Tarbagatay, Altay and Ili: the Governors were replaced by Administrative-Control Boards and local people's governments were established in counties, areas and villages.

The system of military control lasted for only a few months and power began to pass into the hands of the local Conferences of People's Representatives of All Strata of the Populace and to the local people's governments elected by them.

These Conferences were a transition stage of popular representation, existing while the economy of the country was being reconstructed. They existed at village, rural area, county, city and province level. Their most important functions were to debate and make proposals about the work of the people's governments and to publicize the decisions of the governments among the people. During the first period of their activity their resolutions were no more than recommendations. From the middle of 1951, however, they began to exercise the powers later possessed by the Assemblies of People's Representatives. After this date the Conferences selected the corresponding people's governments, controlled their activity and confirmed their budgets, and their resolutions had the force of commands. This stage was completed in Sinkiang by the end of 1952.

At the first session of the Provincial (Provintsialnyy) Conference, April-May 1951, of the 530 delegates 470 had been selected by various social organizations, State institutions and the Chinese Army and the rest had been nominated by the Provincial Government. Workers, peasants, traders, intelligentsia, students, the Communist and other parties and Buddhist, Muslim and other religious groups were represented. The proportions of delegates according to nationalities were as follows: Uygurs - 40.3 per cent; Chinese - 25.1 per cent; Kazakhs - 14.1 per cent; Dungans - 4.7 per cent; Kirgiz - 3.1 per cent; Tatars - 2.7 per cent; Russians - 0.7 per cent; others - 9.3 per cent. [The high proportion of Chinese to Uygurs (population figures 300,000 and 3,640,000) shows that representation was not straightforwardly proportionate. It is possible, however, that in the Conferences, as later in the Assemblies (see below), the urban population was more heavily represented than the rural population, which might account for the high proportion of Chinese representatives. -Ed.]

Between sessions the Conferences were represented by consultative councils elected by them. The resolutions of the consultative councils had the force only of recommendations. [Although they represented the Conferences, to which in theory the local people's governments were subordinate, they had no power to command the governments, their relations with them being based on "cooperation and mutual aid". As the consultative councils sat only four times a year at provincial level and once a month at city and county level it seems obvious that the Conferences can have exercised only minimal control of the governments, especially of the government of the province. -Ed.]

With the beginning of the first Five-Year Plan in 1953 the Conferences ceased to answer the demands of the developing society and were replaced by Assemblies of People's Representatives elected by general suffrage. General elections were held in 1953-4.

[The electoral law of the CPR provides for greater representation of the urban population than of the rural population, the proportion of urban to rural representatives rising from 4 to 1 in local Assemblies to 8 to 1 in the All-Chinese Assembly. Apart from this peculiarity, however, representation is proportionate. Only the representatives of towns (poselki), rural areas, national rural areas and of regions (rayon) of cities and of cities not divided into regions are directly elected by the people. The higher Assemblies, from county up, are elected by the lower Assemblies. These higher elections take place by secret ballot; the lower ones may take place by secret ballot or by show of hands. In the first general elections in Sinkiang, according to Kotov, they took place by show of hands. -Ed.]

Although candidates for election could be put forward by the Communist and democratic parties, by people's organizations and by electors not represented in these parties and organizations, however, "as a rule the nomination of candidates was made by the parties, organizations and electors jointly, which testified to the solidarity of the Chinese[sic] people around the Communist Party." Candidates chosen in this way were put before a local electoral commission which made up a list. The list was then discussed by "groups of electors" and published.

The election, which was carried out in stages, covered 69 autonomous counties, administrative counties and cities and 2,175 inhabited points. The remaining four autonomous districts, 14 counties and 247 inhabited points lay in mainly livestock-breeding areas where there had been hardly any "socialist transformations" and were consequently not affected by the elections. In these areas, instead of Assemblies, Conferences of People's Representatives were called. The Sinkiang Provincial Assembly contained: 231 Uygurs, 48 Kazakhs, 45 Chinese, 14 Dungans, nine Mongols, four Uzbeks and two Russians. The Provincial Assembly was elected for four years, the others for two. New elections were held in 1956 and 1958. The Regional Assembly sits once a year, county, city and city-region Assemblies twice a year, and rural area, national rural area and town Assemblies three or four times a year. Extraordinary sessions can be called. Proceedings are carried on in Chinese and Uygur, with translations for deputies of other nationalities. In the Assemblies of national rural areas the language of the local nationality is spoken.

The Assemblies' executive organs are the People's Committees, which are responsible both to their Assembly and to the superior People's Committee, either of which organizations can annul their measures.

According to Article 48 of the Statute on Sinkiang's Autonomy, the People's Committees of region, county and city Assemblies can appoint special organs in their districts, areas and quarters respectively, to which they delegate their authority in these areas. "At the present stage of the construction of society" this sytem is becoming superfluous in Sinkiang. So, at the end of January 1956 "the directorate of the specially empowered Ili district was abolished and its functions transferred to the People's Committee of the Ili-Kazakh autonomous district." The territory of the former Ili district was split between the Ili-Kazakh autonomous district and the Baratalinsk-Mongol autonomous district. In August 1956 directorates were similarly liquidated in the districts of Southern Sinkiang and Yarkand, and in May 1958 the Urumchi administrative area was abolished and its territory split between the Sandzhiy autonomous district and the city of Urumchi.

[For information on the administrative system in region, autonomous district, city and county see accompanying diagrams at end. -Ed.]

Administrative divisions

Kotov devotes section 3 of Chapter II to administrative and territorial divisions. Unfortunately his account contains less detail than is to be found in CAR, Vol.IV, No.4, pp.437-41. He does, however, give the name of one extra rural area - the Azat-Avat Tadzhik rural area, Kaglyk county.

Trade and industry, 1949-57

In contrast with the Kuomintang period when Chinese merchants, local feudal lords and "compradore" bourgeoisie plundered the working masses, now trade is in the hands of the State. In the first half of 1957 in Sinkiang there were nine State trading establishments of oblast scale, 78 of district and city scale and 645 of county scale. Prices of agricultural produce have been stabilized and the State trading organizations serve the most remote parts of Sinkiang.

The growth of village cooperatives, which buy their members' produce and sell consumer goods to them at market price or lower, is also playing a big part in stabilizing local prices. The peasants are getting more tools, draught animals, pest-killers, plants and seeds.

As State trade increases private trade diminishes: between 1954 and 1955 its share in the retail trade of Sinkiang fell from 42.1 to 31.3 per cent. By the end of 1956, 23,875 private trading organizations (95.64 per cent of the total) underwent "socialist transformation".

During 1947-50 the workers of Sinkiang not only rebuilt their destroyed industry but even developed it. With Soviet help a steel mill, a machine-tractor station, a cement factory, an electric power-station and a coal-mine were built. Textile, flour-milling and vegetable oil factories have also been built. In 1956 six cotton-cleaning factories were completed in Kashgar. Others are to be found in Kashgar, Miral-bash, Yarkand, Fayzabad and Merket counties. Finally there are non-ferrous metal mills, an oil industry and the "October" car repair factory, which is especially important in a region where the truck is the basic form of transport.

In all there are more than 400 industrial undertakings in Sinkiang. Sinkiang's oil is now processed in Sinkiang itself and the refinery built in 1953 with Soviet help supplies Sinkiang with petrol, paraffin and diesel fuel.

Owing to Soviet help oil refining, the mining of non-ferrous and rare metals and open-cast mining are all carried on with the latest equipment.

Industrial production in 1957 was 6.62 times more than in 1952 and its value had increased by 164.12 per cent. In 1958 nine times more iron ore was produced than in 1957, 1.4 times more steel, 2.2 times more coal, 47 per cent more electricity and 272 per cent more oil, and the value of 1958's industrial production was 66.71 per cent above 1957's. Estimated production increase for 1959 is: industry - 116.2 per cent, agriculture - 109.3 per cent.

In 1958 there were 125,000 workers in Sinkiang, many of non-Chinese nationalities, while the number of managers and technicians of minority nationalities is growing: in the Dushan'tsy oilfield six natives hold the post of deputy director and deputy section-chief; the drilling section has trained more than 300 engineers and technicans.

The average wage of workers and employees increased between 1952-7 by 27.1 per cent while its purchasing power was more than doubled.

Material welfare and culture

In 1959 there were 1,218 secondary and 4,534 primary schools. The number of primary school pupils, 307,000 in 1952, had risen to over 718,000 in 1958-9. Corresponding numbers for secondary schools are: 1952 - 16,162; 1958-9 - 146,000. Children of all nationalities receive education in their native languages, and textbooks and educational aids are published in these languages.

Special committees have been formed to combat adult illiteracy. To teach Chinese workers, a special system has been worked out by which sufficient ideograms can be learned in 300 hours to make reading possible. In 1957, 500,000 people were attending literacy courses.

In July 1954 in the Kyzyl Kirgiz autonomous area a committee was formed to develop a Kirgiz national alphabet. "Having studied the experience of the Soviet Union in the working out of national alphabets, this committee worked out a Kirgiz national alphabet numbering 30 characters." (See CAR, 1958, No.1, pp.81-82.)

In order to produce "cadres" an Academy of National Minorities has been founded. In 1956 this Academy had 1,240 students. Agricultural, mining and Russian language institutes have also been established. The Urumchi Medical Institute, built in 1956, had 399 students in 1957 and will have 3,000. There are also mining, stockbreeding, forestry and technical institutes and nurses' and teachers' training colleges. In 1956 there were 24 such special educational establishments.

As a result of these improved educational facilities the number of "national cadres" is increasing: in 1957, 61,700 natives were employed in State organs (54 per cent of the total), and 3,000 natives were chairmen of People's Committees. In the same year 44,000 natives were members of the regional Communist Party (47 per cent of the total membership), 4,900 of whom were women.

Thirteen regional newspapers and 31 county newspapers are published in Uygur, Kazakh, Chinese, Mongolian and Sibo. Also since 1947 more than 2,000 poems, 170 short stories and novels, and 50 plays and scenarios have been published by native writers and a Sinkiang section of the Chinese Writers' Union has been set up.

In 1958 a new 1,200-seat theatre, the "People's Theatre", was built in Urumchi. Sinkiang now has eight theatres, 63 cinemas, 100 houses of culture, 185 mobile cinemas, and libraries and museums. A television transmitter is to be built in Urumchi in 1959 and the radio-relay network is being extended.

To teach hygiene and improve public health a large number of establishments have been set up to train doctors, medical orderlies, nurses, etc., several tens of thousands of whom have already been trained. Sinkiang now possesses 63 maternity hospitals, and every national area has its own hospital and out-patients department. Medical treatment is free.

The workers' material welfare has been improved by the liquidation of unemployment, the introduction of the 8-hour day, the establishment

of a fair wage, paid according to the amount of work done, with equal wages for women, a scheme of State insurance which provides sick-pay, holidays with pay and the extension to workers in private industry of all the rights enjoyed by those in State enterprises, including the right to join trade unions.

Kotov's book also contains a section on the collectivization of agriculture. This section would have added little to Bakhamov's article, which was dealt with in CAR, 1960, No.3, pp.332-3, and has consequently been omitted. The book as a whole suffers from insufficient concentration on problems which are specifically those of Sinkiang: many of Kotov's observations apply equally to any other part of China. The sections of which this is most true are those on the establishment, organization and method of work of the People's Courts and Department of Public Prosecutions (prokuratura), which accordingly have also been omitted. -Ed. CAR.

1. The Organs of Self-Government of the Sinkiang-Uygur Autonomous Region



2. The Organs of Self-Government of the Ili-Kazakh Autonomous District



3. The Organs of State Power and State Direction of the City of Kuldja



4. The Organs of State Power and State Direction in the Counties



THE BORDERLANDS IN THE SOVIET PRESS

Below are reviewed reports on the Borderlands countries appearing in Soviet newspapers received during the period 1 July-30 September 1960. Owing to the large amount of material it has been found impracticable to include Soviet reports on India.

AFGHANISTAN

The Kabul festivities marking the 42nd anniversary of Afghanistan's independence were widely reported in the Soviet press. King Muhammad Zahir Shah was quoted (P. 25.8.60) as declaring that Afghanistan's policy was one of neutrality and non-attachment to military blocs; Afghanistan, having herself struggled for a century against colonialism, was glad that many peoples of Asia and Africa were gaining their freedom, but "the Afghan people cannot remain indifferent to the fate of their brother Pushtuns", who were still continuing their struggle for freedom. The Prime Minister Muhammad Daud was quoted as expressing his gratitude for Soviet economic and technical aid. (SK. 26.8.60), in a report on the parade in Kabul, said that "for the first time this year the uncovered faces of Afghan women can be seen".

A two-year agreement on the sale of Soviet equipment to Afghanistan (P. 13.8.60), includes tractors, shop equipment, washing machines, radio equipment, cinema and photographic apparatus, refrigerators, bicycles and tyres, to a total value of $300,000. Afghanistan is to supply mainly fruit to the USSR under the agreement.

At a national industrial exhibition in Kabul various products of the Soviet foreign trade organizations AVTOEXPORT, MASHINOEXPORT and VOSTOKINTORG were on view. (P. 25.8.60)

P. of 28.8.60 reported without comment the signing on 26 August of the treaty of friendship and non-aggression between China and Afghanistan.

PAKISTAN

Pakistani violation of Afghan and Indian air space

A Tass dispatch from Kabul (P. 16.8.60) on a "violation of Afghan air space" by Pakistan, reported that the Afghan Minister of Defence had complained that two Pakistani aircraft had intruded into Afghanistan; they had been forced to make a landing at the Kandahar aerodrome, and the pilots were under examination. The Afghan Foreign Ministry had protested to the Pakistani Chargé d'Affaires.

TI. of 25.8.60 quoted an Indian press report alleging Pakistani violation of Indian air space. Quoting a correspondent of THE STATESMAN of Srinagar it said: "In the Legislative Council of the State of Jammu and Kashmir it was stated yesterday that in 1959 and the first seven months of 1960 there were 144 flights originating from Pakistan over Jammu and Kashmir. As a result of the flights 18 persons were killed. In addition, during the same period more than 100 bombs were exploded, killing nine persons. In the opinion of the State Government, all the explosions were organized by persons connected with Pakistan."

Soviet aid in oil and mineral production

Pakistan's acceptance of a Soviet offer of aid in prospecting for and extracting oil and minerals was publicized in the Soviet press. In 1958, in an exchange of views with the Pakistani Government, the Soviet Union had declared its readiness to offer aid in this direction. Recently the discussions were continued, and President Ayub Khan had been informed that the Soviet Union was ready to examine the question of providing credit for the setting up of Soviet equipment in Pakistan, the payment of the services of Soviet specialists and the training of local Pakistani technical personnel with the aim of conducting prospecting work. It was proposed to send a group of Soviet experts to Pakistan to study Pakistan's wishes and to determine the scope of the operations. Pakistan's agreement with the Soviet proposal was conveyed to the Soviet Government on 2 August. (P. 10.8.60)

P. of 14.8.60 said that the discussions had aroused great interest in Pakistani business circles and among the general public. Pakistani newspapers had noted that, in offering aid, the Soviet Union did not lay down any political conditions. IMROZ had noted that the Soviet proposals were directed to providing assistance for those sectors of Pakistan's economy which most needed it; Pakistan's present oil output supplied only one-sixth of the country's needs, and in 1959 Pakistan spent 70m. rupees on coal imports.

PV. of 10.9.60, said that the Soviet Union was offering Pakistan a loan at 2.5 per cent, whereas "the Western powers are demanding six or seven per cent".

The Indus waters agreement

IZ.(21.9.60) commented on the agreement reached between Pakistan and India on the distribution of the waters of the Indus basin. The agreement "solves still one more argument left to India and Pakistan as a vestige of Britain's colonial domination". The settlement was of huge significance for the agricultural development of the two countries. The paper noted that settlement of the Indian-Pakistani dispute was achieved through the good offices of the World Bank.

A Soviet journalist's impressions of Eastern Pakistan

KT. of 10.9.60 published an account by M. Metkin of a visit to Eastern Pakistan. A main theme of this was the contrast between the living standards of the privileged classes and those of the simple workers and peasants. In a description of Dacca University Metkin remarked on the high scale of fees demanded of students, including examination fees, which in 1958-9 accounted for almost 25 per cent of the revenue of the university. Another theme was the lack of development of local industry. Foreign capital, said Metkin, took no part in the development of the jute industry; the USA, Britain and Western Germany, being the largest consumers of Pakistan's raw jute, were interested in Pakistan remaining an exporter of the raw commodity, and did not wish it to be processed locally. At the largest jute factory, in Adamji, "the working day is 10 hours, and there is no system of ventilation". A pencil factory in Chittagong was not working at full capacity because of restrictions on imports of timber, which came from California; as a result, foreign currency had to be spent on imports of pencils. The population of Eastern Pakistan, said Metkin, was greatly interested "in the conditions of life and work in the Soviet Union, in the system of education, and in solving of the nationality question".

NEPAL

A parliamentary delegation from Nepal, headed by the chairman of the upper chamber of the Nepalese Parliament, Dumbar Bahadur Singh, arrived in Moscow on 23 September (IZ. 24.9.60), on the invitation of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. Bahadur Singh thanked his hosts for the invitation, and expressed his hope that their trip to the Soviet Union would strengthen the friendly and economic collaboration of both countries. Prior to their arrival, they stopped in Uzbekistan for a two-day visit.

PERSIA

Western reports of unrest in Persia were quoted in the Soviet press. P. of 22.7.60 published a report that 146 Persian officers had been arrested, including five brigadiers, 56 colonels and other senior officers. On 5 August the paper quoted an Italian correspondent's report that the Shah's fear of a revolution was such that he had in permanent readiness, "at a secret aerodrome", a squadron of aircraft laden with his personal belongings.

IZ. of 12.8.60 published under the heading "I do not want to serve the American lackeys", a statement by Persian army officer Rezazadeh Hasan Tagi ogli, of the First Training Regiment of the Persian Army, stationed in the town of Khorramabad, who had left Persia and sought political asylum in the Soviet Union. He declared that the subjection of the Persian Army to American control had become intolerable, and that the burden of militarization was creating unemployment, misery, starvation and disease among the population; "all in Persia regard the Americans and the Shah with loathing." Many patriotic officers had been executed, but the Shah and his "mercenary generals" could not suppress the fighting spirit of the young officers and patriotic soldiers.

Throughout August the Soviet press published reports on what it called the "election mockery" in Persia. It said that the police and gendarmerie were being used to intimidate voters; that voters were being handed ballot papers with the names of Government candidates already marked; and that the elections were being boycotted by voters on a large scale, and a flood of complaints was reaching the Shah and the Government. Prominence was given to reports of a clash between the police and opposition elements, in which 400 persons were said to have been injured.

Initial Soviet comment on the resignation of Eqbal's Government represented it as a blow to the Shah's regime. One comment (IZ. 31.8.60) said that Eqbal had been compelled to resign by the outcry over the scandalous conduct of the elections. "In accepting the resignation of his Prime Minister the Shah pretends that he is not responsible for the actions of the Government which have aroused widespread displeasure in the country. But, of course, nobody believes this. In reality the Shah is now dismissing a Prime Minister who organized fake elections precisely as his sovereign wished.

Persian press forecasts of a possible improvement in Persian-Soviet relations following Eqbal's resignation were quoted in Soviet newspapers. A Tass report from Tehran, published in IZ. and KZ. of

1.9.60, noted that certain Persian newspapers had expressed satisfaction at the fall of the Government: DAD and AJANG had expressed hopes of a less unpopular foreign policy and a settlement of differences between Persia and other countries, and KEYHAN had expressed the view that the improvement of Persian-Soviet relations was now almost a foregone conclusion.

BK. of 27.9.60 noted that at his press conference the Shah had emphasized "the most urgent problem of the Persian community, the problem of the improvement of Persian-Soviet relations. . ." He had said that "friendship with all countries, especially with our neighbours and the neighbour which has such an extended common frontier with us, is a component part of our general policy"; but he had implied that an improvement in relations depended mainly on the Soviet Union. Further, in saying that Persia would not accept any "threat" to her sovereignty as a price for the strengthening of good-neighbourly relations, he was trying to justify the former position of the Persian Government.

THE SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS OF KAZAKHSTAN, KIRGIZIA, TADZHIKISTAN, UZBEKISTAN, TURKMENISTAN AND AZERBAYDZHAN

100 0 100 200 300 km.

Chelyabinsk
Troitsk
Magnitogorsk
Kartaly
Kustanay
Tobol
Petropavlovsk
Omsk
Kokchetav
Shchuchinsk
Stepnyak
Makinsk
Barnaul
Kuibyshev
Mikhaylovka
Rubtsovsk
Pavlodar
Leninogorsk
Ust'-Kamenogorsk
Zyryanovsk
Semipalatinsk
Zaysan
Ayaguz
Akmolinsk
Atbasar
Yesil'
Ufa
Chkalov
Uralsk
Orsk
Aktyubinsk
Kandagach
Temir
Turgay
Irgiz
Chelkar
Dossor
Gur'yev
Stalingrad
Tikhoretsk
Astrakhan'
Stavropol'
Kizlyar
Fort Shevchenko
Grozny
Dzaudzhikau
Batumi
Tbilisi
Yerevan
Kirovobad
Khachmas
Baku
Makhachkala
Derbent
Lenkoran
Astara
Tabriz
Ardabil
Pahlavi
Rasht
Qazvin
Tehran
Semnan
Garmsar
Qum
Kermanshah
Hamadan
Temir-Tau
Karaganda
Karkaralinsk
Balkhash
Mointy
Dzhezdy
Baykonur
Dzhezkazgan
Aralsk
Kazalinsk
Dzhusaly
Kzyl-Orda
Chu
Taldy-Kurgan
Tekeli
Kul'dzha
Panfilov
Alma-Ata
Przheval'sk
Issyk
Kant
Frunze
Tokmak
Rybach'ye
Chulak-Tau
Dzhambul
Talass
Turkestan
Chimkent
Lenger
Arys'
Tashkent
Chirchik
Yangi-Yul
Namangan
Andizhan
Kokand
Fergana
Kok-Yangak
Dzhalal-Abad
Osh
Naryn
Uch Turfan
Aksu
Kucha
Kashgar
Yangihissar
Yarkend
Guma
Khotan
Ulugchat
Tashkurghan
Gilgit
Chitral
Peshawar
Jelalabad
Kabul
Kungrad
Chimbay
Nukus
Takhia-Tash
Khodzheyli
Tashauz
Urgench
Turtkul'
Khiva
Krasnovodsk
Nebit-Dag
Kazandzhik
Kyzyl-Arvat
Ashkhabad
Gonbad-e-Qabus
Bojnord
Shirvan
Quchan
Bandar Shah
Gorgan
Babol
Shahrud
Sabzavar
Nishapur
Mashhad
Torbat-e-Haydari
Kushka
Herat
Andkhui
Maimana
Shibarghan
Mazar-i-Sharif
Tashkurghan
Khanabad
Faizabad
Kerki
Bayram-Ali
Tedzhen
Mary
Iolotan'
Chardzhou
Karshi
Bukhara
Kagan
Kattakurgan
Samarkand
Penzhikent
Gizhduvan
Dzhizak
Mirzachul'
Leninabad
Ura-Tyube
Isfara
Shakhrisyabz
Regar
Stalinabad
Kulyab
Kurgan-Tyube
Nizhni Pyandzh
Denau
Termez
Khorog
Murgab
Wakhan
Garm
Navabad
Borders of the U.S.S.R.
Limits of Union Republics.
Capitals of Union Republics.
Railways.
Canals.
Canals under construction or projected.
Sands.
Main arterial road with pass.

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THE TURKIC LANGUAGES OF CENTRAL ASIA: Problems of Planned Culture Contact. A translation of an article entitled "The Turkic Peoples of the USSR: the Development of their Languages and Writing" by Professor N.A. Baskakov, with comments by Dr. Stefan Wurm. 66pp. large post quarto. Revised (1960) edition. Price: Twelve Shillings and Sixpence.

TURKIC PEOPLES OF THE USSR: Their historical background, their languages and the development of Soviet linguistic policy, by Dr. Stefan Wurm. 51 pp. large post quarto. Price: Ten Shillings.

SOME FEATURES OF THE MORPHOLOGY OF THE OIROT (GORNO-ALTAI) LANGUAGE by C.G. Simpson, Reader in Turkish at the University of Durham. 68 pp. large post quarto. Price: Seven Shillings and Sixpence.

A concise description of the main features of the noun, pronoun, postposition and verb of the Oirot language spoken in the Gorno-Altai Autonomous Oblast of the USSR.

ISLAM AND RUSSIA: A detailed analysis of "An Outline of the History of Islamic Studies in the USSR" by N.A. Smirnov (Moscow 1954), with an introduction by Ann K.S. Lambton, Professor of Persian in the University of London. Bibliography. 87 pp. large post quarto. Price: Twelve Shillings and Sixpence.

THE TURKISH LANGUAGE OF SOVIET AZERBAIJAN by C.G. Simpson, Reader in Turkish at the University of Durham. 120 pp. large post quarto. Price: Twenty Shillings.

A summary of the grammar of the current literary language of Soviet Azerbaijan together with passages of contemporary literature and extracts from the press.

TURKESTAN IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY: A Brief History of the Khanates of Bukhara, Kokand and Khiva, by Mary Holdsworth. 81 pp. large post quarto. Map. Price: Fifteen Shillings.

Based largely on Russian sources, both Tsarist and Soviet, this monograph describes the state of the Khanates before, during and after the coming of the Russians.

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE TURKMEN LANGUAGE: A brief summary of the grammar of the Turkmen language with selected extracts in prose and verse by G.K. Dulling. 47 pp. large post quarto. Price: Fifteen Shillings.

RUSSIAN WORKS ON AFGHANISTAN. 12 pp. large post quarto. Price: Five Shillings.

A bibliography compiled for the most part from bibliographies and references found in Russian publications in the course of the Centre's study on Afghanistan (CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW, Vol. IV, No. 2). It does not claim to be exhaustive, but is believed to be the only one of its kind in existence.

RECENT SOVIET SOURCE MATERIAL ON SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA AND ITS BORDERLANDS (including the Middle East): Issued as a biannual supplement to CENTRAL ASIAN REVIEW. Approx. 60 pp. large post quarto. Price: Seven Shillings and Sixpence.

This bibliography is limited to certain specific periodicals, about 50 in number, and to new books. Highly technical source material is not included.

MAP OF SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA & KAZAKHSTAN: In the form of four folded Sheets in booklet cover with Introduction, Gazetteer and Glossary. Price complete: Forty-two Shillings post free.

The Map is based on a Russian map on scale 1: 5M in the ATLAS MIRA of 1954. It has been brought up to date (1958) as far as possible. Scale: 1: 3,750,000. It is printed in six colours; heights, depths and contour values are given in metres.

THE MIZAN NEWSLETTER: A monthly review of Soviet writing on the Middle East (first issue January 1959), comprising articles on Soviet opinion about Middle East affairs, relations between the USSR and Middle East countries, and Soviet newspapers' presentation of Middle East developments. From July 1960 the scope of the Newsletter has been extended to include Soviet writing on Africa. Subscription rate: Four Pounds per year, post free; single copies: Seven Shillings and Sixpence.



The above map shows the area covered by *Central Asian Review* in relation to the rest of th
The total area of the six Muslim republics is 1½ million square miles, that is, about 23.5 per cent of t
area of Soviet Asia.

The total population of the Muslim Republics is 26,676,000 (1959 Census) or about 41.7 per cen
total population of Soviet Asia now estimated at about 64 million. The figure of 26, 676,000 includes 1
Muslims, 7,923,000 Russian, Ukrainian and Belo-russian settlers and a number of smaller non-Muslim
communities such as Armenians, Koreans, Dungans and Jews amounting to a total of 832,000.

The total indigenous population of Soviet Asia is estimated at 25 million. Thus, whilst the six
republics together occupy only one-fifth of the total area of the region, their indigenous (i.e. Asian) po
amounts to about 66.5 per cent of the indigenous population of the whole of Soviet Asia.

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